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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A History of the Development of Charter School Legislation in Utah 
 
 
by 
 
 
Marlies Burns, Doctor of Education 
 
Utah State University, 2012 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Sylvia Read 
Department: Education 
 The Utah Legislature enacted charter school legislation in 1998 in order to offer 
the state’s first school-choice option. The legislation came following a task force 
discussion about the pros and cons of school choice and what school choice should look 
like in Utah. There was not agreement among task force constituents about what should 
be contained in the legislation, nor which entity should be responsible for the monitoring 
or oversight of the eight pilot charter schools. 
Since enactment, Utah charter school legislation has changed during most 
legislative sessions with some establishing stronger charter school laws and some 
establishing weaker ones. Strong charter school laws are designed to provide for the 
establishment of high-quality charter schools. In contrast, weak charter school laws 
would not provide for the establishment (or accountability) of high-quality charter 
schools. Despite the legislative changes, 81 charter schools are now in operation, serving 
nearly 44,900 students and seven more charter schools are in queue to open in fall 2012. 
iv 
 
Literature, interviewees, and the researcher all offered recommendations to strengthen the 
charter school environment in Utah that focused around topics such as flexibility from 
laws, changes in school funding, strengthening the authorizer environment, and working 
to create legitimate school choice options for all students. 
(187 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
 
A History of the Development of Charter School Legislation in Utah 
 
 
by 
 
 
Marlies Burns, Doctor of Education 
 
Utah State University, 2012 
 
 
School choice is a continual hot topic of discussion among educators and the 
public alike. Utah, the 34th state to join the charter school movement, was a late comer to 
the game in 1998. This dissertation explores the history of the development of Utah’s 
charter school legislation. Marlies Burns, researcher, identified events both in Utah and 
outside Utah that led to the introduction of charter school legislation, including divisions 
occurred among stakeholders concerning legislation. 
 
In 1998, the legislature discussed and passed Utah’s Charter School Act. Prior to 
passage, the legislature considered several proposals and modified the bill language 
significantly. Since 1998, charter school laws have been changed every year to strengthen 
the law. Strong charter school laws are designed to provide for the establishment of high-
quality charter schools. Despite the legislative changes, 81 charter schools are now in 
operation, serving nearly 44,900 students and seven more charter schools are in queue to 
open in fall 2012.  
 
The conclusion offers recommendations to strengthen the charter school 
environment in Utah on topics such as flexibility from laws, changes in school funding, 
strengthening the authorizer environment, and working to create legitimate school choice 
options for all students. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
History of the Development of Charter School Legislation in Utah 
 
 
The development of formal education in the United States differed from that of 
other Western societies in that ours had confidence in education as a principal means to 
achieve individual and social goals, provided more years of schooling for a larger 
percentage of children, and implemented mass schooling through a largely decentralized 
organization (Conley, 2003). American education, unlike the nationally directed and 
financed educational systems of other countries, became mainly the responsibility of the 
state and local governments; the word education does not even appear in the United 
States Constitution. 
Educational reformers in the early 19th century, such as Horace Mann, became 
increasingly troubled by the absence of any system in American public schools (Graves, 
1912). Mann advocated for systematic elementary education, arguing that, “A nation 
cannot long remain ignorant and free. No political structure, however artfully devised, 
can inherently guarantee the rights and liberties of citizens, for freedom can be secure 
only as knowledge is widely distributed among the populace” (Taba, 1962, p. 12). 
Repeatedly, reformers contended that elementary education should be available and free 
to all, financed by public funds, and accountable to state governments. By the end of the 
century, reformers achieved their goal. Beginning with Massachusetts (1852) and New 
York (1853), all states passed compulsory school attendance laws by 1918 (Katz, 1976). 
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Public education became fundamentally a state responsibility, because the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution reserved to the states all powers not 
specifically delegated to the national government. Although final authority for public 
education resided with the state governments, the dominant tradition in the United States 
was one of decentralized administration. The most significant unit of educational 
authority was the local school district, the boundaries of which usually coincided with 
those of a county or town. Therefore, schools were designed to reflect the educational 
values and financial capacities of the communities in which they were located (Powe, 
1993). 
Since the start of public education in the United States, educators and policy 
makers have struggled to find the one best system for organizing schools and educating 
children. Early 20th-century reformers believed that centralized districts and schools 
would offer educational services more efficiently than would small, scattered, or 
disorganized schools (Tyack, 1974). The result was unified districts, larger schools, and 
increased distance between those setting policies and those carrying them out (Brown, 
Henig, Lacireno-Paquet, & Holyoke, 2004). Critics argued these well-meaning reforms 
brought about numerous, unintended negative consequences, such as districts laden with 
layers of bureaucracy, individual schools with countless rules and regulations, a structure 
that empowered administrators far removed from the classroom, and constraints on the 
empowerment of those who were in close contact with students, families, and 
communities (Brown et al., 2004; Elmore & McLaughlin, 1983; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 
1997). 
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The public, when dissatisfied with the state of education, has demanded more 
effective classroom instruction and higher student achievement from schools. In 
response, educators, civic leaders, and policy makers have often turned outside the field 
of education for new governance and management models to enhance organizational 
capacity (Wohlstetter, Malloy, Smith, & Hentschke, 2004). A Nation at Risk (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), published while Ronald Reagan was in 
the White House, sounded an alarm regarding the status of public education and opened 
the door for “competition” through the application of business principles. Two decades 
later, the No Child Left Behind initiative created new policies that intended to provide 
schools and educators with incentives to innovate. Although researchers correctly 
disputed the actual need for such alarm (Berliner & Biddle, 1996), states adopted 
legislation that allowed for school choice, including charter schools, and at an 
unprecedented rate (Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005). 
Two historically significant moments demarcated the shift toward the creation of 
charter schools and the legislation upon which they were based (Renzulli & Roscigno, 
2005). The first was the use of the term “charter” by Ray Budde, a University of 
Massachusetts education professor and education reformer, who, in a conference paper 
presented in 1974 and later published in 1988, called for school districts to create new 
kinds of schools by granting a charter to teachers to explore new pedagogical, curricular, 
and assessment approaches (Budde, 1989). In Budde’s (1996) system of education, no 
one would stand between the school board and the teachers when it came to matters in 
instruction, including the superintendent or principal. Educational reformers initially 
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resisted the idea and instead proposed and implemented other, less politically loaded, 
school-choice programs, such as distinctive, alternative, and magnet schools (Renzulli & 
Roscigno, 2005). It was the late Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT), who embraced the charter idea 14 years after the initial suggestion, as an 
innovative and effective education reform movement at the individual teacher level and 
put charter schools on the national policy agenda with a speech at the national Press Club 
and a subsequent editorial on the topic (Shanker, 1988). Shanker explained charter 
schools created the opportunity for trying new approaches as a permanent feature of each 
and every school. He said this did not mean giving every teacher and administrator a 
license to “do their own thing” without supervision or accountability. It did mean, 
however, giving every teacher and administrator the opportunity to analyze policies and 
practices, to abandon practices that didn’t work, and to create a structure that more 
closely reflected what teachers knew about how students engaged in the learning process 
(Shanker, 1988). His strategy was to promote teacher professionalism as a reaction to 
what he saw as a looming gauntlet of state assessment and accountability that would 
force teachers to “march in lockstep.” 
The second historical development was a legislative initiative in Minnesota that 
eventually led to the passage of the first charter school law. Minnesota policy 
entrepreneurs, such as State Senator, Ember Reichgott-Junge, nonpartisan policy analyst, 
Ted Kolderie, education reformer, Joe Nathan, and others, developed a charter strategy 
that allowed multiple organizations to enter into a charter agreement, permitted converted 
schools to be public and non-sectarian, and provided accountability for student 
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achievement. In addition, this strategy waived many state rules and regulations, allowed 
for schools of choice to be discreet entities, provided comparable per pupil allocation of 
state funds, and allowed movement of teachers between district schools and the newly-
created charter schools (Nathan & Power, 1996). Policy entrepreneurs (political actors 
who make major investments of political capital in a specific issue in the expectation that 
the issue can be used to political advantage) from other states also became involved. By 
persuading state political leaders to adopt charter schools, policy entrepreneurs in 
Minnesota changed the landscape of contemporary education reform and opened the 
gateway for charter school laws across the nation (Wong & Langevin, 2005). 
As charter schools spread across the nation, an opposing coalition and policy 
issue network formed to restrict further charter expansion and impose more state and 
local regulations (Kirst, 2007). These pro and con advocacy networks engaged in major 
policy disputes and minor skirmishes across the United States (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1999). It is noteworthy, however, that, in many cases, coalitions of charter school 
advocates overcame both internal divisions and powerful opponents to achieve significant 
policy changes. The resulting conflicts between charter school advocates and opponents 
produced intrinsically important changes to American public education that affected how 
educators operated and governed public schools and other institutions. Equally important, 
these conflicts were complex and fascinating cases that were used to improve the 
understanding of policy change, which will be discussed in Chapter II.   
Created under an innovative and complex approach to public governance that 
must be authorized by state law, charter schools have been extensively debated in state 
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legislatures all over the country (Hess, 2002). The positions of various interests and the 
arguments they used generally followed similar patterns, but the specifics of the debates 
and the policy proposals varied from state to state. The laws themselves addressed several 
aspects of how chartering takes place, who can get or grant a charter, and what a school 
can or must do once it is chartered, among many other details.  
According to some, charter schools were the latest incarnation in a series of 
efforts to create new or distinctive types of schools within American public education, 
including the alternative school movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the magnet school 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s (Nathan & Power, 1996). Others viewed charter 
schools as a key element in the educational marketplace that both enhanced competition 
and created new opportunities for children (O’Leary & Beales, 1994). Some viewed 
charter schools as the natural evolution of the education reform process, linked with 
efforts towards decentralization and school restructuring (Hart & Burr, 1996), while 
others lambasted false charter schools that carried the name but were really just minor 
variations on the theme of site-based management (Vanourek, Manno, Finn, & Bierlein, 
1997). These visions reflected different ideas about what charter schools were like in 
regards to instructional programs, teacher requirements, and business operations, and 
how they affected the system of public education. Supporters believed charter schools 
offered school choice to families with the support of public funding without 
micromanagement by government bureaucracies (Manno, Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek, 
1998b). Opponents argued that charter schools weakened the public schools and were not 
likely to benefit students educationally, because they competed for limited resources and 
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were often exempted from traditional public education requirements, such as teacher 
licensure (Richards, Shore, & Sawicky, 1996). 
 All these dimensions, shaped by intense debates, yielded an array of divergent 
charter school laws. Although charter school laws varied considerably from state to state, 
the basic premise of charter schools was that, in exchange for considerable flexibility in 
operation and design of curriculum, pedagogy, and other aspects of running a school, the 
school agreed formally to certain standards of accountability through a written contract 
with an authorizing authority. Unlike voucher programs, but similar to magnet schools, 
charter schools were public schools, supported by public monies. Depending on the state, 
private schools might hold charters, and most states allowed public schools to convert to 
charter status. At present, religious private schools cannot become charter schools. 
Charter schools were allowed flexibility in how they complied with a variety of 
regulations and rules that affected traditional public schools in exchange for increased 
accountability for results. Their increased autonomy included relief from collective 
bargaining contracts, in most cases, and provided the charter schools with control over its 
staffing, budget, curriculum, and pedagogy. The charter schools remained accountable for 
compliance with health, safety, and civil rights laws, for oversight of the use of public 
finances, and for academic results on state assessments. Legally independent of their 
authorizers, charter schools were administered under the direction of their board of 
directors, and, according to Wolfe (2000), the primary oversight responsibility for a 
charter school rested with the charter school’s board of directors. If a charter school 
violated its charter, chartering entities reported the violation to the school’s board of 
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directors for resolution. The chartering entity was also obligated to report certain 
violations of laws and regulations to the governmental entity responsible for 
administering and enforcing a particular law or rule (Wolfe, 2000). 
Charter schools in many states were schools of choice that received funding based 
on the number of students they served (Wohlstetter, Wenning, & Briggs, 1995). 
Additionally, charter schools gained autonomy, because parents and students selected 
them and they, thus, did not have to be “one-size-fits-all” institutions. The charter school 
could not pick and choose students, charge tuition or fees that would not be allowed in a 
traditional public school, or be affiliated with a church or operate as a religious 
institution. If the school did not comply with remaining rules and regulations, if too few 
students enrolled to create a viable budget, or if results were not as good as promised, the 
entity that granted the charter closed the school. 
This study explored the history of the development and implementation of charter 
school legislation in Utah, including a review of Utah’s political environment during the 
initial charter school legislation discussion, and will add to the growing pool of state 
legislative histories. To better understand the purpose for the introduction of charter 
school legislation in Utah, the effects of charter school legislation on the creation of 
charter schools, and the effects of changes to charter school legislation on the operation 
of Utah’s 81 existing charter schools, I analyzed historical documents and interviewed 
several individuals involved in Utah’s charter school movement between 1998 and 2011. 
This research might assist states seeking to write new legislation or assist Utah to modify 
existing legislation with new ideas that better support its charter school movement. 
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Purposes and Objectives 
 
 
By understanding the evolution of Utah charter school legislation and the 
expectations of legislators adopting this legislation is important, those involved in policy 
decisions can help modify existing laws, policies, and practices to support the legislative 
intent. Because Utah is rarely studied or mentioned in charter school literature, due in 
part to its small population and relative late entry to the movement, there is little data 
available regarding the relative situation of the state compared to others or the impact of 
the legislature’s initiatives over the span of the program. Adding Utah’s charter school 
legislative history to the growing body of charter school research may increase the 
public’s awareness of the charter school movement, as well as create awareness of the 
unique circumstances faced by the state. 
Since Utah charter school legislation adoption in 1998, it has gone through a 
series of changes as evidenced in the history of the Utah Code. Brian R. Allen, former 
Chair of the State Charter School Board and the legislator who sponsored the original 
charter school legislation in Utah, has stated on many occasions that the way the law is 
written and interpreted now is not how he intended it (personal communication, 
September 20, 2009). In his opinion, the law was written to help charter schools be an 
innovative means of education while providing them with the support and resources 
needed to accomplish that goal. However, other legislators have expressed that they 
passed the legislation in expectation that charter schools would accomplish higher 
accountability, using less state funding (R. Bigelow, personal communication, August 20, 
2008). 
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To better identify, understand, and describe the legislative and educational 
environment in Utah during the discussion and passage of charter school legislation, I 
developed the following research questions. 
1. What event(s), either internal or external to the state of Utah, led to the 
introduction of charter school legislation? 
2. What division(s) occurred among stakeholders concerning legislation? 
3. What proposals were introduced to the legislature? What changes did 
proposed charter school legislation undergo before members of the Utah Legislature 
approved the final legislation for passage and implementation? 
4. What event(s) affected the legislature in its decisions? 
5. Between 1998 and 2011, what changes to Utah’s charter school legislation 
have occurred? 
6. What led the legislature to remove the cap on the number of charter schools? 
What led the legislature to create the State Charter School Board? What led the 
legislature to modify charter school funding? What led the legislature to change charter 
school governance? 
 
Theoretical Lenses and Positionality 
 
As a researcher, I bring both personal and professional theoretical lenses to my 
study. By explicitly describing those lenses and the experiences that made them up (a) I 
was more aware of my theoretical lenses in order to have kept them in check, (b) readers 
of my research knew what assumptions and experiences I brought to the research, and, (c) 
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particular experiences that made up my theoretical lenses were used as a tool to make the 
research richer and more rigorous. Below is a description of the theoretical lens that I 
believed was salient to this research and then a description of how I utilized it in this 
study.   
Charter schools are vehicles for both justice and oppression. The same charter 
school law can provide for multiple scenarios. For example, the Ute Indian Tribe applied 
for a charter to serve tribal students and increase Utah’s American Indian graduation rate. 
There are, however, Utah charter schools that have located in demographically 
homogenous neighborhoods and have chosen not to spend significant time or funds to 
seek diverse populations. Charter laws are not monolithic in design, however, and some 
charter laws are more aligned to meeting the needs of under-represented students than are 
others. The AFT came up with some criteria for judging the merits of various charter 
school laws. 
“Good” charter legislation includes features that allow for experimentation, while 
at the same time ensuring quality schooling within a system that protects the 
public interest and the integrity of public education. “Bad” legislation encourages 
charter schools to become the basis of an alternative school system created for a 
few, but operating at the expense of many. “Good” charter legislation ensures 
public accountability for student achievement, guarantees the accessibility of all 
students to charter schools, empowers the professional educators in those schools, 
requires local school district approval of charter schools, and requires charter 
schools to conduct their business and issue reports in accordance with public 
“sunshine laws.” (AFT, 1998, p. 1) 
 
Henig (1999) argued that school choice can be shaped toward progressive ends, stating 
that “when public officials have committed themselves to the task, they have proven they 
can design and implement magnet schools and controlled-choice programs that serve the 
neediest neighborhoods and facilitate integration.” Such progressive aims require firm 
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regulations and aggressive enforcement, however, and may be politically vulnerable in 
these times. 
But as states pursue charter laws that serve under-represented students, 
legislatures must not neglect the traditional public school model, either. Charter and other 
choice options have sometimes been sought as a way to replace the traditional public 
school, but I do not advocate charters as a means toward the abandonment of the 
traditional school model. Charters are a specialized remedy to the injustices that the 
traditional school model seemingly cannot fix, offering needed, immediate solutions to 
the problems of under-represented students. Charters are not a magic bullet for all of 
public education’s ills, nor should the pursuit of charter reform be an excuse to neglect 
further those public schools that are not “choice” schools. 
My lens looks at whether or not Utah charter school legislation has supported the 
creation of charter schools that are accountable to the students it serves. Through the 
research process, it became clear that the actors in this history created their own realities 
shaped by the state’s cultural, political, religious, and economic values over time. For 
example, although legislators thought they had created charter schools that would use 
different and innovative teaching methods to improve student learning (and report the 
findings to the greater educational community), looking at the data it is apparent that 
there are limited models of charter schools and most are located in suburban 
neighborhoods serving white students. 
From a national view, seven of ten charter schools have a student racial/ethnic 
composition that was similar to its surrounding district (U.S. Department of Education, 
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1999). However, some studies of charter schooling are also identifying class-based 
segregation, finding that the poor remain behind in traditional public schools when school 
choice programs are introduced (Levin, 1999). A recent report analyzing school 
enrollment patterns in 2007-2008 suggested charter schools were more racially isolated 
than traditional public schools, leading opponents to assert that charter schools have not 
met the promise to foster integration and equality in American education (Frankenberg, 
Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2011) 
According to Van Dunk and Dickman (2002), it appeared that parents who had 
attained a higher level of education were more likely to have chosen to have their 
children access educational choices beyond their designated neighborhood school. In 
Fuller and Elmore’s (1996) 3-year Harvard study of choice programs around the United 
States, the authors concluded that when parents were more involved with their children, 
they participated in choice more frequently. 
Parents in higher social classes are also more likely to select the school for their 
children, as evidenced by interview data Diamond and Gomez (2004) analyzed of 
middle-class and working-class African American parents. Holme (2002) likewise 
concluded that parental status heavily influenced school choice. Not surprisingly, 
wealthier parents had the means to send their children to schools of their choice with 
more frequency (Fowler, 2002; Levin, 1997; Payne, 1993). Finally, parents connected 
with community networks are more likely to choose to have their children take advantage 
of educational choices beyond local schools (Howe, 2002; Smrekar & Goldring, 1999). 
Howe concluded that school choice practices tend to “favor parents with savvy, time, and 
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resources” (p. 22). 
For some families, participating in school choice was a matter of running from a 
low performing school. For others, the pull of a better school was the primary motivation 
(Howe, 2002; Smrekar & Goldring, 1999; Wronkovich, Robinson, & Hess, 1998). Most 
decisions were likely based on a combination of both push and pull forces. Other studies 
(Cooper, 2005; Neild, 2005) have tried to discern specific parental motivations such as 
school reputations, physically and emotionally safe environments, challenging academic 
programs, unique curricular emphasis, athletics or other extracurricular programs, 
convenience, distance, and the availability of transportation. However, low-income 
parents were seldom asked what kind of schools they would seek, so their perspectives or 
expectations were not readily available (Holme, 2002). 
Choices were typically made based on available or known information. Quality 
information is needed to increase the likelihood of making appropriate choices, and free-
market theories assume that this information was readily available and accessible. Stigler 
(1961) analyzed this economics of information and noted how reputation greatly impacts 
the purchasing decisions of consumers. 
I am an advocate of school choice, for all students, but with a critical eye towards 
accountability to its partners—students, parents, chartering entity, and state.  I maintain 
that charter school legislation should free charter schools from most bureaucratic 
processes governing public education that are not essential to providing a high-quality 
education for students (e.g., following an orderly termination act compared to at-will 
employment, flexibility to seek and appoint governing board members with specific skills 
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needed by the school, curriculum selection outside of the state’s approved book list, 
opportunity to pilot alternative assessments and be exempt from some or all state 
mandated assessments, freedom from being required to follow district policies, etc.) and 
in return for the freedom, charter schools should be more accountable for school 
performance. Since they are freed from red tape, student achievement should exceed 
minimum standards, as well as make annual progress, more money should be put into the 
classroom, teachers should be able to function as professional educators, developing 
innovative methods of instruction and applying them in the classroom, and charter 
schools should meet the purpose for which they were chartered. This lens was important 
to the research in that it helped determine whether or not school accountability was a 
legitimate impetus for Utah’s charter school legislation. 
When freed from bureaucratic processes, I believe school change at the individual 
school level will occur more readily and frequently than system wide because it involves 
fewer people in decision making and implementation. Wohlstetter, Smyer, and Mohrman 
(1994) contend that site-based management is an innovation that has its roots in the 
private sector, which encourages self-management and empowers the employees, leading 
to improved morale and higher productivity. Site-based management theory was 
transferred from the corporate world to the realm of public education, giving schools 
authority over budget, personnel, and curriculum. Site-based management operates under 
decentralization, the development of internal human resources, and the wide participation 
of school members in the decision-making process, which closely accompanies the tenets 
of critical theory. 
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Researchers contend, however, that even when changes are implemented at the 
school level, schools frequently encounter problems after adoption and terminate a short 
time later, often within the first two years, without achieving full implementation 
(Anyon, 1997; Fullan, 1991; Lipman, 1997; Louis & Miles, 1990; Muncey & McQuillan, 
1993). Explanations of failure include: incorrect assumptions about the behavior of 
students and teachers by policy makers; planning deficiencies; implementation 
difficulties; the culture of the school resisting reform; ideological contradictions that 
create destructive conflict; and a variety of social, financial, and political obstacles. When 
educational innovation is studied over a long time, however, short-term implementation 
failure emerges as central to the process of change and as a critical element in a 
comprehensive explanation of educational change (Sarason, 1996). This school-change 
lens was considered in the following ways: first, to determine whether or not innovation 
was an impetus for Utah’s charter school legislation and, second, to determine if Utah 
charter schools have changed the public education landscape over the past 10 years. 
Because I believe that charter schools are tied to political, social, and ethical 
questions, school accountability becomes more of a challenge to define. Several models 
of accountability have been promoted as the best model to measure charter school 
performance including the free market or consumer model, professional accountability 
model, standards-based performance accountability, and bureaucratic accountability 
(Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). I contend that a combination of the models would be the 
best measure of charter school accountability, in addition to a political model, and, in 
Chapter IV, I provide a suggested model for Utah charter school accountability. 
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I came to this study deeply involved in issues of school choice.  This gave me 
many insights and advantages in carrying of this research but also required that I 
carefully consider how my role and position is implicated in how I carried out the 
research.  I began my career in education as a teacher in a magnet school, a school-choice 
option operated and managed by a school district. After teaching, I was a school 
administrator for one year in a traditional district system, but quickly moved to be a 
school administrator at an independent charter school. I chose to work in an independent 
charter school because site-based management and increased school accountability 
mattered to me. Following a few years as a charter school administrator, I took a position 
with a state department of education where I first worked as a grant writer and a year 
later was appointed as a manager of charter schools.  As the head of the organization that 
(a) provided oversight and monitoring of school performance to state authorized charter 
schools, (b) worked with legislators to strengthen charter school legislation, and (c) 
ultimately answered to the a state level school board, I recognized that I had a unique 
viewpoint regarding the legislative and educational environment surrounding Utah’s 
initial charter school legislation, the strength of Utah’s charter school legislation, and the 
state of Utah’s charter school accountability. Due to my position, I also had privileged 
access to legislators, charter school leaders, state level data, and state data analyses.  
Given my employment history and position, I took care to carefully consider multiple 
viewpoints regarding charter schools.   
Because I intended my research to explore why there was charter school 
legislation in Utah and the political and educational climate at that time, I (a) identified 
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and interviewed several individuals who had privileged information, having been 
involved with the initial discussions surrounding charter school legislation, (b) coded the 
interviews to ensure consistent coding across multiple interviews, and (c) reviewed 
multiple printed publications widely circulated in the state that identified the public’s 
perception of the charter school discussion. 
 
Procedures 
 
Historical research generates descriptions, and sometimes attempted explanations, 
of conditions, situations, and events that have occurred in the past. This method 
comprises the techniques and guidelines by which historians use primary sources and 
other evidence to research and them to write histories in the form of accounts of the past 
(Howell & Prevenier, 2001). It is noted that historical research can illuminate current 
problems and act as a tempering influence (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011). There is 
a need for historical research to produce a faithful record of events. There is need also for 
historical research aimed at suggesting, through a study of previous events, 
generalizations for guiding behavior. Three essential processes in using historical 
methodology are (a) data collection from documentary primary and secondary sources (b) 
criticism of data through assessing the genuineness of information sources, and (c) the 
presentation of information in accurate and readable form (Cohen et al., 2011; 
McDowell, 2002). 
This study was based on a nonemergent qualitative research design with two 
steps, namely, standardized, open-ended interviews, and document analysis, because 
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these methods best align with the prescribed steps used in historical research 
methodology. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) defined a nonemergent, predetermined 
research design as study in which the focus of inquiry is pursued using qualitative 
methods of data collection and data analysis, but the data is completely collected first and 
analyzed afterwards.  
In standardized, open-ended interviews, the same open-ended questions were 
asked of all interviewees. This approach facilitated faster interviews that were more 
easily analyzed and compared. The qualitative research interview seeks to describe and 
understand the meaning of what the interviewees say (Kvale, 1996). In other words, it is a 
method of learning about a topic by finding out what others feel and think about the 
topic. The purpose of interviewing is to generate insights and concepts, expand 
understanding, search for exceptions to any perceived rule by charting extreme cases, and 
document historical idiosyncratic cases. The result is to understand the major points of 
the interviewees’ message and how it compares to our own situation (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005). Standardized, open-ended interviews were conducted with a former member of the 
Utah legislature and other individuals deemed to be uniquely knowledgeable about 
charter school legislative development, such as lobbyists, charter school founders, 
Centennial Charter School task force members, state administrators, and local 
administrators. The findings were not generalizable for all state legislation, but they 
pertained to the context that limited my study.  
Oral history, a type of historical research, follows the same general steps as 
historical research. McCulloch and Richardson (2000) contend that oral history based on 
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interviews has become increasingly popular over the last decade. They assert oral history 
offers a different view from the documentary sources’ top-down view of the history of 
education, allowing the memories and relationships in education to be considered as part 
of the history. Though oral history, occasionally, has been criticized for its interviewing 
techniques, research standards for preparation, and questions of historical methodology 
(Champion, 2008; Frisch, 1989; Lamont, 1998; Perks & Thompson, 1998; Thompson, 
2000), I will lessen these concerns of oral history technique by using an already existent 
body of knowledge concerning interviewing and questioning techniques and, 
triangulation of data. 
Criticisms of historical research interviewing techniques include that interviewees 
are often asked about events years after they happened, people tell a story in a way that 
reflects well on them, and they have a tendency to telescope events together (Partington, 
2010). All of these criticisms equally apply to biographies, autobiographies, newspapers, 
and most other forms of evidence relied upon by historians. However, the main criticisms 
of histories are the reliability of memory and the societal factors that influence and 
manipulate perceived memory. Further, because oral histories are inherently unique to 
each individual, their generalizability and power to understand wider social developments 
are also questioned (Batty, 2009). Hobsbawn (1997) questioned how far the recollection 
of one person can be generalized and suggested that one person is not representative 
beyond him or herself. 
Additionally, document analysis was used to analyze all legislative documents 
pertaining to charter school legislation, including minutes from meetings, draft 
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legislation, and enrolled legislation from Utah’s 1998 General Session through the 2011 
General Session. Enrolled legislation is an exact, accurate, and official copy of a passed 
Senate or House bill. This copy is sent to the governor for executive action. Interviews 
and document analyses provided a comprehensive history of the evolution and 
implementation of charter school legislation in Utah. 
All sources of data were analyzed for the establishment of authenticity (external 
criticism), and accuracy (internal criticism). To reduce the chance of bias, I employed 
both positive and negative criticism. Positive criticism is a strategy for internal criticism 
and it refers to making sure that the researcher understands the meaning conveyed in the 
source. Negative criticism refers to establishing the reliability or authenticity and 
accuracy of the content of documents and other sources of information. To determine if 
the content in the document or source was accurate, I used the following three heuristics 
(a) corroboration—comparing documents to each other to see if they provide the same 
information and lead to the same conclusions, (b) sourcing—identifying the author, date 
of creation, place of creation, or other information that identifies the source, and (c) 
contextualization—identifying when and where the event took place and the context in 
which it took place.  
In addition, triangulation was used. Some see triangulation as a method for 
corroborating findings and as a test for validity. This, however, is controversial. This 
assumes that a weakness in one method will be compensated for by another method, and 
that it is always possible to make sense between differing accounts, but, this is unlikely. 
Rather than seeing triangulation as a method for validation or verification, qualitative 
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researchers, generally, use this technique to ensure that an account is rich, robust, 
comprehensive, and well-developed. 
Denzin (1978) and Patton (1999) identified four types of triangulation. 
1. Methods triangulation, or checking out the consistency of findings generated 
by different data collection methods; 
2. Triangulation of sources, or examining the consistency of different data 
sources from within the same method, such as comparing people with different 
viewpoints; 
3. Analyst triangulation, or using multiple analysts to review findings or using 
multiple observers and analysts; and 
4. Theory/perspective triangulation, or using multiple theoretical perspectives to 
examine and interpret the data. 
To conduct this research project, I completed the following tasks: (a) devised a 
sampling procedure; (b) validated interview questions and identified interviewees; (c) 
developed a structured interview protocol using approved open-ended questions; (d) 
scheduled and conduct face-to-face interviews; (e) collected and analyzed minutes, 
proposed legislation, and enrolled legislation from 1997 to 2011; and (f) transcribed 
interviews and analyzed data. These tasks allowed me to determine if the content in the 
source was accurate. 
The interviews were called “elite interviews” because of the technique of 
interviewing small populations of elite or influential people, which in this case included 
legislators, state level educational leaders, and charter school founders. In elite 
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interviewing, a small number of interviewees are acceptable because it is assumed that 
their knowledge and insights are privileged and unique. As mentioned previously, the 
recollections of one person are not representative beyond anyone other than himself or 
herself (Hobsbawn, 1997). However, the purpose of oral history is to tell a person’s story, 
and the rationale is the need to uncover stories from the past so that we can preserve more 
than a bureaucratic account of a person’s life (Janesick, 2007). 
By concentrating on fewer interviewees, I can acquire an understanding of a 
particular phenomenon that is available to only “insiders” and not commonly known. By 
limiting the interview process to those individuals who were closest to the charter school 
legislative process in Utah, it will be possible to better focus on their perceptions to form 
a coherent network of themes or issues without introducing “noise” in the form of 
hearsay or anecdotal commentary into the data record. Further, in elite interviewing, it 
may be assumed that individuals vary in their proximity to the phenomenon studied and, 
thus, are not equally or similarly knowledgeable in every aspect (Dexter, 1970). 
For this study, individuals deemed uniquely knowledgeable and involved with 
writing charter school legislation were interviewed in depth. Collective oral history finds 
many individual stories surround a particular theme or stories in which all people share a 
particular experience (Janesick, 2007). Many oral historians prefer to interview a 
participant more than one time and as needed in order to get a more detailed and richer 
picture. This type of interview relies on what Rubin and Rubin (2005) call hearing the 
data or qualitative interviewing. 
As is consistent with qualitative interviewing techniques, purposeful sampling 
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coupled with some degree of snowball sampling was used to identify possible 
respondents and select those who were interviewed to reach a targeted sample quickly 
(Trochim, 2006). In research, “sample sizes in qualitative studies can range from one to 
as many as the researcher needs” (Padgett, 1998). To increase maximum variation, only 
those individuals who had different positions and expert knowledge from the primary 
interviewees were considered.  
 
Interview Questions and Identifying  
Interviewees 
Prior to scheduling interviews, interview questions were designed and 
interviewees identified. Once the primary interviewees were identified, I developed an 
interview protocol. The initial protocol included initial contact via email to introduce the 
interviewer, explain the purpose of the research project, discuss the confidentiality of the 
interview, request the interviewee’s participation in the project, secure permission to take 
the interview, and confirm the interview date, time, and location. 
I submitted interview questions to the interviewees to ensure that they had the 
information to provide answers to the questions in advance of our meeting. In addition, 
this ensured everyone received the questions in a consistent way, the questions 
communicated what the interviewees were supposed to describe, and that the questions 
were not so sensitive as to get only socially acceptable answers. Initial interviewees were 
selected based on their level and type of participation in the development of Utah’s 
charter school legislation and initial charter schools. 
 Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the seven interviewees. During the 
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interviews, 11 preselected, open-ended questions were asked. Open-ended questions did 
not give interviewees answers to choose from but rather are phrased so the interviewees 
are encouraged to explain their answers and reactions to the question. The value of open-
ended questions is they allow interviewees to include more information, such as feelings, 
attitudes, and understanding of the subject (Salant & Dillman, 1994). 
 Open-ended questions included the following. 
1. How would you describe your vision to improve education in Utah? 
2. In your role as a parent, educator, or legislator, what experiences have you had 
with any school choice options? 
3. How would you describe your involvement in the development of charter 
school legislation in Utah? 
4. What were the main influences or driving forces that supported charter school 
legislation being adopted in Utah? 
5. What influences can you identify in opposition to the adoption of charter 
school legislation in Utah? What debates occurred on the legislative floor, in Centennial 
Charter School task force meetings, in caucus meetings, or in private meetings? 
6. What impact, if any, do you believe charter schools in Utah will have on 
public schools? 
7. What were your expectations for charter school legislation? 
8. In your opinion, how could the current Utah charter school legislation change 
to meet your expectations? 
9. In your work with the charter school legislation, did you use or rely on models 
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from other states? If not, where did you receive your knowledge on charter schools? 
10. If you were doing this study, whom would you recommend I speak with about 
the development of Utah charter school legislation? 
11. Is there anything else I have not asked you, you would like to say about 
charter schools? 
When interviews are used in a qualitative study, it is essential to let the voice of 
the interviewees speak by not asserting my own views during data analysis and 
interpretation (Patton, 2002). However, it is important to determine how much 
inconsistency is present among the interviewees in both their recollection of factually 
verifiable data and their individual perceptions of the processes (Watson, 2006). To assist 
in detecting misinformation in this study, clarifying questions were asked during each 
interview to further reconcile, if necessary, perceptions provided by the interviewees. 
I employed several methods in this study to establish the trustworthiness and 
credibility of the data obtained, including, specifically, looking for nonexamples, using 
triangulation, and member checking, a process by which the transcript is provided to 
interviewees to amend or to supplement their remarks or content prior to conducting the 
final analysis (Creswell, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). The interviews included 
standardized, open-ended questions, which were audio taped to provide primary data 
(Hannay, 2002) and later transcribed. Peters (1994) also postulated that “there is 
something about thoughts expressed spontaneously in conversation that is different from 
the more carefully chosen words put in writing.” 
The seven tape recorded and transcribed interviews ranged in length from 0.5 to 
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1.5 hours, with an average length of 0.75 hours. The analysis of the interview data 
entailed coding of the responses according to the primary topics the Centennial Charter 
School Task Force (1997) was tasked to discuss: (a) establishment of charter schools 
within public education, administered and staffed by public employees; (b) funding of the 
charter schools through weighted pupil units so that no tuition would be charged; (c) 
creation of charter schools to provide alternative education; (d) need for strong parental 
involvement at the schools; and (e) performance standards for the schools. Analysis also 
included the identification of key patterns and anomalies in the responses. 
 
Document Analysis 
The second form of data collection included the review of various public state and 
national documents. The documents were catalogued chronologically into three-ring 
binders to assist in the analysis and to serve as part of the audit trail used to document the 
procedures of the study. Each document was reviewed for type, purpose, and significance 
to determine if it was central or crucial to a particular activity, event, or individual in the 
study. Documents collected for review included: (a) codified legislation; (b) letters, 
memoranda, and other communications; (c) agendas, announcements, meeting minutes, 
and other written reports; (d) administrative documents; and (e) newspaper clippings and 
articles (Yin, 1994).  
Once all data was collected, it was analyzed using content analysis. Using this 
method, I systematically worked through each transcript assigning codes to specific 
characteristics within the text. I did not use a predetermined list of categories, but rather 
let the categories emerge from the data. Coding is an interpretive technique that both 
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organizes the data and provides a means to introduce the interpretations of it into certain 
quantitative methods. Most coding requires the analyst to read the data and demarcate 
segments within it. Each segment is labeled with a “code” (usually a word or short 
phrase) that suggests how the associated data segments inform the research objectives. 
Some qualitative data that is highly structured, such as open-end responses from 
interview questions, is typically coded without additional segmenting of the content. In 
these cases, codes are often applied as a layer on top of the data. 
A frequent criticism of coding method is that it seeks to transform qualitative data 
into quantitative data, thereby draining the data of its variety, richness, and individual 
character. Analysts respond to this criticism by thoroughly expositing their definitions of 
codes and linking those codes soundly to the underlying data, therein bringing back some 
of the richness that might be absent from a mere list of codes. Coding and analysis of 
these interviews revealed the following potential themes (a) legislative history, (b) 
interested party discussions, (c) funding, (d) parental involvement, (e) reasons for choice, 
and (f) challenges for charter schools. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews literature on the national charter school movement, states’ 
charter school legislation, the expansion of charter school policy, evaluation of charter 
school legislation, changes in charter school legislation since inception, and describes the 
public education landscape in Utah. 
 
Charter School Movement 
 
Since the early 1960s, as a part of the Great Society reforms initiated under 
presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the federal government became involved in the funding 
and management of education (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Continuing the federal 
involvement, in the last eighteen years, Presidents Obama, Bush, and Clinton and 
Congress have placed charter schools in a prominent position in federal education reform 
efforts. Specifically, they have granted millions of dollars to charter schools nationwide, 
and the Race to the Top Fund, President Obama’s major education reform, has special 
provisions for charter schools (Krueger & Ziebarth, 2002; U.S. Department of Education, 
2009).  
A federal public charter schools program, passed into law by President Clinton as 
part of the 1994 amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, helped 
support charter schools in the states where they were legally allowed. The law authorized 
funds for charter school development and for a national study to assess the impact of 
charter schools. The federal legislation that gave momentum to the charter school 
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movement, however, was the Charter School Expansion Act of 1998, also signed into law 
by President Clinton. The purpose of the Act was to “improve and expand charter 
schools” (Charter School Expansion Act, 1998). The Act articulates the nation’s efforts to 
provide parents and students with better schools, more choice, and higher levels of 
accountability in public education.  
From a political perspective, the charter school concept is a response to political 
pressure for increased site-based control of education policy setting, implementation, and 
accountability (McGree & Mutchler, 1998). From an educational perspective, the concept 
draws upon an array of values with familiar themes in school reform since the early 
1980s, including state mandates to improve instruction, school-based management, 
school restructuring, and private/public-choice initiatives. Multiple researchers note the 
frequency with which reform advocates, policymakers, and analysts endorse expectation 
of educational innovations has been notably consistent over time and is overwhelming (J. 
Allen, 2001; Anthes & Ziebarth, 2001; Bierlein & Mulholland, 1994; Brandl, 1998; 
Education Commission of the States and the National Conference of State Legislature, 
1998; Finn & Manno, 1998; Flake, 1999; Halpern & Culbertson, 1994; Hassel, 1999b; 
Hill, 1996; Kolderie, 1990, 1994; Lane, 1999; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Manno, 
Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek, 1998a; Manno et al., 1998b; Nathan, 1996a, 1996b; Nathan 
& Power, 1996; National Governors’ Association, 1986; Rofes, 1996; Vanourek et al., 
1997). The charter school model attempted to merge these often competing values, such 
as balancing autonomy with accountability, teacher professionalism with parental choice, 
and private-sector principles with public-sector values. 
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Still, choice in education is one of the most significant and hotly contested public 
policies, with efforts such as charter schools garnering substantial media and policy 
attention and often reflecting and defining the broader political debates in the United 
States (DeBray-Pelot, Lubienski, & Scott, 2007). Many reformers argue against the “one-
size-fits-all” model for education and believe that market-style mechanisms of consumer 
choice and competition between autonomous schools will encourage diverse and 
innovative approaches for increasing achievement (Finn & Gau, 1998; Nathan, 1996a). 
Evaluations of charter school programs, however, found negligible to moderate impact on 
achievement (Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2009; Hoxby, 2002, 2004; 
Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006; Nelson, Rosenberg, & Van Meter, 2004). Other predicted 
outcomes from choice, such as greater innovations in teaching and learning, are also 
somewhat less impactful than originally anticipated (Lubienski, 2003). 
Despite these findings, efforts to free schools from burdensome bureaucratic 
regulations continued. These efforts are intended to undercut monopolistic political 
control of public education and end the “exclusive franchise” long enjoyed by districts, 
giving educators in charter schools the opportunity and motivation to experiment with 
new instructional strategies (J. Allen, 2001; Hill et al., 1997; Kolderie, 1990).  
 
States’ Charter School Legislation 
 
The charter school movement renewed momentum in, or otherwise altered, a 
variety of education reforms, including school choice, deregulation, student-based 
funding, accountability, school leadership and teacher professionalism, and whole school 
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reform. Some groups in public education looked at the charter movement and saw a 
threat to long-established mechanisms of funding, governing, staffing, managing, and 
building and maintaining support for public schools. Regardless, a broad group of 
educators has pursued this opportunity. Charter schools have been created by parents, 
educators, school leaders, community-based groups, advocates for special populations, 
and whole new sectors of for-profit and not-for-profit education providers. They have 
redefined what public schools are and can do. They have allowed reformers to create the 
types of schools that they imagine can succeed (Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000; Nathan 
1996a) and are contributing to new ways of thinking about the definition of a public 
school (Hess, 2004; Lubienski, 2004; Tyack & Cuban, 1995; Vergari, 2002). 
Virtually every description of these schools either asserted or assumed that charter 
schools were “public” schools that operated free from some or most of the regulations 
that applied to traditional public schools (Kolderie, 1990; Manno et al.,  1998a; Peterson, 
1997; Rofes, 1998; Vergari, 2007). Diverse coalitions supported charter school 
legislation, including conservatives, moderates, and liberals who advocated for increased 
school level control “united in their rejection of what they consider to be a stifling 
bureaucracy-heavy system of public education embracing conformity over innovation” 
(Brown et al., 2004). Since 1991, charter school laws have been adopted across the 
United States despite strong opposition. Many charter opponents believe charter schools 
threaten current education practices that are crucial to fostering equity and providing 
necessary and quality services to children. Alternately, charter advocates argue that what 
charter schools really threaten is an unacceptable status quo that fails far too many 
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American children, as well as the interests of the adults defending current practices and 
the associated outcomes. As a result, broad and powerful conflicts have erupted almost 
everywhere the charter concept has been proposed, debated, and implemented (Medler, 
2008). 
The conflicts have involved all levels of our government, from three presidents, to 
policymakers in state capitals, to mayors or school board members interacting with local 
communities. Indeed, politically powerful teachers’ unions have worked to prevent the 
charter school reform from achieving legitimacy (AFT, 1998; National Education 
Association [NEA], 2006). The charter school laws in place, however, demonstrated that 
the power of an idea sometimes prevails over the power of established political interests 
(Derthick & Quirk, 1985; Kingdon, 1995). These differing state reactions reflect political 
culture, or “the set of acts, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a 
political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern 
behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political issues and the operating 
norms” (Pye, 1968, p. 218).  
The policy process of market-based education reform has been analyzed using 
multiple theories, such as the advocacy coalition framework developed by Sabatier 
(1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), the punctuated equilibrium model 
developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2002), and the policy streams model 
developed by Kingdon (1995; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).  
The advocacy coalition framework focused largely on periods of policy stability. 
An advocacy coalition consists of people from a variety of positions, including elected 
34 
 
and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, and so forth, who share a 
particular belief system and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over 
time (Sabatier, 1988). Coalitions aim to have their shared beliefs translated into public 
policies. They operate within a policy subsystem that includes a broad range of interested 
parties concerned with a particular policy area, such as public education. Participants in 
the subsystem include interest groups, administrative agencies, legislative committees, 
journalists, analysts, researchers, others who generate, disseminate, and evaluate policy 
ideas, and interested parties in government who are active in the policy formation and 
policy implementation processes (Sabatier, 1988). Within the advocacy coalition 
framework, significant policy change stems from events outside the policy subsystem.  
In the punctuated equilibrium model developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 
2002), a policy monopoly creates stable policy outcomes that endure over long periods. A 
policy monopoly is supported by particular ideas and institutions. The ideas constrain 
how issues are understood and discussed by policy makers, and institutional structures 
limit who can participate in policy debates. Outsiders are discredited as being 
“uninformed, irresponsible, or dangerous” and, thus, not qualified to engage in decision 
making for the policy area (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002, pp. 12-13). Indeed, “Policy 
monopolies are often supported by the acceptance of a positive image and the rejection of 
possible competing images” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 26). This equilibrium is 
punctuated by periods of major policy change. When new understandings of problems 
take hold and new interests are mobilized, the policy monopoly’s ideas may lose support 
and break down. In public education, school districts are the monopoly and have looked 
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virtually the same for the past 100 years. 
According to Kingdon’s (1995) model of the policymaking process, policy 
changes emerge when three streams—problem definition, policy response, and political 
process—come together to create a “window of opportunity.” Changes in local and state 
leadership, a fiscal crisis, a massive program failure, or creeping incrementalism may 
help trigger an opportunity.  The tipping point, or whether or not an opportunity translates 
into policy change, requires political leadership or a policy entrepreneur. The policy 
entrepreneur manages the policy network by anchoring the new agenda to a well-defined 
set of problems and solutions (Smrekar, 2011). For any given issue area, once a precedent 
is set and a new principle is established in law, public policy in that area is significantly 
altered. Because future policies are based on the new principle, people become accepting 
of new practices, “and it becomes as difficult to reverse the new direction as it was to 
change the old” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 191). As noted by Kingdon, when an old coalition 
that was blocking a reform is defeated, “life is never quite the same” (p. 191) because the 
coalition can no longer be viewed as invincible or as the dominant interested party in the 
policy area.  
 Table 1 provides a summary of the policy process of market-based education 
reform theories discussed above. 
Many politicians and policy makers operated under the assumption that free 
market forces would naturally encourage good school choices (Chubb & Moe, 1990; 
Friedman & Friedman, 1980). The realities of school choice, however, are more complex 
and bear closer scrutiny (Cohen-Vogel, 2003; Ridenour, Lasley, & Bainbridge, 2001).  
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Table 1 
Summary of the Policy Process of Market-Based Education Reform Theories 
Advocacy coalition framework Punctuated equilibrium model Policy streams model 
Periods of policy stability Policy monopoly Policy change 
Variety of participants that 
share a belief system 
Ideas and institutions that 
constrain discussions 
New ideas drive policy changes 
Operate in policy subsystem Relies on insiders Starts new momentum 
Policy change comes from 
outside events 
Monopoly breaks down when 
new ideas take hold 
Coalitions are no longer viewed 
as invincible 
 
 
For example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 supported this free-market approach 
and allows students in low-performing schools to transfer to other schools. However, as 
reported by the U.S. Secretary of Education, only “about 1 percent of students eligible to 
transfer out of a low-performing school actually exercise their right to do so under the 
federal law” (Hoff , 2006, p. 28). 
Additionally, Marshall and her colleagues asserted that, within a state’s political 
culture, there is an assumptive world involving “the understandings of the rules among 
those who participate in state education policy-making” (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 
1989, p. 10). This assumptive world includes issues (e.g., which people have the right to 
participate in policy discussions, what are legitimate policy goals, and what problem-
definitions and alternatives are not available for consideration). The multiple streams 
literature suggests the specific timing of a decision, particularly in respect to what other 
activities are going on at the same time, also has important implications for the decision 
that is, or is not, made.  
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A significant aspect of that timing is who is involved in a particular policy 
discussion. Clearly, not everyone has access to elite policy discussions. The political 
culture plays a role in determining who does, or does not, have access to the policy 
discourse surrounding charter schools (Mintrom, 1997, 2000). People with access vary in 
how much attention they give to a particular policy issue and what resources they choose 
to expend on that issue. Those policy issues supported by people with access, attention, 
and resources are expected by interested parties to be weighed more heavily than policy 
issues supported by less influential people. 
Policy entrepreneurs are highly influential actors in motivating state governments 
to lead the nation in education reform during the first phase of policy innovation 
(Mintrom, 2000). Mintrom amd Vergari (1998) viewed policy entrepreneurs as 
interested, primarily, in selling ideas designed to bring about dynamic policy change. 
Unlike interest group lobbyists, who, typically, are not considered agents for dynamic 
policy change, policy entrepreneurs are not content simply to push for changes at the 
margins of current policy settings. Rather, they seek to radically change current ways of 
doing things. In thinking about selling their policy ideas, policy entrepreneurs must also 
take into account the interests of others. The better able they are to persuade a winning 
coalition of people that the idea has merit, the more likely they are to see the policy 
innovation adopted. This is not an easy task. North (1990) argued that many political 
institutions, such as state legislatures, may function smoothly and yet produce policy 
settings that, when judged in terms of achievement of the intended outcomes, are highly 
unsatisfactory. 
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Charter School Policy Expansion 
 
Despite what some may view as highly unsatisfactory state charter school 
policies, charter school policy expansion began with only one state in 1991 but now 
includes 41 states and the District of Columbia. Many policy entrepreneurs and 
traditional service delivery groups propose different interpretations about the present 
condition of school choice, as well as contradictory explanations of the reasons for policy 
expansion (Wong & Langevin, 2007). Several accounts have suggested that both 
Democrats and Republicans support charter schools (Pipho, 1991; Teske & Schneider, 
2001). On the one hand, republicans who support the concept of school choice sometimes 
support charter schools because they perceive that a voucher plan will not pass in their 
state (Cookson, 1994). In this case, charter schools offer parents public dollars to 
facilitate their own decisions about schooling (Teske & Schneider, 2001). On the other 
hand, Democrats may see charter schools as a way of leveling the playing field by giving 
school choice to all students while avoiding radical market options, such as vouchers 
(Cookson, 1994).  
Not surprisingly, political partisanship did not seem to lead to better-quality 
charter schools, although which party controls state government may affect their 
numbers. There is some evidence that the number of Republicans in a state legislature 
positively influences the number of charter schools by a small but significant measure, 
and the presence of a Republican governor does so substantially (Hassel, 1999a; Mead & 
Rotherham, 2007). In general, however, partisan disputes complicate efforts to improve 
charter quality and negatively impact the availability of funding and support for charter 
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schools (Shober, Manna, & Witte, 2006).  
Furthermore, the charter school issue was highly politicized in some states yet 
largely consensual in others (Hassel, 1999a). One explanation was that charter advocates 
in diverse states understand the concept to mean different things and seek different goals 
in passing charter legislation, based on a range of assumptions about what motivates 
educational reform. While this explanation seems plausible, with a few important 
exceptions (Hassel, 1999a; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Wohlstetter et al., 1995), analysts 
who have addressed differences among state charter school laws have not probed beyond 
the specific components of the laws (Buechler, 1996; Mulholland, 1996). A number of 
works on public policy has advocated the need to examine the goals, rationales, and 
assumptions that lead to the passage of a particular law in order to better understand the 
creation of the law and its implementation (Hill & Celio, 1998; Schneider & Ingram, 
1993). 
The majority of recent studies have examined state legislative responses to 
national government influence in several policy domains where federal statutes dominate 
the state regulatory environment and frequently supplant the power of local political 
interests (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004; Balla, 2001). Bulkley (2005) claimed it 
is through the national discourse on education, or particular pieces of it, that state 
policymakers learn of new ideas. Other reform ideas under discussion nationally, at a 
particular time, may also influence the political construction of a new idea and set the 
stage for the policy discourse within states, helping to shape the types of problems and 
alternatives that policy maker’s debate. National discussions can influence state policy 
40 
 
discussions in a variety of ways, as state policy makers read pieces by national 
organizations or influential educational thinkers, attend conferences about reform ideas, 
or talk informally with colleagues in other states. 
Bulkley (2005) found that in Arizona, Michigan, and Georgia policymakers 
gathered information about charter schools and other reforms from a variety of external 
sources. While the most common source of data was the actual laws adopted by other 
states, there were also partisan national organizations that provided information. While 
policymakers maintained that they had made the charter idea their own, they still strived 
to connect their law to the national charter movement, and the state variations reflect the 
lack of unity among charter advocates at the national level. National discussions about 
more general education reform also provided policy arguments for state-level 
construction of charter schools, but which aspects of this national discourse policymakers 
attended to most varied based on specific state contexts (Bulkley, 2005). 
Mintrom and Vergari (1998) asserted individuals in each state could be identified 
as successful policy entrepreneurs and played a more important role than anticipated in 
the conceptual framework of charter school legislation. Each individual supported a 
particular construction of charter schools, was able to influence the actions of important 
policymakers, and obtained, at least, some of what the individual sought in the content of 
the bill. Absent these individual advocates, it is unclear whether charter legislation would 
have been passed in these states. When necessary, they made compromises to make the 
idea more politically viable (Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998). After witnessing 
policy entrepreneurs successfully persuade the first state to adopt a new policy measure, 
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neighboring states and regional leaders considered passing the same legislative bill in 
their home state (Gray, 1973). Political leaders often look to neighboring states, states 
with the same population, and states with the same economic makeup for policy ideas 
because of the high opportunity costs of comparing the strengths and weaknesses of all 
policy alternatives (Walker, 1969). 
Political scientists studying state politics have frequently noted how states appear 
to borrow policy ideas from one another. The significant policy autonomy that states 
enjoy permits ongoing experimentation with approaches to addressing policy decisions. 
Thus, the states have often been described as “laboratories of democracy” (Osborne, 
2000) and “policy laboratories” (Gray, 2008). However, while states may act 
autonomously, they do not act in isolation from one another. Should they desire, it is 
relatively easy for state policymakers to observe the experiments of their counterparts and 
consider the advantages and disadvantages that such approaches might hold for their own 
states (Mintrom & Vergari, 1997). 
Renzulli and Roscigno’s (2005) research on charter school policy, 
implementation, and diffusion across the United States used event-history analyses, 
competing risks, and random-effects negative binomial regression, to examine how 
interstate dynamics and intrastate attributes affect the adoption of legislation on and the 
creation of charter schools within states. The findings revealed a strong mimetic tendency 
among adjacent states to adopt charter school legislation and regional similarities in the 
creation of charter schools. The adoption of state-level policy, for example, may be 
shaped by both internal attributes of states, such as interest groups and voting 
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constituencies, and inter-state processes, in which states look to their neighbors for 
legislative blueprints and legitimacy in the adoption process (Renzulli & Roscigno, 
2005). Once policy is adopted, however, it is likely that intrastate political structures, the 
presence of formal organizations and social movements, and demographic features will 
influence educational policy as they do other social policies to various degrees (Meyer, 
Ramirez, & Soysal, 1992). 
Consistent with the argument Renzulli and Roscigno (2005) made is the core 
finding in diffusion research that spatially proximate players influence one another by 
increasing their mutual awareness of an innovation (Strang & Soule, 1998). By virtue of 
their proximity, these players are likely to “infect” one another with new ideas. Relating 
this point to charter schools, one would expect that sharing a border with a state or states 
that have already adopted charter school legislation will increase the likelihood that a 
state will adopt such legislation itself. 
 
Strong Versus Weak Charter School Legislation 
 
Several reviews attempted to identify the reasons that state legislators have 
supported charter school legislation, as well as identify which legislation is strong versus 
weak. For the purpose of this dissertation, strong charter school law means legislation 
that meets the 20 essential components identified by the National Alliance of Public 
Charter Schools and “fosters a development of numerous, genuinely independent charter 
schools,” and a weak law is “one that provides few opportunities or incentives for charter 
school development” (Center of Education Reform, 2001; Ziebarth, O’Neil, & Lin, 
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2010). Nathan (1998) surveyed 50 legislators and policy leaders in several states trying to 
identify why they proposed charter school legislation. The major reasons legislators cited 
were to help students who had not succeeded in existing schools, to expand the range of 
schools available, to increase student achievement, to provide an opportunity for 
educational entrepreneurs, and to pressure the existing system to improve. Legislators 
also felt charter school legislation could be strengthened by (a) giving charter school 
students the same per pupil allocation as district school students; (b) permitting more than 
one chartering entity to create charter agreements; (c) eliminating the cap on the number 
of charter schools; (d) giving charter schools a great deal of independence; and (e) 
providing some start-up funds. 
In addition to other reasons, Marshall and colleagues (1989) examined the 
influence of cultural values on policy making in six states, using survey, case study, and 
statistical methodologies. The authors identified four common values in policy formation. 
These values were quality, equity, efficiency, and choice. Marshall and colleagues 
identified seven policy mechanisms available to policy makers. These were school 
finance, personnel training and certification, student assessment, school program 
definition, school organization and governance, curriculum materials, and school 
facilities. 
In the Marshall and colleagues (1989) study, policy makers ranked the values 
according to their relative importance, placing them in the following order: (a) quality, 
(b) efficiency, (c) equity, and (d) choice. The researchers found that asking the policy 
makers to rank these values did not mean that they rejected others. “When forced to 
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choose, however, respondents gave clear priority to quality, efficiency and equity values” 
(p. 94), though the authors found receding support for educational equity as evidenced by 
no legislative requirement to provide transportation, thus effectively eliminating school 
choice for parents who cannot afford to transport their child to school, and minimal 
expenditures on special education. This seminal study grounded the competing-values 
approach in empirical study. There are related values and policy instruments, especially 
when one considers school choice policies, meriting examination as well. Researchers of 
charter school reform have teased out these values. Garn (2000) applied the competing-
values framework to a study of Arizona charter schools, finding emphasis on choice 
above all other values. Others have proposed criteria for charter schools that emphasize 
equity and access (Good & Braden, 2000). Finally, some researchers examined the 
tension between autonomy, innovation, and accountability (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). 
Levin (1999) argued that school choice initiatives, like charter schools, reflect the 
importance placed on different values or goals. Often, these goals can complete or 
contradict one another, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, he 
imagines the possibility of balancing the goals in the formation of school choice 
initiatives. Specifically, Levin proposes that four major concerns inform school choice 
policies: freedom to choose, productive efficiency, equity, and social cohesion. In 
addition, as policy makers craft legislation and policies aimed at achieving these goals, 
Levin suggests they use available policy tools such as finance, regulation, and support 
services to shape the initiatives. 
Although the major reasons for proposing charter school legislation were similar, 
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the specifics varied by state, with greater flexibility, freedom from regulations, and ease 
of entry defining “strong laws,” according to advocates. These are qualities that shape the 
scope, adequacy, quality, innovativeness, and educational value of charter schools 
(Bierlein, 1997; Center for Education Reform, 2011; Molnar, 1996; Vanourek et al., 
1997; Viteritti, 1999). For example, Michigan legislators passed laws intended to 
encourage the creation of large numbers of charter schools, hoping that large numbers 
would create competition with traditional public schools. In Georgia, on the other hand, 
policymakers were uninterested in competition and sought methods to deregulate and 
decentralize education after a period of increasing centralization. Charter schools were 
one method to move toward these goals (Vergari, 2002). 
State charter school laws have addressed a wide variety of issues, such as who can 
apply to start a charter school, what entities can authorize a charter school, and how 
charter schools are funded. In addition, other important areas of state law include what 
rules are waived for charter schools, whether charter teachers must be certified, and how 
charter schools are held accountable. Some states maintain a regulatory hold on charter 
schools by limiting the agencies that have the authority to grant a charter, restricting the 
types of organizations that can receive a charter, capping the number of charter schools or 
number of students who can attend, and constraining school autonomy in decision 
making, such as requiring charter schools to hire certified teachers or requiring charter 
schools to administer all state standardized tests (Lubienski, 2004). Others provide a 
legislative environment that fosters the development of numerous, genuinely independent 
charter schools (Center for Education Reform, 2011). 
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Most charter laws invite at least some people from outside the existing public 
school system to submit applications. These commonly include individual citizens, 
informal groups, and nonprofit organizations (Hassel, 1998). State charter laws also 
determine which public bodies have the power to issue charters, and the central issue is 
the role local school boards play in the process. In some states, local school boards have 
the power by law to veto any charter school proposed in their jurisdictions. In other 
states, other entities, such as the state board of education, can approve charter schools, 
even if the local school board does not agree. Still other states remain in between, 
requiring applicants to approach their local school boards first but allowing rejected 
applicants to appeal local decisions to the state board of education. A third way in which 
state legislation affects the selection process is by the placement of limits on the number 
of charter schools that may open. Some of these provisions cap the number of charter 
schools statewide. Others limit the number within a single school district or region of the 
state. Some are absolute caps, limiting the number of schools that may be open at any one 
time, while others are annual limits, restricting the number of schools that may open in a 
given year. A fourth important aspect of state charter laws is the criteria for obtaining a 
charter. With these provisions, legislators indicate the factors chartering entities must use 
when deciding whether to grant a charter to a specific applicant. Some laws state these 
criteria explicitly, while others imply criteria by specifying the information applicants 
must provide to chartering entities as part of their petitions. 
As followers of the charter school movement have come to realize, not all charter 
school laws are created equally (Bierlein & Mulholland, 1995; Millot, 1995). Some state 
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laws have spawned dozens of self-governing schools that are operated by a variety of 
organizations and individuals, free from most regulations, and legally and financially 
autonomous. In other states, years have come and gone since the initial passage of the 
legislation without a single charter school having been established, so limited are the 
incentives for charter schools and so burdensome is the process of becoming one. Strong 
charter school laws are designed to provide for the establishment of high-quality charter 
schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2004). In contrast, weak charter school laws 
would not provide for the establishment (or accountability) of high-quality charter 
schools. Bierlein (1996) found that in the six states with the strongest laws, there were 
222 charter schools operating, compared to 14 operating in the six states with the weakest 
laws. 
To assist states in passing a strong charter school law, several groups and 
individuals have proposed components that should be included. The Morrison Institute 
for Public Policy at Arizona State University created a list in the early 1990s. These 
criteria focused on legal components that best supported the creation of autonomous 
public charter schools, such as the number of schools allowed, multiple chartering 
authorities, automatic waivers from laws and regulations, and legal and operational 
autonomy. Vergari (1999) identified nine components: organization, sponsorship, legal 
status, regulations, accountability, admissions, funding, teachers, and number.  
Most recently, however, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 
(NAPCS) identified the 20 essential components of a strong public charter school law: (a) 
no caps on the number of charter schools; (b) variety of public charter schools allowed; 
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(c) multiple authorizers available; (d) authorizer and overall program accountability 
system required; (e) adequate authorizer funding; (f) transparent charter application, 
review, and decision-making processes; (g) performance-based charter contracts 
required; (h) comprehensive public charter school monitoring and data collection 
processes; (i) clear process for renewal, nonrenewal, and revocation decisions; (j) 
educational service providers allowed; (k) fiscally and legally autonomous schools with 
independent public charter school boards; (l) clear student recruitment, enrollment, and 
lottery procedures; (m) automatic exemptions from many state laws; (n) automatic 
collective bargaining exemption; (o) multi-school charter contracts allowed; (p) extra-
curricular and interscholastic activities eligibility and access; (q) clear identification of 
special education responsibilities; (r) equitable operational funding and equal access to all 
state and federal categorical funding; (s) equitable access to capital funding and facilities; 
and (t) access to relevant employee retirement systems (Ziebarth et al., 2010). It is my 
contention this evaluation tool is the most comprehensive. As such, I use this tool as my 
source of “quality” judgments. 
The NAPCS and Center for Education Reform (CER), as well as other groups and 
individuals, used these types of standards, with minor revisions, to issue specific grades 
or ranks for each state against a set of criteria. The CER, an independent, national, non-
profit advocacy organization providing support and guidance to individuals nationwide 
who are working to bring fundamental reforms to their schools, conducted a 5-year study 
that evaluated charter school laws in all states where legislation had been passed as of 
November 2001 (Center for Education Reform, 2001). The laws were not only judged on 
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content but on effect as well. The CER defined a strong law as one that “fosters a 
development of numerous, genuinely independent charter schools,” and a weak law as 
“one that provides few opportunities or incentives for charter school development.” The 
study looked at 32 major components of each state’s law, and these components were 
then factored into nine major categories that defined the law’s strength: (a) strong laws 
place no limits on the number of charter schools allowed; (b) strong laws allow multiple 
charter granting agencies; (c) strong laws allow diverse eligibility in charter applicants; 
(d) strong laws allow new, start-up charter schools; (e) strong laws allow schools to start 
without evidence of local support; (f) strong laws grant automatic waivers from state and 
district laws; (g) strong laws provide legal, fiscal, and operational autonomy; (h) strong 
laws guarantee full per-pupil funding; and (i) strong laws provide exemptions from 
collective bargaining agreements or school district work rules. The state laws are scored 
in each area, on a scale of one through five. States with a total score of 40-50 receive “A” 
grades, states with scores of 30-39 receive “B” grades; “A” and “B” states have strong 
laws. Because the ranking is based upon the perspective of those who value choice over 
other public policy goals, the CER ranking represents a particular political point of view 
(Center for Education Reform, 2011; Scott & Barber, 2002). 
Since 1996, the CER released an annual state-by-state report card, grading each 
state’s charter school legislation on a scale of “strong” to “weak.” These ratings have 
been influential. Each year when the grades are released, newspapers publish stories 
identifying their home state law as strong or weak. As an example, Education Week’s 
“quality counts” has uncritically incorporated CER’s charter law grades into its own state 
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rankings (Orlofsky & Olson, 2001). It should be noted that evaluation criteria are not 
value free (House & Howe, 1999). Rather, these criteria can arise from such sources as a 
client’s request, the evaluator’s own values, or a desire to make the evaluation useful 
(Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1994). In addition to the 
CER’s approach, at least six other approaches have been proposed as alternatives for 
gauging the value and success of charter school laws (AFT, 1998; Buechler, 1996; Miron, 
2005; Scott & Barber, 2002; Witte, Shober, & Manna, 2003; Ziebarth et al., 2010). 
The evaluation approach advocated by the AFT penalizes in its ranking system 
charter school legislation that tends to create an alternative school system serving a few, 
select students; it praises charter school legislation that serves a broader public interest 
and facilitates improvement of the public education system (AFT, 1998). Miron (2005) 
argues that charter school laws should have key features that lead to anticipated 
outcomes. The seven key features he identifies are (a) rigor of approval process, (b) rigor 
of oversight, (c) provision of technical assistance, (d) extent of education management 
organization involvement, (e) financial support, (f) rate of growth, and (g) bipartisan 
support. Scott and Barber (2002) claimed that charter school laws should be analyzed 
based on choice, productive efficiency, equity, and social cohesion, defined as “the extent 
to which the public school systems promote common educational experiences to diverse 
populations of students” (p. 30). Buechler (1996) argued a charter school law will be 
strong to the extent that it (a) permits a large or unlimited number of schools to form, (b) 
permits a variety of operators to start schools, (c) permits a variety of sponsors, (d) 
permits existing schools to convert and new schools to start, (e) establishes an appeals 
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process for denied charters, (f) provides a blanket waiver from education laws and 
regulations, (g) gives the school complete control over personnel decisions, and (h) 
defines the school as a legally and financially autonomous entity, among other criteria. 
Witte and colleagues (2003) proposed yet another list of features in sought-after charter 
school legislation, including (a) applications and authorization, (b) financial support, (c) 
governance, (d) employees, (e) students, (f) performance accountability, and (g) public 
accountability.  
It does not appear that there exists universal agreement on the reasons that charter 
school legislation was written, nor what defines weak and strong state legislation. 
Together, these different approaches highlight the arbitrariness of any given ranking 
system (Chi & Welner, 2008). Table 2 compares select components of strong charter 
school laws according to the researchers discussed above. 
In practice, some state laws are more like one set of strong charter school law 
components than the others, but each state’s charter law has grown out of its individual 
state context, regulatory environment, balance of political forces, and perspectives on 
how charter schools might be implemented. Therefore, charter laws vary widely across 
states regarding the extent to which they follow model charter law guidelines (RPP 
International, 1997). 
In addition to ranking charter school legislation, important work has been done 
examining social, political, and educational values embodied in charter school laws, with 
researchers examining the tension between accountability and autonomy, for example 
(Millot, 1994). Others have provided broader, philosophical examinations of the 
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competing goals of public education (Labaree, 1997) and the public and private purposes 
of education (Levin, 2002). Scott and Barber (2002) contended this work should be 
continued, with educational researchers continuing to provide assiduous study of the 
legislative and policy conditions that shape charter schools as participants jockey for their 
values to be represented in the reform (Keller, 2001; Kemerer & Maloney, 2001; Olson, 
1994). 
 
Changes in Charter School Legislation 
 
As charter schools mature, there is conjecture about forthcoming legislation. In a 
study surveying education policy experts in 50 states, Mintrom and Vergari (1997) found 
that charter legislation is more readily considered in states with a policy entrepreneur, 
poor test scores, Republican legislative control, and proximity to other charter-law states. 
Legislative enthusiasm, gubernatorial support, interactions with national authorities, and 
use of permissive charter-law models increase the chances for adopting stronger laws. 
Seeking union support and using restrictive models presage adoption of weaker laws.  
Yet, public policies are not frequently replicated with the same rules and 
regulations (Wong & Langevin, 2007). In fact, charter school laws differ significantly in 
the details, and these details affect the extent to which charter schools are likely to 
proliferate in a given state (Hassel, 1998; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Wohlstetter et al., 
1995). 
Additionally, state charter school laws are not static. They define the parameters 
in which a state’s charter sector operates, and the marks of specific state policies are 
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visible in state charter sectors. However, state laws are not the only factor shaping a 
state’s charter sector. The political, educational, and other climate factors in a state also 
have an impact and help determine the provisions of state charter laws and how easy or 
difficult it is to change those (Mead & Rotherham, 2007). In fact, as charter school 
legislation entered into the eleventh year of existence, state legislators in several key 
states revisited their charter school laws (Scott & Barber, 2002). During the 2000-2001 
school year, policy makers in Minnesota, California, and Texas reexamined original 
charter school laws and proposed measures to readdress loopholes and, in some cases, 
abuses (Keller, 2001). 
All the states in Mead and Rotherham’s (2007) sample amended their laws 
multiple times, some modestly and some substantially. States added authorizers (CO, FL, 
MN, OH), created appeals processes (CA), clarified authorizer responsibilities (CA), and 
restricted or eliminated some authorizers (AZ, OH). They increased oversight (OH, MI), 
added reporting requirements (TX), and strengthened accountability (AZ, TX). They 
raised (NY), eliminated (CO, MN), or instituted (MI) caps on the number of charter 
schools that can open. They tweaked charter school funding formulas and created new 
funding streams for transportation and facilities (AZ, Washington DC), and they enacted 
a variety of other regulatory and technical changes. 
Taken together, these state law changes seem to point in contradictory directions: 
some states adding restrictions and requirements for charter schools, others creating more 
openings for charter schools. However, from another perspective, state charter school 
laws appear to be converging. States such as Minnesota and Colorado, which started out 
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with fairly narrow laws allowing charter schools as an experiment, have opened things up 
by raising caps and adding new authorizers. States such as Arizona, where an initially 
laissez-faire approach to chartering inevitably led to some poor quality charter schools, 
have increased oversight of both charter schools and authorizers (Mead & Rotherham, 
2007). Also, the quality of a state’s charter schools can affect the politics around them. 
“Blowups” and scandals involving low-performing or corrupt charter schools have 
strengthened the hand of charter school opponents in Michigan and Ohio, making it 
difficult to change those states’ laws to meet more of the attributes of strong legislation. 
The strong performance of the Washington, DC’s, first major class of charter schools in 
1998, on the other hand, helped build political support for charter schools among 
Washington, DC, leaders who were initially skeptical about the congressionally imposed 
reform. 
State charter school laws remain incredibly varied. Over time, however, they 
appear to be opening up opportunities for establishing charter schools by adding new 
authorizers and raising charter school caps. At the same time, they seem to be moving 
toward a greater emphasis on quality by strengthening oversight and accountability, 
defining authorizer responsibilities more clearly, creating new high-quality authorizers, 
and encouraging better authorizing. What follows is the history of Utah charter school 
legislation and its transition from initial policy to the seventh highest ranked charter 
school legislation in the nation, according to the National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools (Ziebarth et al.,  2010). 
In summary, the charter school movement started in the early 1990s when 
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Minnesota passed the first charter school law. Charter schools were an education reform 
movement intended to provide parents with choice regarding which school their child 
would attend, the authority for parents and education leaders to make site-based decisions 
for that school, the requirement that the school be accountable to its patrons, and to 
improve academic outcomes with increased school flexibility from bureaucracy. Charter 
school policy expanded into several states, but not all were strong laws opening high-
quality schools, holding schools accountable to the promises made in its charter. 
Currently, charter school laws have been passed in 41 states and the District of Columbia 
by 2011, opening 5,275 charter schools nationwide and enrolling 1.8 million students. 
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CHAPTER III 
CHARTER SCHOOLS IN UTAH 
 
Utah has 41 school districts, containing 913 schools, serving 542,853 students 
statewide. Additionally, it has 81 operational charter schools, serving 44,892 students, 
with another seven schools approved to open in 2012 (Utah State Office of Education, 
2011d). In the 2011-2012 school year, charter schools served over 7.5% of Utah’s public 
school enrollment. Of the 81 charter schools now open, the majority, about 74%, are 
along the Wasatch Front, including 28 charter schools in Salt Lake County (Salt Lake, 
Jordan, Granite, and Canyons Districts), 20 in Utah County (Alpine, Nebo, and Provo 
Districts), 7 in Davis County (Davis District), and 6 in Weber County (Weber and Ogden 
Districts). This is consistent with the 75% of the population who live in the same four 
counties.  
The larger communities along the Wasatch Front are served by ten medium to 
large-sized school districts, serving between 13,000 and 68,000 students each. These 
communities range from urban environments to affluent communities, with high-
performing schools, in the suburbs. Figure 1 shows the charter school distribution and 
percent population attending charter schools in the school districts serving the four 
counties of the Wasatch Front. 
The state also has many rural school districts serving sparsely populated areas 
throughout the state. Utah has around 14 districts that basically serve a single “feeder 
pattern” (i.e., the entire district contains one high school, one middle school, and one or 
two elementary schools; Utah State Office of Education, 2011a). Some of these small  
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Figure 1. Number of operational charter schools and percentage of students enrolled in 
charter schools along the Wasatch Front in 2011-2012. 
 
 
districts serve extremely large geographic areas as well as student populations with 
extremely high rates of persistent childhood poverty. The remaining eighteen Utah 
charter schools are scattered throughout the rest of the state.  
While charter schools serve fewer than 8% of the state’s overall public school 
students, there are districts where the market share for charter schools is much greater 
and clearly being felt. In Carbon School District and Ogden School District, for example, 
charter schools now serve approximately 15.2% and 13.5% of the districts’ public school 
enrollments, respectively. Utah district leaders have been particularly conscious of the 
growing competition from charter schools. Other Utah districts with high concentrations 
of charter students include Park City School District, with one charter schools and about 
12.2% of district public school enrollment and Nebo School District, with five charter 
schools and 11.1% of district public school enrollment.  
Racially and ethnically, Utah’s public school districts serve a predominately white 
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population. More than 77% of the students in the district are white, 15.3% are Hispanic, 
1.8% Asian, 1.4% are Black, 1.5% Pacific Islander, and 1.3% Native American (see 
Table 3). Similarly, Utah’s public charter schools serve a predominantly white 
population. More than 81% of the students in charter schools are white, 11.0% are 
Hispanic, 1.9% Asian, 1.2% are black, 1.3% Pacific Islander, and 0.5% Native American. 
Statewide, more than 63% of Utah’s families earn too much to qualify for free or reduced 
price lunches (Utah State Office of Education, 2011b).  
The differences and distances between Utah’s school districts reinforce a history 
of local control that is enshrined in the state’s constitution. Despite the structural 
weakness of the state role, Utah has been involved in many of the education reforms that 
consolidate state authority, including the creation of state standards, the implementation 
of a state-wide testing regime and related accountability structure, and the creation of 
policies that allow and facilitate public school choice, including open enrollment and 
charter schools. 
The state’s K-12 education system is governed by an elected Utah State Board of 
Education (USBE), whose members compete in nonpartisan elections. Candidates for the 
USBE, vetted through the Governor’s nominating committee, must have outstanding 
professional qualifications in areas such as business and industry administration, human 
resource management, finance, metrics and evaluation, manufacturing, retailing, natural 
resources, information technology, construction, banking, science and engineering, 
medicine and healthcare, higher education administration, applied technology education, 
public education administration and instruction, economic development, and labor. The  
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Table 3 
Enrollment Data for Utah Public Schools in 2011-2012 Using Fall Enrollment Race/ 
Ethnicity Data and Average Daily Membership Data (percentages shown) 
 
School 
African 
American 
American 
Indian Asian 
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
Pacific 
Islander 
Multi 
race White 
Students 
w/ 
disabilities 
AMES 6.2 3.3 8.5 24.8 8.9 0.2 48.1 4.1 
Alianza Academy 1.1 0.9 2.4 31.0 0.9 3.2 60.7   
Alpine District 0.7 0.5 1.0 8.7 1.3 0.7 87.1 10.3 
American Leadership 2.2 0.8 0.5 12.1 1.2 0.7 82.4 14.9 
American Preparatory 3.3 0.3 5.4 32.1 2.5 0.5 55.9 7.2 
Bear River Charter 0.0 0.6 5.0 6.1 0.6 1.1 86.7 19.5 
Beaver District 0.2 0.6 1.1 11.5 0.1 0.3 86.1 14.7 
Beehive Sci. & Tech. 1.4 0.7 5.1 6.5 1.4 0.0 84.8 12.1 
Box Elder District 0.6 0.7 0.7 9.2 0.3 0.9 87.6 10.7 
Cache District 0.6 0.4 0.6 8.2 0.5 1.1 88.6 11.5 
Canyon Rim 1.9 0.4 1.5 7.6 0.8 1.5 86.4 8.4 
Canyons District 1.3 1.1 2.6 11.8 1.2 2.5 79.6 11.0 
Carbon District 0.4 1.1 0.2 12.1 0.1 0.3 85.8 14.8 
Channing Hall 0.6 0.1 4.3 4.8 1.2 0.0 88.9 8.9 
City Academy 1.9 0.5 1.0 16.9 0.5 5.8 73.4 22.4 
CS Lewis 1.3 0.2 0.2 11.8 1.1 1.3 84.1 23.9 
Daggett District 0.0 0.6 0.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 95.9 10.6 
DaVinci Academy 1.7 0.3 0.2 7.8 0.4 1.4 88.1 17.0 
Davis District 1.5 0.5 1.6 8.5 1.1 1.3 85.5 10.3 
Dual Immersion 0.9 0.5 0.0 83.0 1.4 1.4 12.9 8.3 
Duchesne District 0.3 4.9 0.2 6.0 0.3 2.1 86.2 15.0 
Early Light 0.8 0.3 1.3 5.7 0.9 2.3 88.7 11.6 
East Hollywood 0.0 0.0 0.3 27.2 0.0 0.0 72.5 14.8 
Edith Bowen 1.4 0.3 3.7 7.8 0.7 2.0 84.1 10.2 
Emery District 0.6 0.8 0.3 8.1 0.2 0.6 89.4 16.7 
Endeavor Hall 1.0 0.0 0.3 22.1 0.3 0.3 75.9   
Entheos Academy 1.0 0.4 0.8 14.1 2.7 2.5 78.6 11.9 
Excelsior Academy 0.4 1.3 0.7 6.5 0.1 1.3 89.5 10.0 
Fast Forward 1.4 2.3 0.5 16.4 0.5 1.8 77.3 23.8 
Freedom Academy 0.2 1.5 0.2 6.5 0.1 0.1 91.4 11.7 
Garfield District 0.6 1.4 1.4 5.2 1.1 0.9 89.4 14.1 
Gateway Preparatory 0.9 0.1 2.9 21.4 2.9 0.6 71.3 11.4 
George Washington 1.1 0.4 2.4 5.1 1.6 5.3 84.0 9.2 
Good Foundations 1.0 0.0 0.7 9.9 0.0 3.9 84.5 7.2 
Grand District 0.8 6.1 1.4 14.8 0.3 0.3 76.3 11.9 
Granite District 3.0 1.6 4.3 30.8 3.8 0.4 56.2 10.8 
Guadalupe School 1.6 0.0 0.0 94.4 0.0 0.0 4.0 8.6 
Hawthorn Academy 1.1 0.1 2.3 8.6 0.7 1.8 85.2 7.7 
InTech Collegiate 0.0 0.0 8.1 16.8 0.0 0.0 75.2 9.3 
Iron District 0.5 2.7 0.4 9.3 0.5 1.9 84.7 13.7 
Itineris Early College 0.8 0.0 5.1 17.7 1.2 2.8 72.4 0.4 
(table continues)
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School 
African 
American 
American 
Indian Asian 
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
Pacific 
Islander 
Multi 
race White 
Students 
w/ 
disabilities 
John Hancock 0.0 0.0 5.9 4.3 2.1 0.5 87.2 10.7 
Jordan District 0.9 0.4 1.7 11.8 1.5 2.8 80.9 11.7 
Juab District 0.6 0.3 0.6 3.1 0.3 1.1 94.0 12.6 
Kane District 0.4 1.5 0.3 3.6 0.3 0.3 93.4 13.0 
Karl G Maeser 0.2 0.3 2.7 6.2 1.1 2.4 87.1 4.5 
Lakeview Academy 0.6 0.0 0.4 5.2 1.7 0.0 92.2 10.0 
Legacy Preparatory 0.5 0.0 1.2 4.3 2.8 3.3 87.8 8.7 
Liberty Academy 0.2 0.4 0.2 3.5 0.4 4.8 90.4 6.9 
Lincoln Academy 0.8 0.0 0.9 5.1 0.6 3.9 88.6 13.2 
Logan District 1.4 1.2 3.9 25.2 1.0 0.5 66.8 11.5 
Maria Montessori 0.0 0.0 1.4 7.3 0.4 1.4 89.4 10.1 
Merit College 0.5 0.7 0.5 10.0 0.7 1.5 86.2 14.1 
Millard District 0.2 0.9 0.6 16.2 0.4 1.0 80.7 17.3 
Moab School 0.0 5.1 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 89.7 7.1 
Monticello Academy 0.5 0.3 4.5 21.3 5.3 2.8 65.3 8.5 
Morgan District 0.4 0.2 0.2 2.4 0.5 0.6 95.7 7.6 
Mountainville 1.1 0.4 2.9 4.7 0.5 1.9 88.5 8.8 
Murray District 2.4 0.8 2.0 13.2 1.2 1.5 78.9 10.3 
Navigator Pointe 0.8 0.8 1.9 6.2 0.6 4.1 85.7 9.8 
Nebo District 0.6 0.6 0.5 10.1 0.8 1.0 86.5 13.5 
NUAMES 2.0 0.4 3.3 9.4 2.2 1.3 81.3 0.8 
Noah Webster 1.2 0.3 6.3 14.7 2.9 0.5 74.1 8.9 
North Davis 2.0 0.4 1.3 13.1 0.8 2.0 80.5 6.7 
N. Sanpete District 0.5 0.5 0.3 12.0 0.2 1.1 85.2 14.0 
North Star 1.2 0.0 0.8 2.9 0.0 0.8 94.3 9.2 
N. Summit District 0.3 0.2 0.0 12.0 0.2 1.9 85.4 10.8 
Odyssey 0.4 0.0 2.6 7.3 0.8 3.8 85.2 9.0 
Ogden District 1.5 1.0 0.8 48.2 0.5 1.1 46.8 11.5 
Ogden Preparatory 1.9 0.1 1.7 31.3 0.7 2.2 62.1 9.6 
Open Classroom 1.6 0.5 0.3 2.1 0.3 4.2 91.1 9.5 
Open High 0.6 0.0 0.3 6.1 0.3 4.0 88.7 3.9 
Oquirrh Mountain 1.4 0.1 4.4 3.4 0.3 1.7 88.7 11.3 
Paradigm High 0.7 0.0 0.4 5.5 1.1 0.5 91.8 9.1 
Park City District 0.4 0.3 1.6 18.9 0.3 2.1 76.4 7.5 
Pinnacle Canyon 0.8 0.4 0.2 11.9 0.0 0.4 86.3 32.3 
Piute District 1.9 0.0 0.0 10.1 0.6 0.0 87.4 16.6 
Providence Hall 0.9 0.0 0.6 3.5 0.6 0.1 94.3 8.7 
Provo District 1.0 1.1 2.5 26.6 2.3 1.2 65.2 13.8 
Quail Run 1.5 0.7 0.9 9.3 9.9 7.6 70.1 12.2 
Quest Academy 0.0 0.8 0.5 8.4 0.3 0.9 89.1 12.2 
Ranches Academy 0.3 0.0 0.6 7.2 0.0 5.2 86.7 12.3 
Reagan Academy 1.2 1.3 1.3 11.7 0.7 0.0 83.7 14.4 
Renaissance  0.9 0.0 3.4 6.2 0.7 1.8 87.0 7.4 
Rich District 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.2 96.5 11.2 
Rockwell High 0.3 0.3 1.3 3.9 1.2 0.3 92.6 16.0 
Salt Lake Arts 3.3 0.0 6.0 6.0 1.0 0.3 83.3 5.8 
Salt Lake Science 3.6 1.2 3.0 34.0 4.5 1.5 52.2 10.4 
(table continues) 
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School 
African 
American 
American 
Indian Asian 
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
Pacific 
Islander 
Multi 
race White 
Students 
w/ 
disabilities 
Salt Lake District 4.4 1.7 4.4 37.3 4.5 1.9 45.8 12.6 
Salt Lake SPA 3.2 0.5 0.9 4.1 1.8 1.8 87.7 6.4 
San Juan District 0.3 51.0 0.1 2.9 0.3 0.7 44.7 11.2 
Sevier District 0.5 1.6 0.4 4.7 0.4 0.0 92.4 12.3 
Soldier Hollow 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.4 2.4 92.7 11.9 
S. Sanpete District 0.8 0.6 0.3 11.3 0.7 1.0 85.4 14.4 
S. Summit District 0.3 0.0 0.1 12.3 0.0 1.6 85.6 10.2 
Spectrum Academy 0.5 0.2 0.0 3.2 0.2 2.0 93.8 84.1 
SUCCESS Academy 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.3 0.9 0.9 89.9 0.3 
Summit Academy 0.7 0.0 1.5 2.3 0.3 0.5 94.7 9.5 
Summit High 0.0 0.4 0.0 4.9 0.0 1.8 93.0 7.4 
Syracuse Arts 2.0 0.2 0.7 4.9 2.5 0.5 89.2 12.1 
Thomas Edison 0.8 0.7 2.8 12.1 1.7 0.9 80.9 7.6 
Timpanogos 0.2 0.0 3.9 9.1 0.0 1.4 85.4 11.6 
Tintic District 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 98.1 8.3 
Tooele District 1.1 1.2 0.6 11.5 1.1 1.1 83.5 11.8 
Tuacahn High 0.3 0.3 1.5 7.5 0.6 0.0 89.8 2.9 
Uintah District 0.5 7.4 0.3 6.4 0.5 1.0 83.9 10.8 
Uintah River High 0.0 94.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 8.8 
Utah Connections 1.8 0.7 2.9 6.1 1.1 6.1 81.4 26.2 
UCAS 0.5 0.5 4.1 9.0 1.5 0.5 83.8 1.3 
Utah Virtual 2.0 0.7 1.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 90.4 10.9 
Venture Academy 0.8 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 2.5 91.6 9.3 
Vista at Entrada 0.6 0.6 0.6 5.7 0.9 1.6 90.0 13.2 
Walden School 0.9 2.4 1.8 6.8 2.7 1.5 84.0 18.0 
Wasatch District 0.3 0.2 0.6 14.8 0.1 0.3 83.6 13.0 
Wasatch Peak 2.1 0.5 1.3 6.7 4.8 1.6 82.9 8.4 
Washington District 0.9 1.8 0.6 11.9 1.8 0.4 82.5 10.8 
Wayne District 0.2 0.6 0.6 2.6 0.6 1.1 94.4 11.6 
Weber District 0.9 0.6 1.2 11.5 0.6 2.2 83.0 13.5 
Weilenmann School 0.4 0.0 1.9 3.2 0.4 3.0 91.2 12.3 
Charters 1.2 0.5 1.9 11.1 1.4 1.6 82.2 10.8 
Districts 1.4 1.3 1.8 15.3 1.5 1.3 77.4 11.5 
Statewide 1.3 1.2 1.8 15.0 1.5 1.3 77.8 11.5 
 
 
nominating committee, consisting of 12 members appointed by the governor, represents 
diverse business and industry and education sectors (Election Code, 2 Utah Code Ann. § 
20A-14-104, 2011). The composition and purpose of the nominating committee remains 
a hotly contested topic among legislators and the public (Moss, Nielsen, & Stephenson, 
2011). 
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The state education agency, the Utah State Office of Education (USOE), is 
overseen by a State Superintendent of Public Instruction (superintendent) who is hired by 
the elected USBE members. Thus, neither the legislature nor the Governor exercises 
direct influence over the personalities or leadership controlling USOE.  
 
Utah Charter School Legislation 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, studies have frequently noted how states appeared to 
borrow policy ideas from one another (Gray, 2008; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Osborne, 
2000). Additionally, studies have revealed a strong tendency among adjacent states to 
adopt charter school legislation, and regional similarities in the creation of charter school 
laws were shaped by both internal attributes of states and interstate processes (Renzulli & 
Roscigno, 2005; Strang & Soule, 1998). Of the six states surrounding Utah, five adopted 
charter school legislation prior to Utah. Colorado and New Mexico both passed charter 
school legislation in 1993, Arizona in 1994, Wyoming in 1995, and Nevada in 1997. 
Idaho, along with Utah, passed charter school legislation in 1998. 
Although charter schools had not yet been introduced in Utah, Governor Michael 
Leavitt was very interested in supporting their implementation. He believed that school 
choice for parents and some competition for school districts was important. As a first 
step, he supported the state’s Centennial School initiative. Enacted into law by the 1993 
Legislature, through House Bill 100, Centennial Schools Program, the law embodied 
Governor Leavitt’s goal to move Utah’s public schools to a new level of performance. 
The program commemorated Utah’s 100th birthday, which would occur in 1996. The 
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Centennial School Law was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996, but was extended by 
the 1996 Legislature until June 30, 2000.  
The Centennial Schools program was designed to foster the following.  
1. Implementation of a strategic planning process that (a) defined performance 
goals for students and the means for evaluating those goals, (b) established strategies to 
involve business and industry with the school, (c) focused on the totality of the student 
through the involvement of other local or state agencies, (d) provided for the extensive 
involvement of parents in the development of personalized student education/occupation 
plans (SEOPs) for each student, and (e) included the basics of education as well as higher 
learning skills in new designs to improve learning. 
2. Creation and operation of a site-based, decision-making body that consisted of 
parents, teachers, classified employees, students, and administrators with delegated 
authority to make decisions about the matters that were critical to the achievement of 
school goals established by the group. The decision-making authority of each Centennial 
School was specifically outlined in the delegation document developed by the school and 
approved by the local school district, the Governor’s Office, and the State Board of 
Education. 
3. Implementation of procedures whereby the school was held accountable, 
according to the authority delegated to it through its site-based decision-making body. 
4. Integration of technology into curriculum, instruction, and student assessment. 
5. Provision of procedures for receiving waivers of those local and state rules, 
regulations, and agreements that prohibited or hindered the school from achieving its 
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performance goals.  
Over 600 Utah schools applied for Centennial School status during the first 5 
years of the program. Special committees reviewed the applications and submitted the 
names of recommended schools to the Governor’s Office and State Board of Education 
for approval. The first group of 98 Centennial Schools was named in 1993; 93 additional 
schools were added in 1994; 72 more schools were approved in 1995; 69 schools 
received Centennial School status in 1996; and 62 more in 1997. Each designated 
Centennial School received special grant funds based on its size.  
Governor Leavitt’s next step was to support House Bill 56, Modified Centennial 
Schools Program, which passed in the 1996 general legislative session. Although the 
term modified implies that they were something less than a Centennial School, in fact this 
legislation created a new program that afforded two additional flexibilities to public 
schools that participated, which included (a) exemptions from state and local board rules 
and policies when required to meet performance goals and (b) provisions for program 
funding to flow directly to the school for maximum local control. 
 As of September, 1996, 10 Utah schools were named as Modified Centennial 
Schools. “This takes our Centennial Schools program another important step forward.  It 
provides maximum local control and flexibility to schools to help students reach their 
highest level of performance” (Leavitt, 1996, as cited in Cortez, 1996). To qualify as a 
Modified Centennial School, the school had to demonstrate widespread parental and 
school staff support.  It also had to have completed or be in its third year as a Centennial 
School.  Each of the selected schools had a team of directors that consisted of an equal 
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number of school employees and parents or guardians of students attending that school.  
Directors could request and receive waivers from the state or local board of 
education for any rule or policy that prevented or inhibited the school from achieving its 
performance goals.  This allowed the school autonomy to make local decisions for the 
students, faculty, staff, and patrons of schools regarding teacher employment, student 
performance, school calendars, budgeting practices, and faculty professional 
development. 
Governor Leavitt introduced Centennial Schools at the beginning of his 
administration to increase parent involvement, local control, and student performance.  
He indicated the Modified Centennial School program would run at least three years and 
would then be evaluated to determine the success of student performance goals. The 
Governor was generally perceived by the public education community as a strong 
supporter of public education. However, he was also well known for being forward 
thinking about education, and it was not unexpected when, in 1997, he proposed the 
creation of charter schools, even though most of the public education community did not 
support them. In fact, many in Utah had already likened Modified Centennial Schools to 
watered-down charter schools, because they provided site-based decision making to the 
principal of the school, included parents on the team of directors, and provided for 
waivers from rule and policy.  
The Governor’s position created an interesting dichotomy. Because the public 
education community generally recognized the Governor as a proponent of a strong 
public education system, they did not want to oppose the Governor full force regarding 
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his charter schools proposal. But, they also did not want charter schools. He was open, 
however, to listening to the opinions from all of the stakeholders (Salisbury, 2000).  
Despite the verbalized concerns of several public education special interest groups 
(e.g., Utah School Superintendent’s Association [USSA], Utah Education Association 
[UEA], Utah School Boards Association [USBA], etc.), the Governor listed the creation 
of charter schools as one of his education priorities for the 1998 general session of the 
legislature. One of the interviewees introduced later in this chapter, a state government 
employee, did not think school districts and the public would have opposed charter 
schools had they really been a pilot project with research to support their continuation. 
She identified: 
Instead, it appeared to school districts that legislators were saying that charter 
schools were going to be in Utah whether anyone liked them or not, and that 
charter schools were going to compete for the limited resources, and that districts 
were obligated to like charter schools. A simple change in message could have 
changed the charter school movement from one of competition to one of 
partnership and innovation. People just got the wrong impression in the very 
beginning, and it has taken a long time to get over that. 
 
During the summer of 1997, the Centennial Charter Schools Task Force (task 
force) was organized by the legislature and studied the possibility of creating charter 
schools in Utah (Centennial Charter Schools Task Force, 1997). The 15-member, 
governor-appointed task force consisted of three members of the Senate, Senator David 
H. Steele (R), Co-Chair, Senator Joseph L. Hull (D), and Senator Howard A. Stephenson 
(R); five members of the House of Representatives, included Representative Brian R. 
Allen (R) Co-Chair, Representative Judy Ann Buffmire (D), Representative Brad King 
(D), Representative Evan L. Olsen (R), and Representative Bill Wright (R); one member 
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from the governor’s office, Dr. Gary Carlston, Governor’s Education Director; one 
member from the State Office of Education, Steven Laing, Associate Superintendent at 
the USOE; one certified public school teacher, Pat Rusk; one school district 
administrator, Superintendent Steven Baugh, Alpine School District; one private school 
representative, Margie Coombs; one parent of a student, Sharlene W. Hawkes; and one 
representative of the business community, William P. Moore. 
As the historical record in Utah specific to precharter school legislation 
discussions was found in the task force minutes and recordings, the researcher gained 
most information from the review of these documents. In addition to reviewing the task 
force minutes and recordings, the researcher also identified and interviewed seven 
individuals involved with initial charter school legislation. The interviewees had varied 
experiences with education and charter school legislation. Despite Utah’s growing 
diverse population, around the time of initial charter school legislation there were only 
10.8% minorities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000) and 28.8% democrats in the Utah 
legislature (Utah State Legislature, 2011a). Therefore, the limited diversity in the 
interviewees represented the state’s demographics at the time. Below is a brief summary 
of each interviewee, including his/her involvement with public education and Utah 
charter schools. Throughout this document, each will be referred to by his/her role. 
Charter school principal (Republican), white female, was a former teacher and 
current administrator. Her involvement with Utah charter schools included writing and 
submitting a charter application, participating with a local charter association, 
administering currently operational charter school, serving on the board of a chartering 
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entity, and advocating for improved charter school legislation. 
State government employee (Republican), white female, was a former teacher, 
former administrator, and current staff in a government organization. Her involvement 
with Utah charter schools included serving on the Centennial Charter Schools Task 
Force, working with staff for a chartering entity, and advocating for improved public 
education legislation. 
Charter school founder (Democrat), white male, was a former teacher and 
advocate in Utah’s not-for-profit arena. His involvement with Utah charter schools 
included working as business manager of an original charter school, participating and 
holding leadership positions with a local charter association, partnering with USOE on 
multiple trainings and projects, and developing local governing board capacity. 
Former legislator (republican), white male, was a former legislator and current 
lobbyist. His involvement with Utah charter schools included serving on the Centennial 
Charter Schools Task Force, serving on the board of a chartering entity, lobbying for 
improved charter school legislation, and developing local governing board capacity. His 
original influence to pursue charter school legislation was because of his experience as a 
parent and the lack of accessibility to leadership at the school district, as well as his lack 
of ability as a parent to influence change. This situation prompted the idea that the current 
public education model in Utah was broken and legislators needed to find a different 
model. 
District superintendent (Republican), white male, was a former teacher, former 
administrator, and current district superintendent. His involvement with Utah charter 
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schools included authorizing a former charter school, working with staff for a chartering 
entity, and advocating for improved public education legislation. 
Parent lobbyist (Republican), white female, was a parent of students in public 
education, both charter schools and district schools. Her involvement with Utah charter 
schools included writing and submitting charter application, participating and holding 
leadership positions with a local charter association, partnering with USOE on multiple 
trainings and projects, and lobbying for improved charter school legislation. 
Higher education employee (Republican), white male, was a former teacher, 
former public school administrator, former state level administrator, and current 
administrator in higher education. While at the USOE, he was involved in advising the 
USBE regarding charter school applicants and helping operating charter schools by 
providing technical support. 
As the charter school discussion progressed during the summer of 1997, minutes 
from the 10 task force meetings held between June and November, 1997, showed various 
challenges to the concept of charter schools, debated among legislators and stakeholders 
alike, such as: What entities should be granted authority to authorize and approve charter 
school applications? How many charter schools should be authorized? How would 
charter schools be funded? Should teachers be certified? What community and parental 
involvement should be required? and To whom would the charter schools be 
accountable? These questions were very challenging to resolve due to the variance of 
charter school laws that had been enacted across the nation and the diverse political views 
that existed at the time. Moreover, legislators held very divergent views, although it was 
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anticipated there would be sufficient support to enact some sort of charter school 
legislation. Public education officials were generally unsupportive or only slightly 
supportive as charter school legislation was considered. Through all the debate, Governor 
Leavitt remained committed to gaining legislative approval for charter schools. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I address the commonalities and differences 
between discussions of the legislature’s task force and individuals I interviewed 
regarding charter schools and school choice. A topical history of these discussions 
follows. 
 
Purpose of the Centennial Charter School Task Force 
 
June 19, 1997, was the inaugural meeting. The task force met and reviewed the 
legislation that created the task force and the statutory duties of the task force, which 
included reviewing existing charter school legislation and programs in other states and, if 
applicable, other countries, as well as ultimately making recommendations regarding (a) 
the establishment of charter schools within the state, either administered and staffed by 
public employees or private providers, (b) the funding method through weighted pupil 
units (i.e., no tuition), (c) the need for strong parental involvement, (d) the modification 
of open enrollment policies, including the possibility of dual enrollment for home school 
students, and (e) the creation of charter school performance standards.  
Public educators in Utah felt that school districts already offered school choice 
through the Centennial Schools and Modified Centennial Schools programs and, at the 
inaugural meeting of the task force, members of the USOE and principals of Centennial 
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Schools spoke passionately about the effectiveness of these programs already in place 
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).  
Early task force meetings began with listening to experiences and observations of 
different individuals within Utah public education regarding the Centennial Schools 
program. Ms. Pam Hallam, principal of Orem Junior High School, reported that the 
answer to a better education system was not to recreate schools but to help them become 
better. Ray Morgan, principal of Canyon Crest Elementary, stated his school was 
permitted to waive policies and procedures that stood in the way of reaching goals and 
objectives. Both administrators noted that being able to make decisions regarding what 
was best for their schools and students allowed them to achieve school goals (Centennial 
Charter School Task Force, 1997). Mary Voelker, Granite School District administrator 
and former principal of Olympus Junior High School, and Paul Sagers, principal of 
Olympus Junior High School, addressed the committee on their Centennial School 
experiences. They answered questions regarding why, as principals, they chose the 
Centennial Schools program and indicated they desired to establish a democratic system 
and greater accountability at their school. They also stated that while waivers from 
district policies were, indeed, necessary, the waiver requests were perceived as not 
politically acceptable by district leaders and boards of education (Centennial Charter 
School Task Force, 1997). 
The Utah PTA also reported parents’ frustration with the increased legislative 
efforts to innovate public schools. Ms. Paula Plant conveyed the PTA’s concern that the 
task force was promoting yet another innovation when the Centennial Schools idea had 
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not been given ample opportunity to prove itself as effective (Centennial Charter School 
Task Force, 1997). Despite the apparent lack of support for the charter school concept by 
agencies and associations that represented public education, the governor and legislators 
felt there could be more autonomy and choice in education through charter schools. 
James L. Wilson, Associate General Counsel assigned to the task force, reported 
that it was difficult for him to find a standard legislative model, as charter school 
legislation was unique to each state (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). The 
Education Commission of the States and the National Conference of State Legislatures 
paper entitled, “The Charter School Road Map” identified the common components of 
charter schools. These common components included that all states grant exclusive 
powers to charter schools, including charter schools sponsored by local districts, which 
operated independently under a non-profit corporate status. Similarities in state laws led 
to the conclusion that they were public schools that adhered to the following conditions: 
(a) charged no tuition, (b) were nonsectarian, (c) subjected to state and federal laws 
prohibiting discrimination, (d) complied with all state and federal health and safety laws, 
(e) instructed students the required minimum number of days, and (f) followed 
compulsory attendance regulations. Differences in components of state charter school 
laws included: (a) some states required charter schools to serve a specific percentage of 
at-risk students, (b) requirements found in performance agreements, (c) funding, (d) 
freedom from district and state regulations, and (e) teacher certification requirements 
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
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Chartering Entity 
 
Shortly after the task force met for the first time, the question as to what entity 
(e.g., government, public, private) should be granted authority to authorize and approve 
charter school applications surfaced as the first discussion point. Across the states and the 
District of Columbia, legislatures at that time permitted four different types of public 
entities to serve as chartering entities: (a) school districts, (b) state boards of education, 
(c) other existing public entities (e.g., cities, counties, universities), and (d) public boards 
created for the specific purpose of serving as chartering entities (Vergari, 2001). Looking 
to the surrounding states with enacted charter school legislation (i.e., CO, NM, AZ, and 
WY), the task force found that most states either legislated school districts (i.e., local 
education agencies) or state organizations (e.g., State Boards of Education or independent 
charter boards) as chartering entities.  
Each type of chartering entity presented pros and cons in terms of the growth of 
the charter school movement and the quality of charter school accountability process. 
Among the chartering entities in existence, school districts had the most direct experience 
with the actual day-to-day operation of public schools and all that this entails. This 
expertise seemed to be a real asset for a chartering entity, whether in reviewing 
applications for new schools or in the oversight of charter schools. However, school 
districts that embraced charter school reform were uncommon (Hassel & Vergari, 1999). 
Administrators of the traditional public school system frequently viewed charter schools 
as a distraction from other reform initiatives and as an unreasonable burden on school 
district budgets and personnel. 
75 
 
School districts also placed implicit or explicit conditions on charter approval that 
were unappealing to charter school applicants. Thus, charter school advocates favored 
permitting an entity other than the school district to authorize charter schools. However, 
most state boards of education are less than enthusiastic about charter schools on the 
basis of philosophical, political, and logistical reasons. Charter schools are often viewed 
with a skeptical eye by administrators and staff who have long been faithfully devoted to 
the institution of the traditional public school (Vergari, 2001). Moreover, charter schools 
placed new burdens on state departments of education, frequently without a 
commensurate increase in capacity for meeting the new obligations. In some cases, this 
was a deliberate attempt on the part of state legislatures to discourage the development of 
robust regulatory regimes for an education reform rooted in deregulation. 
Publicly funded entities have faced political pressures from the governor or state 
legislature to assume an active role in the charter school arena or a different set of 
political pressures from formal or informal partnerships with local school districts to not 
become involved with charter schools (Vergari, 2001). Finally, public boards created for 
the specific purpose of serving as chartering entities were not immune from bias. The 
Utah State Charter School Board was recognized as being decidedly sympathetic to the 
aims and interests of the charter school movement. 
Chartering entities fulfilled three key roles. First, they reviewed applications for 
new charter schools and determined whether the proposed schools were likely to be 
sound educational entities. Second, after a charter was issued, the chartering entity 
monitored the school’s performance under its charter and applicable laws and regulations. 
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The charter included provisions pertaining to matters such as governance, curriculum, 
student achievement, fiscal management, and personnel. Third, the chartering entity made 
decisions about whether and how to intervene in lagging charter schools and whether to 
terminate charters. 
Successful fulfillment of each of these roles was made more complicated by four 
features of the institutional arrangements within which chartering entities operated. First, 
many of the most significant tasks performed by chartering entities were technically 
complex. Second, chartering entities determined the appropriate balance between charter 
school autonomy and accountability. Third, chartering entities operated in a politically 
charged arena. Finally, successful implementation of an accountability system was a 
complex task that required adequate capacity not only on the part of the charter school 
being held accountable but also on the part of the chartering entity charged with oversight 
(Cohen, 1996; Elmore, Abelmann, & Fuhrman, 1996). Yet, chartering entities often 
operated under resource constraints (Hassel & Vergari, 1999). 
Although most interviewees discussed both local education agencies and state 
organizations as authorizing entities, interviewees almost singularly preferred a state 
organization as the chartering entity due to the perceived objectivity of the state to see the 
merit of school choice and the state’s willingness to listen to parents’ concerns. 
Experiences of two interviewees included statements that they attempted to work with 
their school district regarding specific instances of frustration but felt that they were not 
heard. The charter school principal went to her local school district when her son had a 
panic episode at school and no one at the school responded to his needs. She recalled: 
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When my son stood in the hallway at his school for over an hour in a state of 
panic, and no one at the school tried to help him, I decided to go to the district to 
see what could be done. The administrator I met with told me “if you people 
would stop having babies then you wouldn’t have these problems.” I knew then 
and there that I had to find an educational alternative for my son, but the only 
others available at the time were private schools and home schooling, neither of 
which was acceptable to me as a public school educator. 
 
Parent lobbyist also knew that she needed to find an alternative for her third son 
who was in an overcrowded class in an overcrowded school. When he was in the first 
grade, he wrote a Thanksgiving story about the lonely turkey and his Christmas story was 
the sad Christmas mouse. Parent lobbyist recognized that her son was not enjoying his 
school experience, even at that young age, and wanted to provide an educational 
environment for him that would make him happy, and, subsequently, flourish. 
Following the review of several other charter school legislative models, 
Representative Brian R. Allen (R) distributed to the task force some tentative charter 
school language describing three autonomy models: full autonomy model, discretionary 
autonomy model, and permitted autonomy model (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 
1997). The full autonomy model allowed the USOE to be the sole authorizer of charter 
schools. Applicants were public or private organizations, or nonprofit groups. The state-
supported weighted pupil unit and school district money flowed directly to the charter 
school. Authority was granted from the state to the school and accountability was 
directed to the USOE. The school was responsible for all aspects of management, 
including academic decisions and school operations, would contract with employees 
directly, and was required to meet additional charter-specific criteria outlined in 
legislation. 
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The discretionary autonomy model allowed the USOE or school districts to be the 
authorizers of charter schools, but required that the authorizers provide oversight and 
monitor school performance. The state-supported weighted pupil unit and school district 
money flowed directly to the charter school, and it could contract with the district for 
various services (e.g., transportation, human resources, reporting). The school was 
responsible for all aspects of management, including academic decisions and school 
operations, would contract with employees directly, and was required to meet additional 
charter-specific criteria outlined in legislation. The main difference between the full 
autonomy and discretionary autonomy models was the right and responsibility of the 
chartering entity to provide direct oversight. 
The permitted autonomy model looked similar to the Modified Centennial 
Schools program in that the school district authorized charter schools and funding flowed 
to the chartering entity for distribution to the charter school as they saw fit. The local 
school board worked with the charter school to determine the amount of authority and 
money available to the applicant. The school’s governing board oversaw various services 
at the school level (e.g., building, supplies, curriculum, auxiliary services, etc.) based on 
what the authorizer allowed. 
Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) recommended that the task force look into the 
New Zealand model, which relied on a parent council that determined how funding was 
spent (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). Research revealed that the New 
Zealand education model offered many of the same characteristics as charter schools in 
that the model included a site-based board of trustees that was elected by the parents, had 
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full responsibility for what happened at the school, and made all spending decisions 
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) moved that the task force recommend the 
discretionary autonomy model in its the proposed legislation, and that the legislation 
provided for the establishment of new charter schools and included language that 
permitted existing public schools to convert their status to charter school. The motion 
passed unanimously (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). At a subsequent task 
force meeting, Senator David H. Steele (R) proposed that “charter schools be established 
with local boards with an appeal to the State Board of Education, and charters may be 
granted by the State Board of Education.” Discussion ensued and ended with the motion 
being divided into two parts: “Charter schools may be established through local boards 
with an appeal to the State Board of Education” and “Charter schools may be sponsored 
by the State Board of Education.” The second motion caused great debate among task 
force members about the merits of requiring the State Board of Education to grant 
charters to applicants denied by their school district. Much of the discussion centered on 
restricting the number of charter schools the State Board of Education could create. A 
substitute motion was proposed by Superintendent Baugh permitting the State Board of 
Education to grant a total of ten charters to applicants appealing or referred by local 
boards. Both motions passed with Reps. Bill Wright (R) and Evan L. Olsen (R) voting 
against the first motion and Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R), Reps. Brian R. Allen 
(R), Evan L. Olsen (R), and Bill Wright (R), Dr. Carlston, and Ms. Hawkes voting 
against the second (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
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Charter School Funding 
 
Once the chartering entities were determined, the task force moved on to charter 
school funding. The task force reviewed fiscal roadblocks encountered by other states in 
the establishment and maintenance of charter schools. They also noted that the U.S. 
Department of Education’s evaluation of charter schools indicated the top three concerns 
on establishing charter schools included start-up costs, capital facilities, and 
transportation (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). Representative Brian R. 
Allen (R) challenged task force members to propose language that addressed the concerns 
expressed in the U.S. Department of Education’s evaluation while still providing a great 
amount of autonomy for charter schools in determining how funds were spent. 
As expected, funding was a topic of great debate among task force members, 
interviewees, and public educators alike. Senator David H. Steele’s (R) initial funding 
methodology proposed each charter school students received the fiscal year’s state 
weighted pupil unit and 50% of the weighted pupil unit from districts. A spirited 
discussion followed regarding the use of the local contribution to help finance students 
attending charter schools. On one hand, task force members argued that public dollars 
should not be spent on what may be conceived as private education (Centennial Charter 
School Task Force, 1997). On the other hand, Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) 
expressed concern that 50% of the local contribution was not sufficient. He argued that a 
laboratory of innovation required an infusion of funds to support its mission, which may 
be more expensive than a traditional school. The Utah School Boards Association asked 
if the proposed dollars to fund charter schools represented a legislative allocation of new 
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monies or increased competition for tax dollars now used to fund district schools 
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
The funding discussion continued over 2 months. Representative Brian R. Allen 
(R) brought five funding options to the task force for consideration. In November, 
Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) moved that applicants might apply for start-up costs in the 
form of a grant through state funding identified by the legislature but which would not be 
part of current education funding. The motion passed with Representatives Evan L. Olsen 
(R) and Bill Wright (R) voting against the motion. Subsequently, Senator Joseph L. Hull 
(D) moved that the State Superintendent of Public Instruction might allocate grants for 
start-up costs based on the size, scope, and special circumstances of the charter school 
applicants. The motion passed and Ms. Rusk and Superintendent Baugh voted against the 
motion (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
General funding of charter school students, however, was not as simple. Five 
options were considered, but only three were found in the meeting minutes. Option 1 
provided for a full weighted pupil unit (WPU) and 50% of local contributions. Concerns 
were voiced regarding Option 1, especially by Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) who 
felt the proposal’s idea to permit charter schools to receive only 50% of the local 
contribution was too little, considering the charter school’s fiscal needs at start-up, 
including facilities. He suggested that it be increased to 75% of the local contribution. 
Option 2 funded charter school students the same as district students, including funds 
received through taxes levied. Concerns voiced regarding Option 2 included the feeling 
that the overall funding for districts would be reduced, if charter school students were 
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funded as if they were in a regular program. Option 5 funded charter school students at a 
full WPU and additionally required that the school districts provide transportation for 
charter school students and offer any unused facilities to charter schools for first right of 
refusal. This caused considerable discussion around the concepts of student transportation 
and capital facilities (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
Dr. Carlston moved that the task force endorse funding options not 
disadvantageous to charter schools and yet causing no financial harm to district bonded 
indebtedness already in place. School districts should be held harmless in their debt 
service funding. Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) offered a substitute motion and the 
task force adopted the language of Option 2, with the additional language that “debt 
service and similar school district obligations be excluded.” The motion passed 
unanimously (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
Although the motion passed, there were remaining concerns regarding the details 
of charter school funding (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). Representative 
Brian R. Allen (R) recommended that an ad hoc committee be created to meet during the 
1998 legislative session to help review charter school funding and help prepare “a general 
philosophical bill and allow all entities involved in chartering to work out the details.” 
However, since the task force was able to align on the proposed legislation, this 
committee was unnecessary and was never created (B. Allen, personal communication, 
July 20, 2011). 
During 2003-2011, public schools in Utah received revenue from three main 
sources: (a) the federal government (12.4%), (b) the state government (64.9%), and (c) 
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local revenues generated by their own property tax levies (22.7%; Utah State Office of 
Education, 2011c). Despite passing legislation intended to fund charter school students 
equitably, charter schools remained unable to capture local revenues in the same way 
districts can (i.e., levy property taxes). Most federal money in Utah public schools came 
in the form of grants and No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) funds, as well as Individuals 
with Disability Education Act (IDEA) special education funding. Additionally, from 
2003 through 2011, Utah received grants from the Public Charter Schools Program 
(PCSP; 2003-2011) and State Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (2005-
2009). Under these grant programs, 83 Utah charter schools received an average of 
$157,607 with the PCSP and 66 of the same Utah charter schools received an average of 
$125,219 with the State Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (USOE Grant 
documents in charter school office). 
The PCSP was designed to increase the number of quality charter schools. Charter 
schools were eligible to receive PCSP grant monies for three years to offset start-up costs 
incurred during their first years of operations. The grant money was used to offset costs 
incurred for obtaining education materials and supplies, developing curriculum, and other 
limited operational costs. According to a study by the Utah Foundation in 2005, more 
than two-thirds of the PCSP grant money received by Utah charter schools was spent on 
property (school equipment) and supplies. New charter schools also spent some of the 
grant funds for personnel costs, professional services, and other services related to the 
opening of a new school. 
Utah charter schools were also able to receive grant monies under the State 
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Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (2005-2009). Implemented under the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act and amended by the NCLB Act of 2001, the 
Facilities Incentive Grants Program was designed to encourage states to expand facilities 
and to help share in the costs associated with charter school facilities. For states to be 
eligible to compete for grants, they were required to have a program currently in place 
and specify in state law a provision for per-pupil funding on an annual basis for charter 
school facilities. To be eligible for this grant opportunity, Utah amended its charter 
school funding law in 2004 to include language stating that at least 10% of the local 
replacement funds must be used for charter school facilities (S.B. 3; Utah State 
Legislature, 2004b). 
Several school districts looked to these grant programs as a way to fund needed 
projects under the guise of a charter school umbrella. District Superintendent, former 
superintendent of a rural Utah school district, sponsored one of the original eight charter 
schools and recalled: 
The main reason behind starting a charter school was financial. The district had 
need for an alternative high school, but didn’t have the funding to support it. As a 
charter school, however, we were eligible for federal startup money, as well as 
state startup money. That provided enough money for us to develop a charter 
school campus. The difficulty I saw, even within the district, was at the other side 
of the district - about a 35 minute drive. A lot of the students had the same need 
for an alternative school, but didn’t have the means to drive across district to 
attend, as charter schools do not receive funding for transportation. 
 
The largest portion of revenue for Utah public education was derived from state 
sources, mainly the Uniform School Fund, which was funded primarily through personal 
and corporate income taxes. Governed by the Minimum School Program Act (MSP), the 
state distributed funds to districts and charter schools using a myriad of formulas based 
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on enrollment, student characteristics, and school location. The MSP was designed in part 
to equalize funding capacity between poorer and richer districts (Minimum School 
Program Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-17a, 2011). The basic program provided support 
to all public schools for students in grades K-12. The basis for distribution of this 
program was the WPU. 
WPU, a measurement unit calculated according to program specific formulas, 
usually involved prior year average daily membership (ADM) plus growth. The 
Legislature determined the dollar value of the WPU annually during the General Session. 
How many WPUs a district or charter school generated was contingent upon various 
student characteristics. For charter schools, Kindergarten students generated 0.55 WPUs, 
students in grades 1-6 generated 0.9 WPUs, grades 7-8 generated 0.99 WPUs, and grades 
9-12 generated 1.2 WPUs (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-
513, 2011). One WPU for FY 2011 was $2,577; for FY 2012 it was valued at $2,816 
(H.B. 2; Utah State Legislature, 2011b). 
Under the MSP, every district in the state was required to levy the basic minimum 
property tax rate in order to qualify for funding from the state’s Uniform School Fund. 
The basic levy rate was applied uniformly to all districts statewide. The more revenues an 
individual district received from the levy, the less revenue that district received from the 
state. School districts were also then able to impose levies in addition to the basic rate. As 
discussed below, charter schools did not have the ability to levy taxes. 
School districts could levy 13 different property taxes. Utah charter schools did 
not have boundaries or taxing authority and so were unable to levy property taxes for 
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these programs. Until 2003, districts provided to charter schools 50% of their per-pupil 
local property tax revenue for the number of pupils enrolled in charter schools (H.B. 145; 
Utah State Legislature, 1998). In 2003, the Legislature enacted changes that allowed 
districts to retain all local revenues derived from property tax collection and created 
‘local replacement funding’ for charter schools (H.B. 3; Utah State Legislature, 2003). In 
the opinions of charter school founder and parent lobbyist, however, the formula used in 
law to calculate the amount of local replacement funding for charter school students was 
flawed as it only included a few of the 13 allowable levies, leaving charter school 
students underfunded.  
Parent lobbyist would often attend dinners and meetings with legislators that 
spouses were invited to, and as she got more into the finances of the charter schools, she 
found that “charter schools were under-funded by a thousand dollars per student as 
compared to a district student.” That frustrated her and she soon began asking her 
legislator friends “how can you justify taking a student that left a traditional school and 
chose to go to a charter school, how can you justify underfunding them to that degree” 
(Parent Lobbyist, personal communication, October 8, 2010)?  Eventually she helped 
form the Utah Association of Public Charter Schools (UAPCS), a group who’s job was to 
educate legislators on what was happening and why we needed to change the funding 
formula so that charter school students could be funded equally. 
Ensuring funding parity between charter schools and districts has been a concern 
for many legislators, educational professionals, and the charter school community since 
the inception of charter schools in Utah. A study by the Utah Foundation (2005) 
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calculated that Utah charter schools received $4,955 per pupil in ongoing funds in FY 
2004, while districts received $5,756 per pupil. This placed charter school funding at 
about 86% of traditional public schools’ funding. The study identified that the $801 per 
pupil gap in funding between charter schools and district schools was the result of three 
primary forces: (a) differences in student populations served (e.g., Title I, economically 
disadvantaged, ethnic minorities, etc.), (b) ineligibility for some funds (e.g., 
transportation funding), and (c) a local replacement funding formula which did not fully 
compensate charter schools for the lack of property tax revenues.  
According to the study, local replacement funding issues included several 
shortfalls in the formula for replacing local property tax revenues (Utah Foundation, 
2005). For example, the formula created by 2003 legislation attempted to provide state 
funds equal in per-pupil amount to the property taxes levied by districts. However, at the 
time, debt services revenue, state guarantees used to supplement local property taxes in 
districts with low property values, and capital outlay foundation funds were excluded in 
the formula. Utah Foundation calculated that had these revenues been included, it would 
have accounted for an additional $552 per charter school student. It became clear since 
that legislation passed that bond proceeds were not included in debt service fund 
revenues, state guarantees used to supplement local property taxes in districts with low 
property values might have been considered a “quasi-property tax,” and that capital 
outlay foundations funds also should have been added.  
Nevertheless, charter school advocates, parent lobbyist and charter school founder 
recognized that unless changes were made to the local replacement funding formula, 
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charter schools would be at a perpetual disadvantage financially. Since the time the local 
replacement formula originated in 2003, it changed multiple times and eventually 
included a more comprehensive list of districts levies (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 
Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-513, 2011). In FY 2012, the average local replacement funding 
rate for charter schools was $1,687 per student, an increase of $80 per student from FY 
2011, leaving only a $170 gap in funding disparity between charter school students and 
district school students (C. Bleak, personal communication, August 10, 2011). 
 
Parental Involvement in Charter Schools 
 
Another highly discussed topic of the task force was the level and type of parental 
involvement at their child’s charter school. Decades of research pointed to the numerous 
benefits of parent involvement in education for not only students but also for the parents 
involved, the school, and the wider community (Epstein, 2001; Fan & Chen, 2001; 
Jeynes, 2003, 2007). Despite the challenges in establishing a causal link between parent 
involvement and student achievement, studies utilizing large databases showed positive 
and significant effects of parent involvement on both academic and behavioral outcomes 
(Fan & Chen, 2001; Jeynes, 2003, 2007). Research also found that parent involvement 
was related to a host of student achievement indicators, including grades, attendance, 
attitudes, expectations, homework completion, and state test results (Dearing, McCartney, 
Weiss, Kreider, & Simpkins, 2004; Sheldon, 2003). 
The rise of the charter school movement was seen as an opportunity for parents to 
play a more central role in the education of their children. Charter schools were touted as 
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a setting in which the traditional barriers to involvement could be alleviated, since charter 
schools were typically small “community schools” that were schools of choice with 
missions tailored to their student populations. In 15 states, the opportunity for parent 
participation was one purpose written into the charter school law. Tennessee’s law stated, 
“The purpose of this chapter is to…afford parents substantial meaningful opportunities to 
participate in the education of their children” (Tennessee Public Charter Schools Act of 
2002, Tenn. Code Ann. §49-13-102(a)(6)) and Utah’s law said, “The purposes of charter 
schools are to…provide opportunities for greater parental involvement in management 
decisions at the school level” (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-
1a-503, 2011). In addition, parent contracts were a common approach for charter schools 
to encourage parent involvement once the school is operational (Corwin & Becker, 
1995). 
Not surprisingly, there was an underlying assumption that charter schools 
involved more parents both quantitatively and qualitatively. Theory posited that charter 
school parents, because they actively chose to send their child to a charter school, were 
more involved than parents whose children were automatically assigned to a district-run 
school (Goldring & Shapira, 1993). Due to the greater autonomy enjoyed by charter 
schools, researchers found that these schools tended to adopt stronger and more specific 
parent involvement policies than traditional public schools (Bulkley & Wohlstetter, 2004; 
Finn et al., 2000). An early study of charter schools that compared charter school parent 
involvement to that of traditional public schools in the same neighborhood reported 
greater parent involvement in charter schools (Becker, Nakagawa, & Corwin, 1997). 
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Other researchers also found that parents were more involved in charter schools and most 
importantly, they were involved in more significant ways: for example, serving on 
charter-school governing boards (Finn et al., 2000). While charter school laws varied a 
great deal across the nation, many states emphasized the role of parents in the creation as 
well as the governance of a charter school, as noted above. 
Murphy and Shiffman (2002) noted that parent involvement was the “cornerstone 
of many charter school visions” (p. 97). Despite lofty goals and good intentions, charter 
schools varied greatly in how they involved parents. A 2007 survey of charter leaders in 
three states found that parent involvement was one area in which charter school leaders 
struggled to translate intent into practice (Gross & Pochop, 2007). Becker and colleagues 
(1997) discovered that despite a greater level of involvement, charter schools did not 
necessarily take a more active role in trying to involve parents. Parent contracts were the 
only notable outreach method. The researchers also voiced concerns that parent contracts 
excluded minority and working-class parents from enrolling their children in the school, 
afraid they would be unable to fulfill the requirements of such contracts. Fuller’s (2002) 
case studies suggested that charter schools did not necessarily escape the issues that 
plagued parent involvement in traditional public schools. Issues like social class 
differences, language and culture barriers, and the intimidating role teachers presented to 
some parents who did not experience success in school themselves created obstacles for 
meaningful involvement and communication in charter schools as they did in traditional 
schools. 
At the July 2, 1997, meeting, several individuals mentioned the importance of 
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parent participation in a child’s education. Mrs. Susan Lawrence, parent, commented on 
the value of parental involvement in a child’s education. Mrs. Gayle Ruzika, president of 
the Eagle Forum in Utah, indicated that the Eagle Forum supported tax credits for 
education costs and did not support the charter school concept. She believed that parental 
involvement was the key to resolving most problems in public education. Mrs. Jana Rae 
Shaw, parent, also raised concerns of a district board not being well informed on critical 
issues and the lack of responsiveness and intimidation exhibited by board members and 
administrators towards parents (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
The task force discussed the need for more community involvement in public 
schools, the changing mind set of educators and families regarding better partnerships 
and relationships with schools, giving more flexibility and power at the school sites, 
providing necessary training for educators, and increasing accountability (Centennial 
Charter School Task Force, 1997). To this end, Senator David H. Steele (R) 
recommended that a charter school governing board should include the principal and 
equal numbers of educators of the school and interested citizens, and the governing board 
should have site-based authority to operate in lieu of the district board of education. The 
task force discussion regarding Senator David H. Steele’s (R) recommendations focused 
on charter school governance issues and concerns over gridlock and stagnation between 
parents and staff when issues come to a vote (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 
1997). 
However, there was still discussion as to who determined the type and amount of 
parental involvement. It was clear to the task force that charter schools would provide 
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opportunities for substantial parental involvement, but they found it difficult to conclude 
if parents should be allowed to participate in the development of school policies. Senator 
David H. Steele (R) felt the charter school application should describe how parents would 
be involved and participate in the school. Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) suggested 
that specific charter schools may not even require parental involvement, but this concept 
was met with disagreement by most task force members. Senator David H. Steele’s (R) 
proposal established a site-based authority and governance model that was completely 
defined by each charter applicant, with the exception of basic health and safety standards. 
Superintendent Baugh noted that the chartering entity typically accepted, rejected, or 
modified a proposal to become a charter school. Dr. Laing moved that a site-based 
governance model be completely defined by the charter applicant, except for basic 
standards of health and safety. The motion passed unanimously (Centennial Charter 
School Task Force, 1997). 
The task force also discussed whether or not parental involvement could be a 
condition of enrollment. Some members felt that it was a key component in the entire 
charter school movement and should be required, but others felt it was up to the parent to 
decide their level of involvement. Ms. Rusk moved that charter school legislation ensure 
an opportunity for parental involvement with the plan identifying and describing their 
involvement. The motion passed. Representative Brad King (D) voted against the motion 
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).  
In addition to the discussion of the importance of parental involvement by the task 
force, all interviewees also mentioned the importance of parental involvement in the 
93 
 
education of children. The charter school principal stated, “It makes all the difference in 
the world. I think one of the best things we can do to improve education is to be receptive 
to parental input and allow for more parental involvement in whatever facet each school 
wants to make available.” 
 Most Utah charter schools were started by passionate groups of parents, not for-
profit companies, which were not allowed to apply for or operate charter schools 
according to state law (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-
504(1), 2011). Following a frustrating episode with her school district, Charter School 
Principal turned to charter schools as a possible alternative in the public education arena.  
I felt that the general education population at the time was nonresponsive to 
parental input or parental needs. So, my motivation in working within public 
education was to improve the mechanism for parental input and parental 
involvement in the schools. 
 
One expectation of the 1998 legislature was increased parental involvement. 
Former Legislator was pleased at the level of parental involvement, “and the sense that 
parents have that they can actually influence school policy and direction and things that 
are happening at the school level.” He has long believed and held: 
The best way to improve education in Utah is to increase local community 
involvement, increase parental involvement, and make the parents more 
responsible for the education that is being delivered to their children, and more 
engaged in the process. I think having the parents and the community involved, 
would by very nature, increase the school’s accountability. 
 
 
Waivers from Laws and Rules 
 
By very definition, charter schools were supposed to be created through a contract 
between a chartering entity and an applicant. In theory, that contract contained several 
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waivers from state laws that mainly by-passed bureaucratic red tape and hampered the 
charter school’s ability to be innovative, as well as provided greater accountability to the 
school’s stakeholders. One of the legislatively assigned questions tackled by the task 
force centered on whether or not charter school teachers should be licensed (Centennial 
Charter School Task Force, 1997). Representative Brian R. Allen (R) stated charter 
schools needed to be part of the state’s education system, but waivers could be included 
in the legislation that would provide the flexibility that was needed for charter schools. 
The motion passed unanimously (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).  
The task force debated whether or not Utah charter schools would be waived from 
any laws or Board Administrative Rules. Some state legislators wanted charter schools to 
be free of many rules and regulations imposed on regular public schools, including the 
certification of charter school teachers and principals, but others argued that all educators 
in a public school should be appropriately licensed and endorsed for their assignments. 
Flexibility in teacher certification was the first issue discussed.  
Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) argued that there was not a need for flexibility from 
teacher certification because state law and board administrative rule already made 
provisions for some certification flexibility. Alternately, Representative Brad King (D) 
felt that employing uncertified teachers would be an acceptable consideration for charter 
schools, if they met the same standards and requirements as certified teachers. 
Representative Bill Wright (R) offered a third opinion in that he felt individuals with 
subject matter expertise should be allowed to teach. To help educate the task force 
regarding options already available, Dr. Laing, USOE Associate Superintendent, 
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summarized the four ways for a noncertified person to teach and expressed his opinion 
that, on a day-to-day basis, university prepared teachers learn instructional and 
presentation expertise that often is subtle but extremely important to student learning. 
Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) felt that an orthodox teaching methodology may not 
be essential in a charter school setting. Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) moved that each 
charter school plan allowed for flexibility in employing noncertificated personnel. The 
motion passed. Representative Brad King (D) and Ms. Pat Rusk abstained and Dr. Steven 
Laing voted against the motion (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
Senator David H. Steele (R) suggested the task force reconsider adopting 
language that would state the charter plan should allow teacher licensure flexibility. 
Superintendent Baugh proposed they begin with certification as a requirement and, then, 
provide for specific elements of flexibility. He felt for the good of the child, teachers 
should be certified. He explained that high-quality teaching would not be attained without 
some kind of certification requirement. Some committee members contended, however, 
that if charter schools are to enjoy freedom, there should be very limited stipulations on 
teacher qualifications. Others pointed out that every other professional field has 
requirements and standards, and a process is typically required through which a 
professional learns and qualifies himself or herself to be part of that profession 
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). No action was taken on this topic at this 
meeting. 
The final task force discussion at this meeting contemplated the merits of the idea 
that waivers from rules and regulations were necessary to provide flexibility to charter 
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schools so they could focus on educational results rather than process. Representative 
Brad King (D) moved that applications for waivers from “rules and regulations” were to 
be heard by the waiver granting authority. The motion passed with all present voting in 
favor (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
As of early 2011, there were four states that enacted charter school legislation that 
did not require teachers to be licensed and 20 states that required licensure, but with 
exceptions (Education Commission of the States, 2011). Utah was one of the seventeen 
states requiring charter school teachers to be licensed the same as any other teacher in 
public education. There was an entire section of Utah code dedicated to the requirements 
of educator licensing and professional practices (Educator Licensing and Professional 
Practices Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. § 53A-6, 2011). 
District Superintendent agreed that charter school teachers should be licensed. He 
stated that when working with legislators to determine which waivers charter schools 
should receive from Board Administrative Rule, he felt his role was to: 
help legislators understand why some State Board of Education rules were in 
place, such as why administrators needed to be licensed, why teachers needed to 
have licensure and background checks, why school buildings needed inspections, 
etc. and why it would hurt public education if the legislature completely did away 
with those kinds of requirements. 
 
Recruiting, paying, and retaining qualified teachers ranked high on the list of 
challenges facing charter school operators (Utah Foundation, 2005). Of the 574 teachers 
who transferred teaching assignments in Utah public schools between the 2008-2009 and 
2009-2010 school years, 7.7% (44 teachers) transferred from a charter school to a district, 
15.2% (87 teachers) transferred from a district to a charter school, and 10.1% (58 
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teachers) transferred between charter schools (Utah State Office of Education, 2010). 
With the annual charter school teacher turnover rate reported as 33.0%, there was 
concern over the ability of charter schools to attract and retain quality teachers. 
There was speculation that due to the lower pay and benefits, charter schools 
could only attract teachers with qualifications lower than those employed in districts 
(Utah Foundation, 2005). While it was possible to comment on the overall teacher 
compensation reported by charter schools, it was difficult to correlate this with the quality 
of teachers working at charter schools. Individual, highly qualified teachers may have 
been willing to sacrifice pay or benefits in exchange for working in a school that 
encouraged creativity or had adopted a curriculum they found favorable.  
State government employee also alluded to the importance of hiring quality 
teachers, but did not go as far as to say they must be licensed to be high quality, when she 
said: 
While we have shifted from education being a teaching profession to being a 
student-oriented classroom, I still think that we have a long way to go to make 
sure that every child has a great teacher, every child has every opportunity in the 
classroom to succeed, and every child has the opportunity to reach their highest 
potential. 
 
The requirement for all charter school teachers to be licensed was detrimental to 
the state when applying for CSP grants. In July 2011, Utah received feedback on a CSP 
grant application that identified a weakness in state statute regarding the requirement for 
teacher licensure stating “Utah charter schools must still hire licensed teachers. This 
requirement can handcuff flexibility for charter schools to hire the most qualified 
individual” (U.S. Department of Education, personal communication, July 21, 2011). 
98 
 
Open Enrollment 
 
Some districts provided open enrollment as an option to students to bring about 
choice options within district boundaries. District Superintendent, while a principal at a 
district laboratory school, tried to promote open enrollment within the district. “Families 
had the option between my elementary school and the one across town. It was probably 
one of the first schools that convinced the district that it wasn’t a bad thing to have open 
enrollment.” Former Legislator, however, indicated that: 
The legislature tried to expand that notion so that more kids could choose between 
schools within a school district, or schools between school districts. However, 
what was found is that changing schools within the district really wasn’t much of 
a choice because they were all so similar. And, from district to district, there 
wasn’t much difference in the culture of the schools. 
 
Charter schools were seen as the next open enrollment experiment (District 
Superintendent, personal communication, September 23, 2010). 
Senator David H. Steele’s (R) first proposal required that charter schools accepted 
all students who applied, with no admissions requirements, and, if oversubscribed, held a 
lottery to determine which students could enroll. Discussion around this issue included 
several concerns. For example, if a student applied at a charter school established to 
pursue a physical or intellectual goal beyond his capability, would the charter school be 
required to change its mission to meet the student’s needs? Representative Bill Wright 
(R) felt most parents directed their children to a charter school that emphasized the kind 
of training they desired. Discussion alluded to the idea that open enrollment and 
specialization tended to be incompatible ideas that often were overridden by 
discrimination. Representative Brad King (D) moved that charter school legislation not 
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permit discrimination expect for limitations in available space. The motion passed. 
Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) and Representative Evan L. Olsen (R) voted against 
the motion (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
During the time of the task force meetings, many special interest groups attended 
and then met and discussed their concerns regarding the direction of possible charter 
school legislation. As it appeared that the Representative Brian R. Allen (R) would move 
forward with charter school legislation in the 1998 legislative session, the Utah School 
Boards Association (USBA) and Utah School Superintendents Association (USSA) 
argued that charter schools diverted focus from the current public school system and 
weakened it. In fact, Kent Sadler, president of the USBA, presented the formal position 
of the USBA and USSA on charter schools, which suggested: (a) charter schools should 
be chartered by, governed by, and accountable to local school boards; (b) funding should 
not exceed allocations for districts; (c) charter schools should comply with all state and 
federal laws that protected the health, safety, and welfare of students, prohibited 
discrimination, and insured access to all students; (d) charter schools should demonstrate 
fiscal responsibility and accountability; (e) professional staff must be certified; (f) 
waivers from state law and Board Administrative Rule should be made available to 
charter schools and districts; and (g) student demographics should reflect the district 
schools in the same attendance area. Kent Sadler also said that both associations believed 
charter school legislation should not include provisions that allowed them to have a 
negative impact on district schools (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). 
On February 18, 1998, House Bill 145, Schools for the 21st Century, was 
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introduced by Representative Brian R. Allen (R) to the House Education Committee. The 
bill provided for 3-year schools for the 21st Century program of continuous improvement 
and the creation of up to eight charter schools. Specific requirements of charter schools 
included defining the charter process, designating the State Board of Education as the 
sponsor, providing requirements, identifying issues to be addressed in the application, 
outlining the accountability report, allowing for termination, and providing some 
exemptions and waivers.  
Considerable discussion among House Education Committee members occurred 
on February 24, 1998, requiring Representative Brian R. Allen (R) to “defend” the bill 
for two hours. At the end, it “squeaked out of Committee” by a vote of 5 yes, 4 no, and 3 
absent, resulting in a favorable committee report and a substitute bill, House Bill 145 1st 
Substitute.  The Committee Chair, Representative Lloyd W. Frandsen (R), sent the 
recommendation that House Bill 145, Schools for the 21st Century, be replaced with a 
favorable recommendation that House Bill 145 1st Substitute, Schools for the 21st 
Century, should include the allowance for charter schools to participate in the Risk 
Management Fund. 
The bill came before the House of Representatives on February 26, 1998, but was 
circled (i.e., to temporarily postpone action on a measure without removing it from its 
place on the calendar) and was not discussed by the House until the following day, 
February 27, 1998, day 40 of the 1998 General Legislative Session, where it was 
uncircled and discussion on the bill ensued. Representative Brian R. Allen (R) proposed 
the first set of amendments, including several technical changes and two substantive 
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changes. The first substantive change included adding a “protection clause for teachers,” 
who did not want to stay at a converted charter school, to allow them to receive 
preference to transfer to an open teaching position within the district, and the second 
substantive change was to provide permissive language regarding the State Board of 
Education’s decisions about requested waivers from Board Administrative Rule. The 
chair determined, on vocal vote, that House floor amendment number three passed. 
Representative Brian R. Allen (R), as the House sponsor of the bill, led the 
discussion. He indicated that the task force “agonized” over the topic of charter schools 
but came to a consensus that a very controlled, 3-year pilot study, with a limit of eight 
charter schools would be an appropriate way to see if charter schools had a place in Utah 
public education. Representative Brian R. Allen (R) also reported that the bill’s proposal 
that the State Board of Education authorize charter schools, with local governing board 
input, was a “bone of contention” with the school districts. However, he indicated that the 
larger school districts would not oppose the bill because they wanted to see how charter 
schools would work. 
Representative Brian R. Allen highlighted to House members that the State Board 
of Education would be tasked with developing rules regarding the distribution of funding 
to charter schools, which would include that the money went to the district for 
distribution to charter schools, so the district and state would know the financial status of 
charter schools. Additionally, charter school students would be required to take the same 
assessments and the school should submit the same performance reports to the state that 
are required of all public schools. Charter schools, however, would have an additional 
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report to the legislature and USOE regarding its attainment of the performance goals 
listed in its individual Charter Agreement. 
Representative Susan J. Kohen (R) proposed House floor amendment number 
four, a substantial amendment to the bill that transferred authorizer authority exclusively 
to school districts following the pilot period. In response, Representative Brian R. Allen 
(R) indicated he felt it was unwise to “presuppose outcomes” and grant exclusive 
authorizer authority to school districts. He argued that some districts won’t want to 
authorize charter schools within their boundaries, but that shouldn’t preclude parents 
from being able to have a charter school in their district. He also indicated that he had 
worked with districts throughout the summer and had given them “everything they’ve 
asked for” in regard to the bill, “save this one thing.” Representative Brian R. Allen (R) 
opposed the amendment, as did Representatives Bill Wright (R), John W. Hickman (R), 
and Lloyd W. Frandsen (R). Other Representatives, including Ronnie Bigelow (R), 
supported the amendment. The chair determined, on a vocal vote, that the amendment 
failed. 
After researching and weighing the roles and responsibilities of chartering 
entities, ultimately, the Utah legislature decided to designate the USBE as the chartering 
entity for the eight pilot charter schools. Chartering entities in Utah were responsible for 
reviewing applications from eligible applicants, seeking input from the local education 
agency in which the school will be located, and providing monitoring and oversight to 
any schools that it provided a charter (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. § 
53A-1a-501.6, 2011). 
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Representative Nathan C. Tanner (R) applauded the part of House Bill 145 1st 
Substitute that converted Centennial Schools to Schools for the 21st Century but indicated 
frustration that the part of the bill pertaining to charter schools was not a separate piece of 
legislation. To dump them together “is kind of forcing the issue, so to speak, and it’s 
really loading it so that 21st Century can carry the charter school program.” He argued 
that this bill is unconstitutional in that it removes the “general control and supervision” of 
public education from the State Board of Education.  His amendment, House floor 
amendment number five, included removing all mention of charter schools from the bill. 
Representative Brian R. Allen (R) was offended that he was being portrayed as an 
opponent of public education and as trying to circumvent the constitution and he opposed 
the amendment, as did Representatives Tammy J. Rowan (R), John E. Swallow (R), and 
Brad King (D). Representative Richard M. Siddoway proposed a substitute motion 
reducing the number of pilot charter schools to four. The substitute motion failed. No 
other Representatives spoke in support of the original amendment. The chair determined, 
on a vocal vote, that the amendment failed. 
Representative Bill Wright (R) proposed two amendments in House floor 
amendment number six, the first being that charter schools should have school 
performance “at least equal to that of similar public schools within the district in which 
the charter school is located, unless the uniqueness of the school prevents making such 
comparisons,” and the second being that charter schools could not accept any federal 
funds that would “compromise the integrity of the pilot program.” Representative Brian 
R. Allen (R) was not opposed to these amendments. The chair determined, on a vocal 
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vote, that the amendment passed, which amended the bill. 
Representative Lloyd W. Frandsen (R), House Education Committee Chair, spoke 
in favor of the bill, but wanted to make a suggestion that some of the public education 
problems could be solved in a more fundamental way, such as providing money for 
quality in-service training and classroom size reduction, rather than continuing to fund 
education reforms such as Centennial Schools, Modified Centennial Schools, Charter 
Schools, Schools for the 21st Century, and so forth. Representative Ronnie Bigelow (R) 
spoke in overall support of the bill.  
In summation, Representative Brian R. Allen (R) indicated the biggest concerns 
about House Bill 145 1st Substitute included the school districts’ concern over not being 
in control. Representative Brian R. Allen (R) asked that the legislature allow the 3-year 
pilot program, with rigorous evaluation, and, then, decide how charter schools could 
better be implemented on a broader scope, if it “actually bears the fruit I hope it bears.” 
The amended bill, House Bill 145 1st Substitute passed with a vote of 48 yes, 24 no, and 3 
absent, and House Bill 145 1st Substitute went to the Senate for consideration. 
The Senate received the bill on February 27, 1998, suspended its rules, and placed 
it on the bottom of the 2nd reading calendar, as it had generated a great deal of interest 
from the public. The bill was discussed and the Senate voted on March 2, 1998, with a 
favorable vote of 15 yes, 9 no, and 5 absent. House Bill 145 1st Substitute was forwarded 
for enrolling on March 9, 1998, and was signed into law by Governor Leavitt on March 
20, 1998, signaling a significant change in the landscape of Utah public education. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICY CHANGE AND CHARTER SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY IN UTAH 
 
House Bill 145 1st Substitute effectively challenged the monopoly of local control 
by school districts. School district monopolies had gone unchallenged by a new education 
movement since the passage of the Utah Constitution in 1895. Because private schools 
existed concurrently in Utah prior to the passage of the Utah Constitution, they were also 
perceived as an acceptable alternative to public education and were not viewed as a 
challenge to the system.  
As discussed in Chapter II, alternative options to public schools sprang up in the 
United States during the 1960s, including schools in protest against racially segregated 
schools and “open classroom” schools modeled after the British experience (Cuban, 
2004). In 1970, with the assistance of $6 million from the federal government, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, mounted an alternative education experiment and opened four 
elementary schools and one high school with different organizational designs. Following 
Minneapolis’ success, other cities and states opened specialized schools, some of which 
were called “magnet” to describe how the school worked in attracting students. However, 
by 1975, the term was being used to describe types of schools and fiscal assistance to the 
school choice movement contemplated by the federal government. By 1980 most major 
cities had systems of magnets (Colorado Parent Information and Resource Center, 2011). 
Utah, however, did not join the magnet school movement because:  
the prevailing wisdom at the time was that, with the open enrollment law, districts 
could create magnet schools if they wanted to. Since one hadn’t been created, and 
the districts seemed lukewarm on the idea when it was discussed, the legislature 
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assumed they simply didn’t want to go to the extra work to create one.  (Former 
Legislator, personal communication, December 23, 2011) 
 
Therefore, community loyalty remained with school districts. In addition, the 
topic of school choice generated opposition within both political parties among 
members who felt loyalty to school districts and were moved by arguments 
emphasizing Utah’s tradition of local control. 
House Bill 145 1st Substitute provided a means whereby an individual or groups 
of individuals, including teachers and parents of students who would attend the school, 
might establish a public school that would be subject to a performance based contract, 
called a charter. As discussed in Chapter III, this bill caused several heated debates 
among legislators and public education officials. 
Eventually it passed in the House, 48 to 24, and in the Senate, 15 to nine, despite 
Utah’s opposition from mainline education interest groups, such as the teachers union 
(UEA), schools boards (USBA), and administrators associations (USSA). Utah officially 
joined the charter school movement in 1998, the 34th state to join, led by Utah State 
Representative Brian R. Allen (R) and Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R). Immediately 
after adoption, the USBA filed a lawsuit against the Utah State Board of Education 
(USBE) challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Charter Schools Act, claiming that 
the Act violated the Utah Constitution because the constitution granted the USBE only 
general rather than specific “control and supervision” over the Utah public education 
system (Utah School Boards Association v. Utah State Board of Education, 2001). The 
“friendly lawsuit” began when USBA disagreed with the legislature that the USBE 
should hold the supervisory position over charter schools. The USBA believed that the 
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local school boards were better suited to monitor the charter schools in their districts, 
given that they use mostly local funds. 
In Utah School Boards Association v. Utah State Board of Education (2001) the 
Utah Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that it was constitutional for the 
USBE to have authority to supervise the charter school program in accordance with the 
Utah Charter Schools Act. The Utah Supreme Court held that because the charter school 
program was part of the state’s public education system, the legislature had plenary 
authority to decide whether the state or local school board had authority to supervise the 
charter school program. 
Following the legal decision regarding USBE’s authority to supervise charter 
schools, the Center for Education Reform deemed the Utah Charter Schools Act (1998) 
as relatively weak compared to charter school laws passed in other states. The law was 
considered weak because, originally, charter schools were a pilot program, limited to 
eight schools for a 3-year period, there was a single authorizer, and schools were forced 
to apply to the USBE for waivers from state rules rather than receiving some waivers 
automatically (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-511, 2011). 
Local and state education codes traditionally dictated nearly every aspect of school 
operations, everything from class size, to curriculum, to student assessment. Ideally, 
charter schools operated unconstrained by external rules and regulations (except those 
related to health, safety, and civil rights) and were free to make any or all changes to 
traditional school policy and practice that might enhance students’ performance. 
According to Wohlstetter and colleagues (1995), charter schools’ autonomy was highest 
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when schools were granted an automatic and “blanket” waiver from all local and state 
rules and regulations, freeing the schools to make all critical decisions at the school site. 
Autonomy was lowest when the law required charter schools to apply for waivers on a 
“rule-by-rule” basis, as found in Utah. 
The limitations on sponsorship, the eight school cap, and the lack of automatic 
waivers from state laws were particularly discouraging to Utah’s charter school 
advocates, but charter supporters immediately went to work developing school proposals. 
Within one year, the USBE received and considered multiple charter school applications 
from various groups around the state, which included the Ute Indian Tribe, educators 
from the University of Utah, educators within the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind, 
and others. One of the first applicant groups, consisting of Charter School Founder’s wife 
and three other professors at the University of Utah, regularly met over lunch to discuss 
what the ideal school would look like. The only problem they faced was finding a way to 
make their vision of the perfect school a reality. Charter school legislation opened that 
door and within months of the legislation passing, they, along with 15 other applicant 
groups submitted the required documents to the USBE to start charter schools (J. Schmitt, 
personal communication, August 10, 2011).  
The first approved was Jean Massieu School in Salt Lake City in September, 
1998, and the first opened was Tuacahn High School for the Performing Arts in St. 
George in the fall of 1999. Other charter schools were soon approved in rural Wasatch 
County, Ft. Duchesne, Price, and Salt Lake City. In 1999, six charter schools opened, 
serving 390 students, and by 2000 all eight allowable pilot charter schools were open, 
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serving 537 students. The charter school movement started small and former legislator 
believed that districts went along with the original bill thinking the charter school pilot 
program would be a failure and would go away after 3 years, nevertheless, he and a few 
supportive legislators envisioned a larger movement (personal communication, 
September 20, 2009). However, not many members of the general public or public 
education community were aware of the pilot program. 
Originally known as the “fat ladies in the park,” charter school principal and some 
friends, frustrated with overcrowding in schools and the school district’s newly adopted 
math curriculum, joined efforts in the summer of 2000 to see what they could do to 
change the public education system. This is when charter school principal and parent 
lobbyist learned that the state had first attempted to offer school choice through open 
enrollment, inter- and intradistrict transfers for students opting for a school other than 
their neighborhood school, and then passed legislation allowing for a charter school pilot 
program. But, by the time they learned of the charter school pilot program, all of the pilot 
charter schools had opened and the cap of eight had been reached. 
So, Parent Lobbyist went up to the (capitol) Hill and “just started asking 
questions, and asked for the cap to be removed. We worked with a handful of other 
schools to find a legislator that was willing to listen to us and try to remove the cap.” 
Although her initial goal was to lobby for legislation allowing ten additional autonomous 
charter schools statewide, there was the thought in the back of her mind, similar to 
Former Legislator, that charter schools could become a statewide movement, allowing 
more parents and more districts to become involved.  
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Charter school principal’s original expectation was to, first, extend the pilot 
program, but she too quickly realized that there was more demand for charter schools and 
her tactic changed to one of proposing a graduated growth plan to legislators. The first 
year of the charter school lobbying effort and parental demand led to four additional 
charter schools, increasing the statewide total to 12, with another set number of charter 
schools approved annually until parent demand for school choice was met (S.B. 169; 
Utah State Legislature, 2001).  
Despite the addition of four charter schools in 2001, parent groups wanted to open 
more charter schools, and they continued to lobby for legislative change. However, the 
lobbying group realized it was imperative that they prove the charter school movement 
was successful by providing legislators with parent surveys and academic data, and then, 
hopefully, they could lobby for more flexibility with things like required curriculum and 
required hours and days of instruction. The ability for the USBE to authorize 16 charter 
schools and six New Century High Schools (magnet schools focused on math, science, 
and technology) was legislated in 2002 (S.B. 138; Utah State Legislature, 2002), and in 
2003 the number of students attending charter schools grew to 3,253, a 113% increase in 
student enrollment over 2002 (Utah State Office of Education, 2011d).  
At this point the USBE was spending a significant amount of time reviewing 
applications and approving more schools. The USBE authorized the first twenty-eight 
charter schools during the period of regulated growth, but “once the cap was removed 
and more charter schools could open, it became an overwhelming task. The Board 
[USBE] found itself in a situation where it had more on its plate than it could deal with” 
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(state government employee). To this end they worked with legislators to create an 
independent charter board called the Utah State Charter School Board (SCSB). Utah 
experienced significant policy change in 2004 when the legislature established a charter 
granting authority that was independent of local school districts, called the Utah State 
Charter School Board (SCSB; H.B. 152; Utah State Legislature, 2004a). The creation of 
the SCSB expanded the power of Utah’s charter school sector in several ways, and it 
dramatically decreased the power of local school districts to block charter schools within 
their boundaries (G. Hughes, personal communication, February 22, 2011). Additionally, 
it relieved the USBE from spending all of its time on the growing demand of charter 
schools and allowed them to focus on other aspects of public education impacting both 
district and charter schools. 
The State Charter School Board originally consisted of seven individuals, 
appointed by the Governor, with expertise in finance or small business management and 
education (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-501.5, 2011). 
District Superintendent participated in recommending individuals to serve on the 
inaugural SCSB and when recommending people, he “wanted to ensure there was 
balance between charter advocates and those that would hold charter schools 
accountable.” As new appointments to the SCSB occurred over the years, debate among 
stakeholders ensued regarding the role of the SCSB (e.g., advocacy at any cost vs. 
authorizing only the most innovative and accountable applicants). Former Legislator, an 
original SCSB member, maintained that the Board’s purpose was to promote charter 
schools and that the school’s stakeholders would hold it accountable by “parents voting 
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with their feet” (personal communication, September 20, 2010). To this end, the 
legislature changed the law to require that two members of the SCSB have expertise or 
experience in developing or administering a charter school and that these individuals 
would be nominated to the Governor by “an organization that represents Utah’s charter 
schools” (S.B. 140; Utah State Legislature, 2011a). 
In 2005, following the creation of the SCSB and seven years of charter school 
operation, caps were lifted from the maximum number of schools and charter schools 
began to proliferate throughout the state (S.B. 178; Utah State Legislature, 2005). By fall 
2011, the SCSB authorized 47 new schools, in addition to taking over the oversight and 
monitoring responsibility for the existing 28 charter schools authorized by the USBE 
between 1999 and 2003, making them ultimately responsible for 75 schools, located in 21 
school districts, serving 44,892 students. The SCSB helped grow the charter school 
movement from serving slightly over 1% (1.26%) of the public school population to 
almost 8% (7.64%) over the past seven years. Figure 2 shows the number of charter 
schools opened by school year over time and the number of public school students 
attending charter schools over time. 
However, not all educators were thrilled by the number of charter schools being 
approved. District Superintendent understood the following. 
There would be a study done during the pilot period with eight charter schools 
and then their effectiveness would be reviewed and future decisions would be 
made with evidence. The legislature, however, did not stick to that original three 
year study and determine the impact of choice in public education. 
 
District Superintendent now sees charter schools as “Having created a dual 
system that the State can’t afford” and “They are not anything new or innovative, and not 
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Figure 2. Number of operational charter schools and students enrolled in charter 
schools (on October 1 of the school year indicated) as approved by chartering entities 
(i.e., Utah State Board of Education, Utah State Charter School Board, and local school 
districts). Six schools began operations in 1999 with 390 students. By 2011, 81 schools 
were in operation with a total enrollment of 44,892 students. 
 
 
 
held to higher accountability, they are just, you know, schools that just didn’t want to be 
part of a district.” 
 
Utah Legislative Changes Over Time 
 
The Utah legislature continues to modify charter school laws in almost every 
session, as do most states. State charter school amendments have expanded the number of 
permissible charter schools, eased entry of schools into becoming charter schools, 
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increased the flexibility of charter schools, and increased fiscal support. Utah’s charter 
school program exemplifies this evolution. Following is a summary of significant charter 
school policy changes in Utah since inception. 
In 1998, House Bill 145 provided a relatively weak charter school law stipulating 
that, to qualify for conversion to a charter school, a public school must show evidence of 
support from two-thirds of its parents and teachers. The law instituted a cap of eight 
charters and required that teachers in charter schools must be certified  
In 2001, Senate Bill 169 gave school districts the authority to approve new charter 
schools and allowed schools whose charters were rejected to appeal to the State Board of 
Education. The cap for state-issued charters rose to 16 for the 2002-2003 school year. 
In 2002, Senate Bill 138 allowed the USBE to sponsor up to six New Century 
High Schools (magnet charter schools focused on math, technology, and science), 
allowed local school districts to sponsor an unlimited number of conversion schools and 
start-up charter schools, as long as they enrolled no more than 4% of a district’s student 
population, and authorized the state superintendent to allocate grants for both start-up 
costs and ongoing expenses of charter schools. 
In 2004, House Bill 152 created the State Charter School Board to authorize 
charter schools subject to the approval of the State Board of Education and expanded the 
number of charter schools the board may sponsor to 24. The bill also required the State 
Charter School Board to study existing state law and administrative rules for the purpose 
of determining which ones are burdensome to charter schools. 
In 2005, Senate Bill 178 removed the cap on the number of charter schools that 
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the State Charter School Board may authorize, prohibited charter schools from being 
denied due to certain impacts on public schools, allowed a chartering entity to take 
certain actions if a charter school failed to remedy deficiencies within an established 
timeline, allowed a private management company to operate a charter school, if the 
school was terminated during a school year, and provided that rules governing licensing 
of administrative and supervisory personnel did not apply to charter schools. In addition, 
House Bill 36 exempted charter schools from certain municipal land use regulations. 
In 2006, House Bill 172 modified local land use provisions relating to charter 
schools. In 2007, House Bill 318 created the State Charter School Financing Authority to 
issue obligations under the Utah Industrial Facilities and Development Act. 
In 2009, Senate Bill 188 expanded the membership of the State Board of 
Education by including a member of the State Charter School Board as a nonvoting 
member and removed a statutory enrollment cap on charter schools. In addition, Senate 
Bill 55 allowed a board of trustees of a higher education institution to enter into an 
agreement with certain individuals or entities to establish and operate a charter school 
(subject to approval by the USBE). 
In 2011, House Bill 388 provided that a chartering entity may use certain data to 
measure the performance of a charter school and prohibited a chartering entity from 
imposing performance standards, except as permitted by statute. In addition, Senate Bill 
140 provided that of the seven members appointed by the governor to the State Charter 
School Board, three members shall be nominated by an organization that represents 
Utah’s charter schools and have expertise or experience in developing or administering a 
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charter school. 
Charter advocates in states initially passing laws often have to make a hard choice 
between accepting a relatively weak law or postponing their fight for another day. In 
Utah, a law with serious weaknesses was incrementally strengthened over time, as the 
constituency for the idea grew and made itself felt in the legislative process, as hard 
evidence of problems with certain provisions of the law emerged, and as myths and 
concerns raised earlier were dispelled (C. Bleak, personal communication, March 11, 
2011). While many of the changes were seemingly small, it made charter school 
accountability a moving target.  
As discussed in Chapter II, chartering entities sponsored charter schools and 
entered into an agreement that provided certain flexibility from rules and regulations in 
return for increased accountability found in its Charter Agreement, the terms and 
conditions for the operation of an approved charter school. Based on the increased 
number of charter schools and students attending charter schools, it appeared that Utah’s 
charter schools were successful. However, Utah’s charter school legislation passed with 
the promise that charter schools would make a difference in the state’s public education 
system. But, have they? 
 
Models of Charter Schools 
 
Researchers contended the theory of charter schools had five core components, 
four of which dealt directly with autonomy, innovation, and accountability. 
1. The adoption of a charter school law would lead to the creation of new 
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schools or the reinvention of existing ones, expanding both the variety of schools 
available and the choices offered to parents (Kolderie, 1990; Nathan, 1996a). 
2. Charter schools would have more autonomy and flexibility than traditional 
public schools through their independence from school districts, waivers from state laws 
and regulations, and parental choice (Wohlstetter et al., 1995). 
3. The interplay of autonomy and market forces would make charter schools 
more innovative and of higher quality than traditional public schools in such areas as 
instruction and curriculum, school organization and governance, and, in some cases, 
teacher qualifications and union involvement in schools (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999). 
4. Charter schools would be more accountable than traditional schools because 
they would have to meet the demands of their parent and student “consumers” and 
because they have short-term performance contracts with government agencies that 
provide public funding (Kolderie, 1990). 
5. The combination of autonomy, innovation, and accountability would lead to 
improved student achievement, high parental and student satisfaction, high teacher/ 
employee satisfaction and empowerment, positive effects on the broader system of public 
education, and positive or neutral effects on educational equity (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003). 
Charter school accountability was the legislatively assigned topic that received the 
most discussion in the 1997 task force committee meetings, as well as on the floor during 
the 1998 General Session of the Utah legislature. Once the State Charter School Board 
(SCSB) became the chartering, oversight, and monitoring entity for state-chartered 
schools in 2004, it began the process of defining its role as an authorizer and its 
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procedures for determining charter school accountability (SCSB, July 15, 2004). 
Typically, chartering entities enjoyed a good deal of discretion in defining their roles and 
each developed their own procedures for determining how to hold charter schools 
accountable and whether to terminate or renew a charter (Vergari, 2001). A number of 
studies suggested that authorizers often focused their oversight on the familiar, such as 
compliance and financial stability, rather than on performance (Bulkley, 2005; Henig, 
Moser, Holyoke, & Lacireno-Paquet, 1999; Hill et al., 2001). In a SRI International study 
(2000), chartering agencies surveyed reported that they focused on curriculum, finances, 
and assessment during the charter-granting process and on student achievement, financial 
record keeping, and compliance with federal and state regulations once schools were 
operating. So, the SCSB sought to focus on multiple aspects of accountability, including 
performance (State Charter School Board, August 11, 2011). 
Several models of accountability have been promoted as the best model to 
measure charter school performance including the free market or consumer model, 
professional accountability model, standards-based performance accountability model, 
bureaucratic accountability model, and political accountability model (Fusarelli & 
Crawford, 2001; Garn & Cobb, 2001). The assumption was that charter schools would be 
accountable to all models, which included that consumers would demand, among other 
things, high-quality education and that the accountability to all models would be mutually 
reinforcing. 
The free market model assumed good schools achieve success through freedom of 
choice by families, educators, and school operators. It assumed that competition results in 
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schools providing good instruction for students and a positive working environment for 
teachers, and that competition rewarded schools that use money efficiently (Education 
Commission of the States, 2011). Under free market accountability, schools were not 
subordinate to bureaucracies, such as the SCSB, but rather were enterprises that succeed 
or fail solely on whether they could attract families and teachers. 
The theory of market-based accountability in education focused resources on 
family-school connections instead of community-school linkages resulting in greater 
efficiencies in achieving educational goals. By pushing decision making down to families 
and allowing schools to respond independently to the variety of family interests, market 
approaches claimed to be more responsive and therefore produced greater accountability 
and public satisfaction (Education Commission of the States, 2011). 
While a pure market model argued for competition without regulation, authors of 
market-based accountability models advocated for a mix of markets and government, 
termed a regulated market (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). A regulated market put a few 
rules and barriers into effect to protect children and parents, such as ensuring equality for 
students with disabilities and monitoring the legitimacy and credibility of school 
management. The scope of regulation was broad enough to ensure the legitimacy of 
market results, but was constrained enough to allow the market to function in the 
competitive framework that was intended.  
As for state academic standards under regulated market arrangements, the 
standards served as thresholds for school licensure. Schools that failed to teach certain 
core skills effectively did not receive public funds. While all schools were required to 
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meet threshold standards, rigorous standards were set to trigger competition among 
schools. 
The professional accountability model suggested that if teachers were freed from 
the rules and regulations of the educational bureaucracy, they would function as 
professional educators, developing innovative methods of instruction and applying them 
in the classroom (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). The goal of improving student learning 
through the improvement of teaching was at the heart of a professional model of 
accountability. Such a model regulated the qualifications and performance of teachers 
and school leaders. It relied on professional and state quality-assurance mechanisms that 
worked for other professions in America, such as professional accreditation and 
meaningful state licensing (Education Commission of the States, 2011). The professional 
model also included regular peer and administrator evaluation to ensure that teachers 
engaged in appropriate professional practice. 
The professional accountability model relied on both state and the profession’s 
involvement in developing standards and assessments for teacher preparation, teacher 
licensing, and teaching performance through coalitions of educators and education 
stakeholders, including national, state, and local policymakers, and members of the 
public (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). While a professional model of accountability for 
teaching coexisted with state-level accountability mechanisms and integrated state and 
professional expectations, eventually it worked better in a system of national expectations 
for teachers (Education Commission of the States, 2011). 
Standards-based performance accountability was contingent on achievement gains 
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made by students in the classroom (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). A standards-based 
vision was enacted in federal law under the Clinton administration with the 1994 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and carried 
forward under the Bush administration with the NCLB of 2001. In a recent survey of 
policy makers, standards were acknowledged as the central framework guiding state 
education policy (Massell, 2008). If charter schools and those who operate them 
demonstrated that their students were performing and meeting standards as set forth by 
the state, then the school met the criteria for accountability. 
In a standards-based accountability system, state academic content standards 
provided descriptions of the domains that were formally endorsed by policymakers, 
educators, and the public. Standards writing committees consulted scientists, researchers, 
teachers, and others, and crafted descriptions of the content domain that served as the 
basis for curriculum and assessments. One might think that educators long ago reached 
agreement on the content of the public school curriculum, but, despite many efforts to 
codify content in the disciplines (e.g., National Research Council, National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics), state standards still varied considerably in terms of breadth, 
depth, coverage, and format (Stecher, 2010).  
The fourth model, bureaucratic accountability, referred to the accountability of 
schools to various levels of administration for student performance. Bureaucratic 
accountability was the basis for the vast majority of formal accountability systems. It was 
top down and held schools accountable to the district, state, or federal government for 
student performance on standardized tests. Rewards and sanctions served as external 
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motivators for improving student achievement. Because failure to improve test scores had 
significant consequences, these tests were often referred to as “high stakes” (Fuhrman, 
1999). In the charter school movement, bureaucratic accountability was based on the 
superior-subordinate relationship and depended upon the formal definition of the 
responsibilities of positions within an organization. The chartering entity assigned 
responsibilities to charter school governing boards where bureaucratic accountability 
dominated (Adams & Kirst, 1999).  
Political accountability in its purest form was between an elected official and the 
voters. As with professional accountability, the performances expected could be quite 
variable and hard to specify (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003). They might have also changed 
radically over time so that what the voters wanted at one point, they rejected at another. 
Political accountability facilitated the lobbying of elected officials to ensure that they 
acted on one’s preferences, and it might have included rewarding them by helping them 
get reelected. Political accountability extended to officers appointed by elected 
representatives, especially superintendents appointed by elected school boards. 
Historically, American schools have primarily used a mix of political, 
bureaucratic, and professional accountability (Hill, Lake, & Celio, 2002). The elected 
school board set policy and appointed the superintendent, who held the highest position 
in the formal bureaucracy. Still, teachers had considerable autonomy to choose 
instructional methods, even if licensure standards were rarely challenging and peer 
accountability was the exception, not the rule. 
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Charter School Accountability Framework 
 
Initially the SCSB enjoyed the same discretion in defining the performance 
measures by which an individual charter school’s accountability was determined and 
placed them in the contents of its charter agreement. Utah Administrative Rule R277-481 
defined a charter agreement as “the terms and conditions for the operation of an approved 
charter school.” Rules and procedures were specified in advance, and criteria for good 
performance were established in the charter agreement. And, according to state law, a 
charter agreement “may be modified by mutual agreement of the chartering entity and the 
governing body of the school” (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-
1a-508(4), 2011). Once the charter agreement was signed, the chartering entity then 
observed the process and evaluated both the process and the results (Newmann, King, & 
Rigdon, 1997). 
Because the SCSB desired to promote and authorize high quality charter schools 
in Utah, it began the process of creating a performance accountability framework in late 
2009 as a way to objectively measure charter school accountability. The accountability 
framework incorporated aspects of all four models described above. In creating the 
performance accountability framework, the SCSB took a two‐tiered approach in forming 
the list of metrics for charter school quality that could be considered for inclusion in a 
performance accountability framework. First, they looked nationally at what others in the 
charter school sector were doing. The SCSB hired the Center for Research and 
Educational Outcomes (CREDO) to look across the country to gather input into 
suggested metrics to be included in the performance accountability framework. 
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CREDO’s starting point for creating a list of proposed metrics was the Building Charter 
School Quality Initiative (BCSQ), a national project focused on creating common 
performance measures for quality charter schools. This project itself sought input from a 
broad set of charter school constituents, including schools, authorizers, charter school 
support organizations and funders of charter schools. In addition to the BCSQ metrics, 
CREDO gathered current performance accountability materials from state charter support 
organizations, state departments of education and authorizers in Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Florida, New Mexico and Texas. CREDO combined the metrics to create a 
consolidated list that was used as the knowledge base to survey the Utah charter school 
community. 
Second, the SCSB sought the input of the Utah charter school community. The 
survey distributed throughout the Utah charter school community focused on metrics, the 
precise computations associated with school performance, because metrics were both 
granular and specific, characteristics necessary for a successful performance 
accountability framework. Metrics were grouped by measure and there was opportunity 
under each measure for respondents to add their own suggestions. There were two 
purposes to the survey. The first was to build an understanding of the views of each of the 
stakeholders concerning a “formula” for charter school performance accountability, as 
revealed by their responses to a set of structured questions. The second was to provide an 
opportunity for engagement with the stakeholder groups at an important stage of the 
development cycle of the performance accountability framework. 
For each metric the SCSB asked participants to give their thoughts on four 
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dimensions. 
1. Do you already use this metric to monitor charter school accountability? 
2. How valuable to do you find this metric for managing charter school 
accountability? 
3. How feasible is it to track and monitor this metric? 
4. How frequently do you feel this metric should be monitored and reported 
(e.g., never, weekly, monthly, quarterly, biannually, annually)? 
Surveys were sent to all school principals and charter school governing board 
chairs for the operational Utah charter schools, as well as the SCSB, USOE Charter 
School Office staff, and the leadership of the Utah Association of Public Charter Schools. 
The survey results revealed significantly different views on the importance of key areas 
of performance (e.g., academic status, academic growth, student engagement, board 
performance, and parent and community engagement) across the groups of respondents. 
This divergence had clear implications for the feasibility and ease of creating a 
performance accountability framework that enjoyed widespread and enduring support 
(Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2011).  
According to the survey, the SCSB and the USOE Charter School Section staff 
considered academic performance to be the most important area of accountability, with 
school‐based respondents giving it less importance. The extent of the divergence between 
school principals and charter school governing board members was slight, but is 
significantly different from the SCSB and the USOE Charter School Section staff. The 
difference in perception between the SCSB and the USOE Charter School Section staff 
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was noteworthy and presented challenges as the details of the performance accountability 
framework moved towards finalization. 
During the 2011 legislative session, however, legislation passed prohibiting the 
State Charter School Board from “imposing performance standards, except as permitted 
by statute, that would limit a charter school from accomplishing the purposes of charter 
schools” (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. § 53A-1a-507, 2011). While 
the language could be interpreted as somewhat permissive, considering that the 
performance accountability framework does not limit charter schools from accomplishing 
their purpose, the Utah Association of Public Charter Schools published that the intent of 
the legislation was to “Ensure that the charter school board cannot increase regulations 
and rules on charters unless in statute” (C. Bleak, personal communication, March 11, 
2011). Alternately, the State Charter School Board would like to see legislation holding 
the charter schools to a higher standard of quality and does not see performance 
accountability as an antithesis of autonomy and innovation (T. Morgan, personal 
communication, July 14, 2011). 
 
Autonomy and Innovation 
 
Autonomy has a variety of meanings, and autonomy for charter schools varied 
considerably across states and authorizers. Autonomy meant freedom from state 
regulation, autonomy with respect to a district or authorizer, and autonomy for parents 
and students through school choice (Wohlstetter et al., 1995). Parent lobbyist thought 
parents and choice were the keys because any parent knew that each child learned in 
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different ways.  For her, that was the impetus of getting involved in charter schools. 
So I think choice in education is imperative, not every district school is a bad 
school; not every charter school is a great school. But, it is a parent’s 
responsibility to find the school that best suits, or fits, the needs of their kids and 
make an informed choice regarding where the child attends school. 
 
Half of the states with charter school laws in 2000 allowed charter schools to 
waive many state laws, rules, and regulations, and waivers were uncommon in such areas 
as fiscal requirements and student assessment policies but more common in collective 
bargaining and teacher certification (SRI International, 2000). District superintendent, 
who believed charter schools should be held accountable to high quality education in 
return for greater flexibility, said, “It was frustrating to districts that the legislature was 
spending money on charter schools in Utah without having any research behind it.” 
Drawing a lesson from the business world, many educators and policymakers, 
including those in Utah, decided that to do their best work, schools also needed the 
luxury of freedom (Dillon, 2011). Just as autonomous cultures in the business world have 
improved employee morale and increased innovation (e.g., Google), greater autonomy 
could free charter schools to try new approaches with instruction, staffing, and schedules, 
so they could respond quickly and more effectively to student needs. With expanded 
autonomy, Utah charter schools made big decisions like how to spend the budget, what 
curriculum to use, and how to hire and train teachers. In theory, those who knew students 
best were best able to direct resources and took actions on students’ behalf (Ouchi, 2003; 
Schmerler, 2002). 
Experience with charter schools showed that granting charter schools more 
flexibility yielded more innovation in management, staffing, and instruction, bringing 
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high-quality schools to neighborhoods that greatly needed them (Dillon, 2011). But 
research also showed that not all charter schools had the capacity to fill the space created 
by autonomy with actions that held them accountable to actually improving student 
learning. Unlike many Fortune 500 companies, which hired employees specifically for 
their ability to thrive on their own, and which could easily fire those who could not, 
charter schools often didn’t have the leaders, the staff, or the vision to make good 
independent decisions, and they just as often lacked the ability to build that capacity. 
Decades of research on school autonomy showed that without those tools, autonomy was 
unlikely to improve student achievement. 
One review of 77 studies on site-based management found virtually no firm, 
research based evidence of either direct or indirect effects of site-based management on 
students (Leithwood & Menzies, 1998). Researchers in England also found no evidence 
that status as an autonomous school led to higher student performance (R. Allen, 2010; 
Levacic & Hardman, 1999). And research on charter schools here in the United States 
failed to show a direct connection between autonomy and achievement (Zimmer & 
Buddin, 2005). Indeed, the uneven performance of charter schools across the country, and 
even within districts, indicated that success demands far more than just regulatory 
freedom (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2009). 
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CHAPTER V 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Since adoption of Utah charter school legislation in 1998, multiple changes 
occurred, as evidenced in the history of the Utah Code. Former Legislator stated on many 
occasions, however, the way the law is currently written and interpreted now is not how 
he intended it (personal communication, September 20, 2009). In his opinion, the law’s 
intention was to help charter schools be an innovative means of education while 
providing them with the support and resources needed to accomplish that goal. Other 
interviewees felt that Utah’s charter schools were supported, but that not many chose to 
be innovative and a few did not add positive value to the educational landscape. 
In addition to researching available evaluations of Utah’s charter school 
environment, I asked the interviewees what impact charter schools had on Utah’s public 
education system and what recommendations, if any, they had to improve the charter 
school landscape. Chapter V is an account of the interviewees’ perceptions about charter 
school impacts and legislative and policy recommendations. 
 
Charter School Impact 
 
Overall, Utah charter schools show promising achievement, and there are clearly 
numerous examples of high performing, successful charter schools. But some charter 
schools are better than others and, as in every state with a charter school law, not every 
Utah charter school is effective. Researchers argue that the effectiveness of charter 
schools depends on many factors, including different features of charter school policy, as 
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well as the local contexts in which the policies are implemented (Levin, 2002). 
 
Literature Recommendations 
 Recent literature reviews on the issue of relative effectiveness of charter schools, 
however, revealed the challenges of studying charter school effects. Of those literature 
reviews that met the standards of methodological rigor, most were longitudinal student-
level studies in a handful of states and large cities (Betts & Tang, 2008; Evergreen, 
Miron, & Urschel, 2008; Teasley, 2009). Evidence from those studies regarding the 
effectiveness of charter schools for increased student performance was mixed. That is, 
depending on the student population served, operational years, and other factors, charter 
schools had produced negative, positive, and no effect on student achievement in these 
different studies. 
National and multi-state studies provided a representative picture of charter 
schools, although they were generally limited by their study design (Center for Research 
on Educational Outcomes, 2009; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006). State-specific studies, 
however, could use consistent measures of student achievement over a number of years 
(Ni & Rorrer, 2011). The evidence of state-specific studies was important to more fully 
understand the variations of charter school effectiveness in different policy environments. 
However, only a few states provided comprehensive longitudinal student level data for 
rigorous state-wide studies. Ni and Rorrer evaluated Utah’s charter school effectiveness, 
based on longitudinal student-level data from 2004 to 2009, using (a) hierarchical linear 
growth models with matched sample and (b) student-fixed effects regression. Both 
methods yielded consistent results that charter schools on average performed slightly 
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worse as compared to traditional public schools, a result that was primarily affected by 
the low effectiveness and high student mobility of newly-established charter schools. Ni 
and Rorrer reported when charter schools gained more experience they became as 
effective as traditional public schools, and in some cases more effective than traditional 
public schools.  
Conversely, CREDO did not find that Utah charter schools became more effective 
over time. As reported to the SCSB in 2011; 
1. Overall Utah charter school performance was slightly worse in both reading 
and math compared to traditional public schools. 
2. One third of Utah charter schools outperformed traditional public schools in 
reading and math. 
3. Urban Utah charter schools performed better in both math and reading 
compared to traditional public schools. 
4. Utah charter students performed better than their peers in traditional public 
schools after the first year of enrollment. 
5. Utah charters were performing better with Hispanic students but worse with 
ELL students than traditional public schools in reading. 
CREDO found virtual control records, determined by finding matched schools 
based on demographic variables such as race/ethnicity, gender, English proficiency, 
socioeconomic status, special education status, and grade level, and compared their 
performance to Utah charter school students’ performance. In CREDO’s earlier report, 
Multiple choice: Charter school performance in 16 states, they found that 17% provide 
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superior education opportunities for their students and 37% deliver educational results 
that are significantly worse than their student would have realized had they remained in 
traditional public school (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2009). 
These two reports, Ni and Rorrer (2011) and CREDO (2011), led to two 
implications for the SCSB. First, that quality focus begins at the authorizing stage. 
Second, that the SCSB should have a plan for dealing with low-performing charters. 
Therefore, policy change is warranted to ensure both the strength of Utah’s charter school 
movement in the application and authorizing process and the monitoring and oversight 
process. 
 
Interviewee Recommendations 
All interviewees believed charter schools had an impact on Utah’s public 
education system. The extent and importance of the impact varied, but all recognized 
system wide changes. According to Charter School Founder, “charter schools create new 
models of public education that, if successful, can be adapted by districts. In fact, there 
are five districts in Utah that sponsor their own charter schools to try innovative 
instructional methods and curricula.” He viewed charter schools as laboratories of 
experimentation where quality programs producing good results could be implemented 
system wide. 
Former Legislator indicated that charter schools had definitely offered an 
alternative to parents and students that were not successful in the traditional public 
education system. He also thought, to a certain extent, charter schools “keep the 
traditional system honest.” Because the traditional system had to respond to students 
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leaving the district to go to charter schools, the districts had to self-assess and ask “why 
are people choosing the charter school over us?” His hope was the self-assessment would 
help districts improve offerings to their stakeholders. The system also kept the charter 
schools honest because “[the charters] know they must offer a high-quality program, 
which is responsive to stakeholders, as it is more convenient to go to the neighborhood 
school and they could lose the revenue if they don’t meet students’ needs.” 
State government employee’s perception of charter schools is that, in the 
beginning, charter schools were started either for the very best or the very worst reasons. 
If created for the very best reasons, such as to create a different vision or mission of 
public school, they were the “best schools in the state.” Alternately, if they were started 
for the very worst reasons, such as to settle a score or a personal vendetta, then the 
charter school really struggled. “The charter school movement has evolved over time and 
authorizers have learned that they create a thoughtful application process that gets people 
thinking about all the right reasons to start a charter school.” State government employee 
applauded the USBE and SCSB for putting those mechanisms in place, as evidenced by 
the quality applications she now sees coming forward. “Charter applicants are very strong 
people. They have a vision of what they want to accomplish. They are in it for kids.” 
Some charter schools were very effective schools, according to District 
Superintendent.  During his tenure at the USOE, he visited several charter schools and 
found some to be excellent schools. Those excellent schools helped shape public 
education in Utah. Similar to former legislator’s statement that charter schools kept the 
system honest, as a district administrator district superintendent asked himself “what is it 
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that we are not doing, what are we not providing our patrons, so that they want to reach 
out and go to another school?” He thought the self-assessment was probably the biggest 
benefit of the new charter schools. 
“I think (charter schools) have had a huge impact and I think that parents now 
know (a) that they have a voice, and (b) that they can do something with that voice, that 
there is an outlet for that voice,” says parent lobbyist. Parent lobbyist’s district, recently 
identified by the National Alliance of Public Charter Schools as “among the top ten 
nationally when it comes to the highest annual growth in the percentage of public charter 
school students,” did not respond to parents’ dislike of its newly adopted math program 
and, as a result, has nearly 9% of its student population attend charter schools (Warnock, 
2011). Also, because parent lobbyist knew the local district was watching the charter 
schools within its boundaries, it caused the charter schools to “work harder to do what’s 
best for kids.” Instead of teaching to the lowest common denominator, charter schools 
differentiated and individualized their instruction to each student who chose to attend. 
Charter School Principal, also located in the same school district as parent 
lobbyist, “thinks (charter schools) have proved the school district wrong.” Her perception 
was the district thought she would go away once they finally relented to meet with her 
and she was able to share her concerns regarding curriculum with them. Instead she 
opened the first charter school in the district. As new charter schools opened within the 
same district, the school district began to recognize that they were not meeting all of their 
stakeholder’s needs. The charter schools organized, made sure they were providing 
quality education and running quality schools, and provided accountability to their 
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stakeholders. “We weren’t afraid to open our doors and let people come in. We wanted 
the transparency. We wanted the parental involvement. We wanted the districts to come 
and look too.” 
 
Researcher Recommendations 
Today, parents’ choice of schools is largely predicted by the student racial and 
socioeconomic composition of choice schools (Holme & Richards, 2009; Schneider, 
Teske, & Marshall, 2000; Weiher & Tedin, 2002). Consequently, when choice was 
available, most parents preferred to send their child to a school where most students were 
similar to their child (Lacireno-Paquet & Brantley, 2008). While students benefited from 
attending schools with higher-achieving classmates, racially and socially isolated learning 
environments tended to negatively influence students’ opportunities for success in 
academic achievement and later in the labor market (Cobb & Glass, 2009; Ladd, 2002). 
Although the population in Utah was increasingly diverse, charter school enrollment in 
fall 2010 reflected a significantly lower portion of minority and economical 
disadvantaged students (Ni & Rorrer, 2011). 
Utah charter schools continue to expand into school districts and communities 
currently not offering school choice.  Currently, each school district in Utah has at least 
one student attending a charter school. Figure 3 shows the Utah school districts with 
more than 5.0% of its students choosing to attend a charter school. 
 
Authorizing Environment 
 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the authorizing environment is very important and 
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Figure 3. Percentage of students attending a charter school by district of residence for 
those districts with more than 5.0% of students choosing to attend a charter school in 
2011-2012. 
 
 
 
should ensure that only high-quality charter schools open and continue to operate.  I have 
focused the next section on the SCSB as the predominant charter school authorizer in 
Utah, authorizing over 90% of Utah charter schools. 
 
Literature Recommendations 
In 2007, the Utah Legislature asked for a study to be completed of charter school 
issues by the Office of the Legislative Auditor General (LAG) due to the increased 
growth and cost of charter schools (State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor 
General, 2007). Several findings and recommendations came from the study. 
1. Inconsistent data made it difficult to analyze charter school expenditures, 
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therefore the SCSB should review the guidance and training available to charter schools 
to identify ways to help ensure expenditures are reported accurately. 
2. Most charter schools appear financially viable but more oversight is 
necessary, thus the SCSB should formalize their financial oversight process by 
establishing written policies and procedures, enhance their financial monitoring to 
include regular review and follow-up of problems addressed in audited financial reports, 
and establish a protocol for actions to be taken for failure to comply with reporting or 
state requirements. 
3. Authorization process for charter schools can be enhanced, consequently the 
SCSB should improve the application process, improve the methods used to evaluate 
charter school applications, and identify critical benchmark dates that schools must meet 
during the preopening year. 
4. Charter school accountability mechanisms should be strengthened, 
subsequently the SCSB should ensure reports are submitted, make certain site visits 
occur, adopt a clear and comprehensive site visit protocol, and ensure that the 
accountability of charter schools becomes a higher priority. 
In the closing sections of the audit, the auditors found that there was a “concern 
that the dual role of facilitator and overseer are inherently conflicted” (State of Utah 
Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2007, p. 95). This statement served as a 
philosophical summary for many of the findings in the report. It was fair to say that the 
rapid growth of charter schools, as well as the new experience that such growth provided, 
were the root cause of some of the concerns noted in the audit (P. Harrington, personal 
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communication, January 11, 2007). It was important to understand that the same inherent 
conflict of facilitator and overseer was applied over and over again in daily decisions and 
policy formation to provide support, ensure accountability, and yet respect freedom for 
each entity. The SCSB worked to minimize the conflict noted above by building a 
cohesive state leadership team, having frequent and ongoing dialogue with members of 
the USOE and USBE, and providing a roadmap of expectations to the staff director. 
A follow-up LAG audit of the SCSB in 2010 determined the SCSB addressed the 
LAG findings of 2007 and effectively implemented Board-determined processes and 
policies. Recent evaluation of Utah’s authorizer environment, by National Association of 
Charter School Authorizers (NACSA), CREDO, and LAG, revealed that the SCSB’s key 
competencies included its (a) strong commitment to continuous improvement, (b) strong 
work relationship between the board and staff, characterized by trust and effective 
communication, (c) effective process for hearing complaints from charter school parents 
that respected school autonomy, and (d) clear and reasonable timelines for all stages of 
the charter application process (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2011; 
State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2010; National Association of 
Charter School Authorizers, 2011).  
 
Interviewee Recommendations 
When asked about recommended changes to current legislation, former legislator 
indicated he would put some component in law that would give charter schools more 
flexibility in getting waivers from State Board Rule. He would go so far as to “give 
(charter schools) sort of a caveat that if they asked for a waiver, they would get it, unless 
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there was a compelling reason not to give it to them,” demonstrated by specific criteria. 
Some examples of waivers requested by charter schools that were denied by the SBE 
include teaching career and technical education introductions standards and objectives 
integrated in other classes rather than as a stand-alone class, holding four extended-days 
in a school week (144 school days) rather than five days (180 days as required in Board 
Rule R277-419, Pupil Accounting), and issuing course credit based on student 
proficiency in lieu of requiring students to attend classes a set number of seat hours. 
Former Legislator thought waivers should be easily secured for requests such as such as 
single-gender schools, schools serving specific high-risk students (e.g., teen mothers), 
and eliminating some required courses (e.g., P.E., art, CTE) to make room for more target 
classes geared towards the mission of the charter school (e.g., advanced science, foreign 
languages, American history) so students could graduate with specialized knowledge or 
skills. 
Charter School Principal also advocated for more flexibility, including flexibility 
from reporting and teacher certification. In Utah, public schools have over 100 annual 
reports to submit to the USOE due to federal, legislative, and internal reporting 
requirements. She feels that all public schools should be able to determine which reports 
best capture the purpose of the school, along with the required reports for specific state 
and federal funding, and that should be all of the reports required. Additionally, although 
intended as an area for flexibility in the original charter school legislation, all teachers at 
charter schools must be licensed and endorsed for their assignments. This “dampens 
some of the innovation charter schools could have” by not allowing them to hire 
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individuals who could demonstrate the qualities necessary to be a good charter school 
teacher. Charter School Principal does not advocate that anyone can or should teach, but 
rather sometimes an individual with a specialized skill or knowledge brought something 
to the classroom. And, if the fact that they did not major in education was the only thing 
keeping them from sharing with others, it was unfortunate that this opportunity was 
missed due to a technicality. Despite the USBE’s multiple avenues for teacher licensure, 
all of the routes are costly and require additional classes or examinations, along with 
approval from USOE. 
State Government Employee thought it would be better to have the New Century 
High Schools, the six magnet charter schools focused on math, science, and technology 
authorized in 2002, to be authorized by institutions of higher education rather than local 
school boards or the SCSB due to their specific focus. Concerns, however, regarding the 
accountability of the New Century High Schools, if authorized by universities, would 
need to be addressed. 
Charter school funding parity is an ongoing issue in Utah, as indicated by Charter 
School Founder and Parent Lobbyist, but because it has been a legislative discussion for 
several years, “I think the timeframe for making any meaningful funding changes is just 
about up,” Charter School Founder stated. His solution to ensuring funding parity is for 
every Utah school district to raise money for all of their resident children, and then send 
the funding for each resident student to the school they attend, whether district or charter. 
“The devil in the detail is how would you do that, on what basis?” Arguments from 
higher education employee, who did not favor charter school founder’s solution, included 
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that (a) if school districts raise taxes for charter school students too, then it is responsible 
to ensure the funds are spent appropriately, which would disallow charter school fiscal 
autonomy, (b) since school districts have not been collecting taxes for charter school 
resident students in the past, then districts should be allowed to create a separate “charter 
school levy” so parents know that they are paying for charter school students, and (c) the 
sponsoring legislators promised the education for charter school students would cost less, 
but now charter schools want the same funding.  
Chris Bleak, Executive Director of the Utah Association of Public Charter 
Schools, indicated charter schools also had arguments regarding the way that school 
districts proposed to solve the financial problem, including (a) charter schools wanted 
autonomy from district rules and policies and did not want the district to have control of 
the charter school’s funds, (b) since charter schools received a state average of taxes 
collected for several years, to move to a district value would cause about half of the 
charter schools to receive less funds per student than before, and (c) charter schools 
wanted all allowable funds included in the formula for how the Legislature calculates the 
local replacement fund (LRF), a different formula than districts wanted (C. Bleak, 
personal communication, March 11, 2011). “Since Utah didn’t do it right from the 
beginning, [charter school funding] will be an ongoing issue that will eventually go away 
with no resolution” (personal communication, Charter School Founder, September 30, 
2010). 
Parent Lobbyist wanted to see improved legislation for charter school funding, 
including a corrected formula for determining the LRF.  
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[She] would love to see what is called backpack funding. The idea is that you look 
at the funding for students, and most kids get “X” amount of dollars. If a student 
had additional needs, such as special education or ELL, they would receive 
additional dollars in their backpack. The money for each student follows the 
student to the public school of their choice. 
 
Former Legislator agrees: 
The ability to make spending decisions at the local school level, rather than at the 
district office, would change the emphasis on how the money is spent at each 
local school.  And each school would be able to tailor their educational program 
to better fit the needs of their community. 
 
 
Researcher Recommendations 
That being said, there were several notable recommended priorities for continued 
improvement. CREDO’s report led to two implications for the SCSB. First, that quality 
focus began at the authorizing stage. Second, that the SCSB should have a plan for 
dealing with low-performing charters. Therefore, policy change was warranted to ensure 
both the strength of Utah’s charter school movement in the application and authorizing 
process and the monitoring and oversight process (Center for Research on Educational 
Outcomes, 2011). The LAG’s report stressed that financial monitoring of charter schools 
by SCSB needed to be enhanced (State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 
2010). Finally, NACSA’s report recommended the SCSB must establish clear and 
meaningful expectations for school performance, including the development of a 
performance framework with clear, measureable outcomes for academics, finance, and 
operations. Additionally the SCSB must monitor school performance in relation to the 
established performance expectations (National Association of Charter School 
Authorizers, 2011).  
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As the SCSB made efforts to develop a performance framework for Utah charter 
schools, several roadblocks threatened to stop its desire to improve charter school 
accountability in these areas. The Utah Legislature, for one, seemed uncertain as to which 
side of the argument of charter school accountability it took. For example, the LAG’s 
office issued a legislative report that recommended the SCSB define generally accepted 
standards of fiscal management and follow-up on school performance compared to those 
standards (State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2010). This report 
was accepted by the 2010 Legislature. The Legislature’s Administrative Rules Review 
Committee, however, told the SCSB that such legislative audit recommendations did not 
need to be followed and should not be followed if the standards limited, infringed, or 
prohibited a charter school’s ability to be innovative (M. Madsen, personal 
communication, December 15, 2010). Instead, the Committee recommended that the 
SCSB not set any financial, academic, or operational requirements of charter schools 
other than what is currently in statute, or the school’s charter agreement. This 
recommendation emerged in House Bill 388 (2011), which stated:  
A chartering entity may not impose performance standards, except as permitted 
by statute, that limit, infringe, or prohibit a charter school’s ability to successfully 
accomplish the purposes of charter schools as provided in Section 53A-1a-503 or 
as otherwise provided in law. (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. 
§53A-1a-507, 2011)  
 
NACSA recommended the SCSB also establish and implement a process for 
making high stakes decisions, be prepared to manage orderly school closure, revise the 
contract amendment process, and improve its ability to assess applicant capacity 
(National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2011). Each of these 
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recommendations required strong SCSB processes and procedures that addressed 
everything from the application to the charter agreement to monitoring and oversight. 
 
Monitoring and Oversight 
 
When asked what the SCSB could do to ensure charter schools were accountable, 
repeatedly Utah charter school leaders asked that they be held accountable to their charter 
agreement. To this end, Board Rule R277-481, Charter School Oversight, Monitoring 
and Appeals, passed the USBE in October 2011, which established procedures for 
oversight and monitoring of charter agreements and charter schools to encourage 
compliance with minimum standards. The rule required that the SCSB provided direct 
oversight to its authorized charter schools by requiring that they (a) complied with their 
charter agreement, (b) be accredited by the Northwest Accreditation Commission, (c) 
annually reviewed their charter agreements, (d) regularly reviewed their operations, and 
(e) audited and investigated claims of fraud or misuse of public assets or funds. 
A streamlined oversight process was the goal, and charter school leaders were 
involved in continual assessments of how to achieve that goal. The group of charter 
school leaders determined that five minimum standards were warranted in addition to the 
school’s charter agreement, which were (a) not having any unresolved findings in 
required independent audits, (b) maintaining a minimum of 30 days cash on hand, (c) not 
having violations of federal or state law or regulation, board rules or board directives, (d) 
having all teachers properly licensed and endorsed, and (e) ensuring all employees and 
board members have criminal background checks on file. A charter school that fails to 
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meet minimum standards may be placed on warning, probation, or, eventually, closed. 
 
Literature Recommendations 
Whether this is too much oversight for charter schools in Utah is a matter of 
judgment. According to the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2011), Utah’s 
charter school law does not include any of the model law’s authorizer and overall 
program accountability system, indicating that the SCSB does not provide any oversight. 
NACSA (2011) and CREDO (2011) also agree that state law should be strengthened and 
the SCSB should provide more oversight as to whether or not its charter schools meet the 
agreed upon performance measures in the charter agreement. Board Rule R277-481 is the 
first step (T. Morgan, personal communication, February 1, 2010). Most interviewees 
also agreed that changes to legislation were warranted to strengthen the support and 
quality of the charter school movement. 
 
Interviewee Recommendations 
Greater accountability is also a concern to District Superintendent, who believes 
that the 3-year pilot was never realized because the cap was lifted off the number of 
charter schools prior to a report of their success. He would want legislation holding 
charter schools more accountable to improved student achievement. “Despite the USOE’s 
effort to monitor and hold charter schools accountable, it does not happen.” A change to 
legislation is needed to give the SCSB and local school district’s greater authority to 
close underperforming charter schools. 
 
146 
 
Researcher Recommendations 
Through researching and writing this dissertation, I learned a great deal about the 
genesis of the Utah charter school movement. Specifically, I learned the reason charter 
school legislation passed in 1998 as compared to other school choice options (e.g., 
vouchers, tuition tax credits, magnet schools, etc.), I met the political actors involved in 
writing and lobbying for and against charter school legislation, and I gained a greater 
appreciation for the long and laborious process for making legislative change. As such, I 
gave some thought to important process and policy changes that could be implemented 
internally and later institutionalized in law. 
“Charter friendliness” is important, but not good enough. Utah must make deeper 
changes to truly integrate charters with other district schools. It cannot continue to be us 
versus them. Utah has gone further than most states to embrace charter schools, but 
history has proven that school districts have a knack for knocking the wind out of 
reformers’ sails (National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2011). Old habits, 
cultures, and interest group politics play a part, but much more mundane central office 
structural realities also need to be reconfigured to better support entrepreneurialism, 
equity, and autonomy. The USOE is designed for a centralized school system. The USOE 
needs to orient and challenge staff to serve both districts and charter schools effectively. 
But even with nearly 8% of its students attending charter schools, the USOE still 
treats charter schools largely as a distinct and, for the most part, separate system of 
schools. For this to change, the Superintendent and USOE need to begin to truly integrate 
charter schools with other public schools. The USOE has begun that work by inviting 
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charter schools to attend the same statewide training as school districts. Charter school 
accountability requirements have also begun to influence conversations about 
accountability for other schools but not in any significant way to date. 
Utah must update the first wave of state charter laws to allow for widespread 
access to charter schools. The Utah charter initiative demonstrates the potential impact of 
using chartering to improve all schools in a community. Most state charter laws, 
including Utah’s, were not designed to support or promote system-wide chartering; they 
were crafted as compromises among interest groups primarily to get a number of charter 
schools up and running to demonstrate their potential. Now that the potential is clear, the 
next wave of state charter laws should (a) promote systemic change by allowing 
chartering entities to charter enough schools to reach all students in need of alternatives 
to traditional district schools and (b) increase the capacity for charter schools to be 
successful with the most challenging student populations by providing equitable funding 
and access to facilities or facilities funding. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The original concept behind Utah charter schools was to provide maximum 
flexibility for improved student achievement, an education reform that epitomized the 
theory of school-based management and promised to offer quality educational 
opportunities to traditionally under-represented students. In Utah, charter school 
legislation does not provide much, if any, flexibility to its charter schools, as evidenced 
by a minimal number of waivers from state laws found in statute (The Utah Charter 
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Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-511, 2011) and the limited waivers from board 
rule approved by the USBE. Whether or not this lack of flexibility plays into Utah charter 
schools not having a significant impact on the education of its students was outside the 
scope of this dissertation, but is an area for additional research.  
Charter schools are de facto school-based management schools in that they have a 
representative decision-making body at the school. Utah charter schools are required by 
state law to have independent governing boards, constituted of volunteers, which enter 
into an agreement with a chartering entity to run a charter school (The Utah Charter 
Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-508, 2011). The governing board focuses on 
policy governance while the administration focuses on day-to-day management. For 
school-based management decisions to be sound, attention must be paid to who decides 
what. Sound decisions are best made by those who are informed about and care about the 
issues and who know the context in which the decision will be carried out. Otherwise, 
there is no guarantee that these decisions will be any better than those made by 
policymakers many steps removed. Participatory management does not mean that 
everyone decides everything. Some decisions are best left to the professionals in the 
school (David, 1995). 
Charter schools are unlikely to improve unless community members, particularly 
parents, participate meaningfully. And in secondary charter schools, students should be 
involved as well. Charter schools are also unlikely to improve unless teachers, the main 
implementers of management decisions, shape the direction of change. In general, those 
who have the strongest personal stake in and the most immediate connection to the school 
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are the ones who should tackle the issues. The challenge is to maximize the likelihood 
that decisions will be appropriately participatory, informed, and sensitive to the context. 
Unfortunately, some charter schools have turned from being school-based to relying on 
for-profit companies to make some decisions. 
In a recent conversation with parent lobbyist about a bill being considered in the 
Utah Legislature’s 2012 General Session, she said, “charter schools can no longer survive 
without management companies” (March 5, 2012). She was referring to the charter 
schools’ ongoing concern that they cannot keep up with providing both a quality 
education and successfully running a medium to large-size nonprofit corporation with the 
multitude of reporting requirements. In response to the reporting requirements, charter 
management organizations (CMOs) in Utah emerged around 2003, when there was an 
explosion of charter schools that opened, offering mainly business and human resource 
services for a fee. More recently, however, CMOs have begun hiring executive directors, 
administrative leadership, and, sometimes, teachers for charter schools, thereby creating a 
corporate environment in schools.  
Preliminary data from CREDO found that only 31% of Utah’s charter schools had 
a positive impact on student achievement in math and a 33% positive impact in reading 
when compared to student achievement in district schools (see Table 4). Alternately, 39% 
of Utah charter schools had a negative impact in math and 47% had a negative impact in 
reading, meaning that the students would have been better served in their district school. 
This means 30% of charter schools in math and 20% of charter schools in reading make 
no difference on a student’s education (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes,  
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Table 4 
Distribution of Charter School Academic Impacts 
 
Academic area Positive No Difference Negative 
Mathematics 31% 30% 39% 
Reading 33% 20% 47% 
National 17% 46% 37% 
 
 
 
2011). The national average is charter schools have a 17% positive impact, 46% no 
difference, and 37% negative impact.   
Table 4 shows the distribution of Utah charter school academic impacts in the 
areas of mathematics and reading. Overall, charter school performance is slightly worse 
in both reading and mathematics compared to district schools. One third of charter 
schools outperform district schools in reading and math but a higher percentage of charter 
schools underperform district schools in reading and math, 39% and 47%, respectively. 
CREDO found that Utah’s urban charter schools perform better in both math and 
reading compared to district schools, giving hope that, perhaps, social justice might be 
served through school choice. School choice has addressed some problems in urban Utah, 
but in doing so it has created others. Typically, school choice benefits students with the 
means to choose but works to the disadvantage of students without the means to choose. 
For instance, Utah charter schools do not receive transportation dollars so most do not 
offer transportation, thereby limiting student attendance to those that can afford to 
provide their own transportation. Fall enrollment data for 2011-2012 indicates that 
charter schools serve 29.2% economically disadvantaged compared to school districts, 
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which serve 37.7%. Additionally, charter schools only serve 9.2% disadvantaged 
minorities compared to school districts serving 15.3%. 
Based on CREDO’s preliminary data, it appears that Utah charter schools do not 
serve the purpose of improved public education. Instead, it appears that the values of the 
actors involved in charter school legislation created their own realities, shaped by their 
cultural, political, religious, and economic values, and charter schools continue to open 
and serve predominantly higher socioeconomic students. Also, it is clear that 
underperforming charter schools are not closed by their chartering entity.  
I contend that if the actors involved in writing and lobbying for legislation were 
concerned with social justice and creating opportunities for underserved students to 
receive a high-quality education, legislation would be passed that would correct funding 
inequities for charter schools so they could provide a higher-quality education, would 
hold charter schools accountable for what they said they would do, including improved 
test scores, and would use the school-choice movement as a mechanism to provide 
educational equity for all students in the state. 
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educational communities among diverse constituencies, strategic planning, and program implementation. 
Proven ability to work professionally with State Charter School Board, State Board of Education, State 
Office of Education, State Associations, and school leaders to design and implement Utah’s highly 
functioning and responsible charter school program. Respected leader with particular expertise in 
collaboration, consensus building, and resource management.  
 
Professional Experience 
 
Utah State Office of Education March 2007—present 
Salt Lake City, UT 
 
State Director for Utah Charter Schools leading charter schools to accomplish significant educational 
improvement evidenced by the increasing number of high quality charter schools, consistent school 
academic performance, and rising number of parents seeking the charter school option  
 
• Chief executive officer for the State Charter School Board promoting charter schools, training, and 
informing the Charter Board of pertinent changes and information 
• Successfully crafted and proposed legislative elements that resulted in charter school 
accountability program (U.C.A. 53A-1a-519) and processes for closing a charter school (U.C.A. 
53A-1a-510.5) 
• Effectively formulated, interpreted, and implemented policy and programs specific to charter 
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Education Specialist administering federal Charter School Program grants including determining program 
goals, setting objectives, defining measurable outcomes, and supporting the program. Applies USOE 
policies and procedures, State Charter School Board practices, and federal or state laws and regulations to 
charter school grant and subgrants.  
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• Organized charter school meetings, conferences, and workshops to provide training and technical 
assistance to charter school Governing Boards and Principals/Directors, including planning, 
coordinating, and promoting the first statewide annual charter school conference attended by over 
350 individuals 
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Principal successfully performing the role of the instructional leader in effecting school change, including 
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Provo, UT 
 
Account Executive creating, maintaining, and managing key business relationships in highly competitive 
industry. Attracted best available candidates to fill open positions by matching candidate skills and 
qualifications with job description crafted following a telephone interview with hiring company. Expertise 
using extensive industry-specific database. 
 
• Created professional business relationships with companies in the medical device industry by 
offering technical support in locating qualified job applicants 
• Performed hundreds of candidate assessments and assisted best available candidates with resume 
writing and interview skills 
 
Clark County School District August 1996 - June 2001 
Las Vegas, NV 
 
Science Teacher, Varsity Swimming and Diving Coach, Student Activities Director at Magnet School 
teaching, directing, and modeling for students the importance of education, teamwork, and leadership. 
Direct, hands-on experience with large group, small group, and individual instruction. 
 
• Improved student science scores on the TerraNova by several percent and designed in-class credit 
recovery options for struggling students which resulted in a nearly 90% pass rate 
• Created and implemented leadership curriculum for year-long leadership course which required 
research of best-practices in leadership, focus-group meetings, understandable design at the 
student level, which led to improved student council activity attendance, increased teacher 
participation, and less wasted class time 
 
 
Education 
 
• Ed.D. Curriculum and Instruction, Utah State University, Logan, UT, 2012 
• M.Ed. Educational Leadership, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, 2001 
• B.S. Biological Science, Brigham Young University-Hawaii, Laie, HI, 1996 
• A.A. Music, Brigham Young University-Hawaii, Laie, HI, 1996 
 
 
Professional Qualifications 
 
• Administrative Certification, Utah, renewed 2007 
• Teaching Certification, Utah, renewed 2007 
• Vice-President, American Association of University Women, Salt Lake City, 2007-2008 
• Member, Executive Board, Utah NAME, 2006-present 
• Member, National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2006-present 
• Member, National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2003-present  
• Member, Utah Association of Secondary School Principals, 2003-2006 
• Member, Utah Association of Public Charter Schools, 2003-2006 
• Member, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 2002-present 
• Member, Wyoming Association of Secondary School Principals, 2002-2003 
• Member, Wyoming Association of Elementary School Principals, 2002-2003 
• Chair, Fundraising Committee, American Association of University Women, 2000-2001 
• Member, National Science Teachers Association, 1996-2002 
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Awards 
 
• Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, Princeton, NJ, 1998 
• Howard Hughes Summer Science Institute Fellowship, Reno, NV, 1997 
 
 
Publications 
 
• Utah Charter School Accountability Handbook, Salt Lake City, UT, 2008 
• Utah NAME Newsletter, Salt Lake City, UT, 2006-present (biannual) 
• National Association of Public Charter Schools Conference, Albuquerque, NM, 2007, table talk 
session “Journey of a charter authorizer in developing and implementing an accountability tool” 
• Utah Institute on Special Education Law, Ogden, UT, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 workshop presenter 
• National Science Teachers Association National Convention, Orlando, FL, 1999, workshop presenter 
 
